In the evolving global economy, boardroom governance has forged an increasing influence on what transpires in corporations today. Within the boardroom, expectations of board directors and executive management (key actors) have shifted dramatically due to the financial failures (i.e., Enron and WorldCom, etc.) and the ensuing global financial crisis in the 2000s. The belief is that these directors and managers contributed greatly to these crises (Boerner, 2011). Consequently, there is a growing appeal to study boardroom governance and the roles of board directors and executive managers, not from a structural description, but rather from a behavioral perspective. In the literature, corporate governance structural framework is well informed while the behavioral framework is lacking. Often referred to as a black box, board behavior is not well understood because board processes are not easily observed nor are researchers readily invited to do so (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). There is therefore a clear call for studies to examine the black box of boardroom governance (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; Lockhart, 2010; Huse et al, 2011). Recognizing this demand, an examination of the beliefs and values of the board directors and executive managers in their boardroom culture, was undertaken as the starting point to open the black box of boardroom governance.

In the evolving global economy, boardroom governance has forged an increasing influence on what transpires in corporations today. Within the boardroom, expectations of board directors and executive management (key actors) have shifted dramatically due to the financial failures (i.e., Enron and WorldCom, etc.) and the ensuing global financial crisis in the 2000s. The belief is that these directors and managers contributed greatly to these crises (Boerner, 2011). Consequently, there is a growing appeal to study boardroom governance and the roles of board directors and executive managers, not from a structural description, but rather from a behavioral perspective. In the literature, corporate governance structural framework is well informed while the behavioral framework is lacking. Often referred to as a black box, board behavior is not well understood because board processes are not easily observed nor are researchers readily invited to do so (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). There is therefore a clear call for studies to examine the black box of boardroom governance (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; Lockhart, 2010; Huse et al, 2011). Recognizing this demand, an examination of the beliefs and values of the board directors and executive managers in their boardroom culture, was undertaken as the starting point to open the black box of boardroom governance.

After the financial crisis and several corporate scandals, efforts to improve the quality of corporate governance have been made but extended regulatory actions can be seen as insufficient as issues still arise. According to several scholars and practitioners one way for boards to become more efficient is by increasing their involvement in strategy. However, there are discrepancies in what the boards are expected to do and what they are capable of doing. By researching what the barriers are for boards’ active involvement in strategy, the purpose of this paper is to fill, or at least partly explain, this empirical gap. Palepu (2012) has identified four potential barriers for boards’ strategic involvement; the role of the board, external pressures, access to information and boardroom dynamics. Based on Palepu’s framework 17 board members were interviewed with the aim to explore underlying issues and problems preventing strategic work in the boardroom. The results of this study show that the potential barriers for strategic involvement have two different effects on strategy. The role of the board, as well as the external pressure affect the amount of time spent on strategy in the boardroom. The boardroom dynamics and the access to information on the other hand have an impact on the quality of the strategic discussions. These four factors may then limit boards’ involvement in strategic questions if not handled correctly. Two main areas that have shown to be of utmost importance in improving the strategy engagement and the board work in full are increasing the level of engagement of the individual director and having more diversified boards in large. Diversification and higher levels of engagement are thereby two key factors which should be prioritized in order to ensure a sustainable development of corporate governance with more efficient boards actively involved in strategy.