Corporations have the choice of expensing (using the fair value method), or non-expensing (using the intrinsic value method and provide pro forma disclosure in financial statement footnotes) of employee stock options. The current study examines how corporate governance factors affect such choices. Prior studies (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 2000) have indicated that certain corporate governance factors have an impact on corporate accounting behavior, including earnings management. Based on the assumption that expensing employee stock options is a good practice of accounting that improves earnings quality, it is hypothesized that these corporate governance factors would affect companies' option expensing decisions, in ways similar to how they affect companies' other earnings management choices.A series of hypotheses relating to specific corporate governance factors are developed. These corporate governance factors include: Board independence (percentage of independent directors on the board, CEO/board chairman split, and tenure of independent directors), board expertise (governance expertise and financial expertise), board diligence, board ownership, board size, CEO tenure, and internal blockholders (cumulative ownership percentage of internal blockholders, and whether the largest blockholder is the CEO). A sample of firms that elected to expense employee stock options up to early September 2003 is identified from the report of Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (2003), and a control sample of non-expensing firms is selected based on certain matching principles. The final sample consists of 235 expensing firms and 235 matched control firms, 470 firms in total.A logit regression is conducted. The dependent variable is companies' decisions on whether or not to expense employee stock options. The independent variables are corporate governance factors and control variables. Regression results indicate that the following corporate governance factors have statistically significant impact on option expensing decisions in the directions predicted: finance expertise, board diligence, and whether the CEO is the largest blockholder. Regression results indicate a statistically significant impact on option expensing decisions, which is in the opposite direction than predicted, for the cumulative ownership percentage of internal blockholders. The impacts of all other corporate governance factors are statistically insignificant.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-02T21:42:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renato Capa.pdf: 2822964 bytes, checksum: 9f2246d51556a8c6fc6872b40ebdd02c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-13 / The main objective of this study is to analyze the determinants of the composition the board of directors in small and medium private owned publicly traded companies in the region of ABC paulista. The study is motivated by the reason that in Brazil there is little or no studies approaching this subject and the studies presented abroad on analyzing the size board, the types of directories, the financial performance, the independence, etc., of the companies and none of them had its focus in composition the board of directors in small and medium private owned publicly traded companies. In the light of above, the current research is scheduled to try to find out an answer to the following questions: What factors were determinant to establish the composition of the board of directors in small medium private owned publicly traded companies of the region of ABC paulista? From this problem statement we established to the following hypotheses: If the power and the influence of CEO/Chairman of the board in companies of small and medium size is high, there will be possibilities to have external advisers; Should there be clear segregation of function between the CEO and the Chairman of the board and if the CEO would be interested to preserve his act and mandate then there will be a possibility to have internal advisers; Should there be interest in the efficiency, performance of the company, then there will be a possibility to have external advisers; Should the company be in the circle of expansion and maturity, then there will be a possibility to adopt and to have external advisers.(AU) / O principal objetivo deste estudo é analisar os determinantes de composição de Conselho de Administração em pequenas e médias empresas de sociedade anônima de capital fechado da região do ABC paulista. A razão de iniciar este trabalho, surgiu devido à constatação de que no Brasil existem poucos artigos e dissertações que tratam de composição de Conselho e os elaborados no exterior se centralizaram na composição em termos de tamanho e tipos de diretores, de desempenho financeiro, de independência etc., mas nenhum deles focou nas determinantes de composição de pequena e média empresa. Portanto, baseando-se nas observações acima, se efetuou pesquisa de campo para responder à seguinte problemática Que determinante(s) estabelece(m) a composição de Conselho de Administração de Pequenas e Médias Empresas de Sociedade Anônima de Empresas da Região do ABC paulista? Partindo dessa problemática, se estabeleceu as seguintes hipóteses: se o poder e a influência do CEO/Presidente do Conselho em empresas de pequeno e médio porte são grandes, então existem baixas possibilidades de ter Conselheiros Externos; se houver segregação de cargos entre o CEO e o Presidente do Conselho e o CEO estiver interessado em preservar a sua atuação, então há probabilidade de escolher Conselheiros Internos; se houver segregação de cargos entre o CEO e o Presidente do Conselho e o CEO estiver interessado na eficiência, orientação e na necessidade de recursos externos, então há probabilidade de escolher Conselheiros Externos; se a empresa está no Ciclo de Vida Expansão e Maturidade- , então há possibilidades de adotarem Conselheiros Externos.(AU)