Burma is home to one of the longest-running civil wars in the world, and Burmese refugees are the largest refugee group to arrive in the United States since 2008. The aim of this report is to help tell their story through testimonies of how individuals became refugees in the first place and what they experienced as a result. I have told their story in both a written narrative and a documentary video. I know that testimonies of the refugees in my story cannot impact the situation in Burma overnight, or in the short-term future, but I hope that by presenting a small segment of history in this report I will contribute to change and give voice to ordinary people involved in extraordinary events. I would like to thank all the refugees who helped make this report possible. / text

Proefschrift--Utrecht. / "Stellingen": leaf inserted. Bibliography: p. 233-236.

Proefschrift--Utrecht. / "Stellingen": leaf inserted. Bibliography: p. 233-236.

Thesis (Master of Research)--University of Yangon, 2002. / Cover title. "September 2002."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1950. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 278-285).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1993.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 579-602).

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was created during the Second World War to be a central collector, producer, and disseminator of foreign intelligence. Its secondary role of clandestine warfare did not come easily. One OSS unit, Detachment 101, surmounted numerous problems to become a model clandestine and special operations unit able to create its own indigenous army that waged war behind Japanese lines in Burma. This study uses previously unexplored primary source materials from the OSS records held by the U.S. National Archives to examine the unit and its organizational changes from 1942 to 1945. Detachment 101 succeeded in the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) for the simple reason that it was able to function independent of immediate control from either the U.S. Army or OSS main headquarters. Source documents reveal that the unit’s commander was left on his own to decide how the unit would operate, and how to incorporate various OSS branches and capabilities into its operational matrix. The CBI’s lack of resources dictated that the Detachment 101 had to streamline its efforts to be successful. Its officers needed to get acquainted with the entire operation and then integrate their disparate elements into where they best fit as the whole. An exploration of the documents reveals that each of the unit’s two commanders molded the unit into an organization that reflected their personalities. Colonel Carl F. Eifler, was bold and impetuous and modeled the group to accomplish any task—even if it could not. Colonel William R. Peers, focused the group’s efforts on assisting the north Burma campaign. Under his direction, the unit rapidly became a much more cohesive unit able to help the Allies win control of north Burma. His direction was instrumental in Detachment 101’s first real test; the Myitkyina Campaign. Examination of the primary documents uncovers that by the end of the war, the unit had become so successful and so flexible that it was the only ground combat unit fighting in north Burma, and was able to adopt a variety of dissimilar missions. Although other OSS combat operations gave exceptional service, none was as central to the conduct of an entire campaign as was Detachment 101.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong. / Type-written copy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 136-138). Also available on microfilm.