Radically Enactive Cognition (REC) claims that basic cognition is contentless and that non-basic cognition is contentful. This thesis argues that, as REC stands now, the position’s understanding of contentful cognition is unclear. Furthermore, the thesis focuses on the unclearness of whether REC conceives of contentful cognition as dynamical or as computational as a way to evaluate whether or not REC provides a substantially different account of cognition. The thesis further argues that both options are problematic and that there are good reasons to question whether REC has succeeded in providing a substantially different account of cognition. This is because if contentful cognition is understood as computational it implies giving up on enactivism, whereas, if it is understood as dynamical, REC’s account of content risks collapsing into either computationalism (or something close to computationalism, by understanding contentful cognition as the rule-based manipulation of representational content) or eliminativism.