This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001. Japans prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan. Although it is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been. The inference is that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led to the sustained recession in Japan. Numerous proposals have been offered and some implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 1990s. Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures. Many Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their own system of control. As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate governance is examined in this study. Using a different econometric approach from that of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations. The purpose of this empirical framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, governance and performance variables. Results show that: (1) there exists a significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance. (3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed. (4) President turnover, whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance. Overall, results support that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firms performance and the 2SLS model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.

This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001. Japans prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan. Although it is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been. The inference is that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led to the sustained recession in Japan. Numerous proposals have been offered and some implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 1990s. Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures. Many Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their own system of control. As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline. <p>The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate governance is examined in this study. Using a different econometric approach from that of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations. The purpose of this empirical framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, governance and performance variables. Results show that: (1) there exists a significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance. (3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed. (4) President turnover, whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance. Overall, results support that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firms performance and the 2SLS model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.

In the evolving global economy, boardroom governance has forged an increasing influence on what transpires in corporations today. Within the boardroom, expectations of board directors and executive management (key actors) have shifted dramatically due to the financial failures (i.e., Enron and WorldCom, etc.) and the ensuing global financial crisis in the 2000s. The belief is that these directors and managers contributed greatly to these crises (Boerner, 2011). Consequently, there is a growing appeal to study boardroom governance and the roles of board directors and executive managers, not from a structural description, but rather from a behavioral perspective. In the literature, corporate governance structural framework is well informed while the behavioral framework is lacking. Often referred to as a black box, board behavior is not well understood because board processes are not easily observed nor are researchers readily invited to do so (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). There is therefore a clear call for studies to examine the black box of boardroom governance (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; Lockhart, 2010; Huse et al, 2011). Recognizing this demand, an examination of the beliefs and values of the board directors and executive managers in their boardroom culture, was undertaken as the starting point to open the black box of boardroom governance.

This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001. Japans prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan. Although it is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been. The inference is that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led to the sustained recession in Japan. Numerous proposals have been offered and some implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 1990s. Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures. Many Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their own system of control. As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline. <p>The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate governance is examined in this study. Using a different econometric approach from that of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations. The purpose of this empirical framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, governance and performance variables. Results show that: (1) there exists a significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance. (3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed. (4) President turnover, whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance. Overall, results support that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firms performance and the 2SLS model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.

This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001. Japans prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan. Although it is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been. The inference is that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led to the sustained recession in Japan. Numerous proposals have been offered and some implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 1990s. Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures. Many Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their own system of control. As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate governance is examined in this study. Using a different econometric approach from that of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations. The purpose of this empirical framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, governance and performance variables. Results show that: (1) there exists a significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance. (3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed. (4) President turnover, whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance. Overall, results support that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firms performance and the 2SLS model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.

In the evolving global economy, boardroom governance has forged an increasing influence on what transpires in corporations today. Within the boardroom, expectations of board directors and executive management (key actors) have shifted dramatically due to the financial failures (i.e., Enron and WorldCom, etc.) and the ensuing global financial crisis in the 2000s. The belief is that these directors and managers contributed greatly to these crises (Boerner, 2011). Consequently, there is a growing appeal to study boardroom governance and the roles of board directors and executive managers, not from a structural description, but rather from a behavioral perspective. In the literature, corporate governance structural framework is well informed while the behavioral framework is lacking. Often referred to as a black box, board behavior is not well understood because board processes are not easily observed nor are researchers readily invited to do so (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). There is therefore a clear call for studies to examine the black box of boardroom governance (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; Lockhart, 2010; Huse et al, 2011). Recognizing this demand, an examination of the beliefs and values of the board directors and executive managers in their boardroom culture, was undertaken as the starting point to open the black box of boardroom governance.

The present research provides the first analyses of Australian women directors from the perspective of social identity theory. The overall objective of the research program is to confirm the validity of social identity theory to the study of women on corporate boards and in doing so, add to the limited knowledge regarding successful women directors. An aim of the research was to identify factors that are significant in the social identity of women who are successful directors of corporate boards. These factors were revealed through a longitudinal study (over six years) of changes in the demographic characteristics of the women and their board positions. Factors were revealed through their perceptions of their effectiveness as an ostensibly minority (female) board member. Similarities in stereotyped attitudes to men and women board directors confirmed their status as an ingroup member. Through identification of significant factors in women’s success as board directors it is hoped to assist both individual women who are striving for success on corporate boards and organisations who wish to make more effective use of women on their boards. Five studies examined various aspects of women directors’ experiences and influences through three survey instruments that were used to collect data over a period of six years. A survey design allowed the gathering of detailed data on a variety of items thought to be relevant to women’s experiences of being directors and allowed the data collected to be oriented to a theoretical framework. Thus, a survey design was deemed superior to common alternatives of analysis of archival company annual report data or re-analysis of data collected by executive search companies for a study of corporate directors. A survey of 572 Australian women directors in 1995 identified many characteristics of women directors. A profile of a typical Australian women director was constructed and compared to international research on women directors covering a similar period (e.g., Burke, 1994b; Catalyst, 1993; Holton, Rabbets & Scrivener, 1993). An examination of differences between the characteristics of executive and nonexecutive women directors confirmed that the two director roles could be perceived as distinct groups. A further survey of the women six years later examined changes in their characteristics and board experiences. Of the 298 women who had agreed to follow-up research, 59 surveys were returned as no longer at the same address, 23 women indicated that they were no longer on a corporate board, and 32 were current corporate directors. Changes in the women’s profiles that the directors had attained through increased board memberships and more central board roles were interpreted as indicators of success. Based on research by Cejka and Eagly (1999), similarities and differences in stereotypical attitudes of men and women directors were examined in relation to social identity theory. Factors in nonexecutive women directors’ identification as board directors, their perceptions of their ability to contribute as board directors, and their behaviour as a board directors were assessed by measures from Karasawa (1991) and Westphal and Milton (2000). The present research program demonstrated the value of social identity theory as a vehicle for understanding Australian women director’s experiences on corporate boards. For the present research, social identity theory provided insights into how successful Australian women directors perceive themselves and other members of their ingroup of board directors. By contributing to a deeper understanding of successful women directors, it is hoped that a greater number of women will be able to successfully join ingroups of board directors, thereby breaking down the barriers to women.

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This thesis explores gender-related barriers in CEO successions. Only 4% of Fortune 500 CEOs are female despite the fact that women have held the majority of college degrees in the US since the late 1990's and now comprise almost half of the workforce and the majority of managerial positions. Their representation is low even in comparison to the other two top management positions from which CEOs are typically sourced. It is less than one-third of the percentage of both female executive officers (15%) and board directors (17%). A holistic and qualitative research approach was utilized. Data were gathered on societal, individual and organizational factors through one-on-one, semi-structured interviews with board directors, executive search consultants and female CEOs, and analyzed using computer-assisted coding software. This thesis challenges the perception that women's individual barriers are the main reason why there are so few female CEOs. While all three types of barriers were found, organizational barriers appear to be the most important. The convergence of predominately male board directors, CEOs and top executive search consultants with informal, subjective, secretive and disparate talent management and CEO successions programs effectively results in the CEO position being a better fit for men than women. While moderating factors were beneficial to the women who have become CEOs, many factors were found for why they cannot be relied upon to greatly increase the number of female CEOs. A deliberate and comprehensive effort by society, individuals and organizations is required.