This study is to discuss the correlation between financial firms and non-financial firms through board linkages and the relationship between these connections and lending and borrowing behavior. Although a board linkage may provide the benefit of better information flows between the lender and borrower, a person on the board of both a bank and a borrowing firm board linkage may face a conflict of interest: the person has a fiduciary duty to both the bank and the firm and these interests may diverge. Many studies suggest that the information benefits of connections outweigh the costs of conflicts. In this way, the study is to find out what kind of firms will attract banker on the board, and the relationship between these connections and lending and borrowing behavior. The conclusions of this study are presented as the following. On firm characteristics, financial firms will choose companies with better credit risk to be the directors. In addition, on the lending and borrowing behavior, the bankers will be the directors of the companies that have longer borrowing terms. The purpose is to monitor these companies. It also can be implied that non-financial firms with banker on the board will have longer borrowing terms than the financial firms.