Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1978. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 54-57).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1978. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 54-57). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 137-147). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: l. 69-71.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Michael Malley, Alice L. Miller. "June 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-82). Also available in print.

No description available.

This thesis examines the recruitment of the political elite in Burma from 1962 to 1967, the first five years of the second Ne Win regime. The political elite is defined as consisting of officers of the rank of Colonel or higher, and civilians who hold administrative or party offices similar to those held by these high-ranking officers. The aspects of recruitment considered are (1) the extent of representation of ethnic groups; (2) the extent of achievement orientation; and (3) the nature and scope of recruitees' experience in dealing with the leadership of minority ethnic groups. These recruitment variables are chosen for their relevance to political development, and this will be demonstrated by consideration of some of the implications of elite recruitment practices in Burma for the development of equality, system capacity, and structural differentiation. Research into the ethnic origins and career experience of the current Burmese elite was conducted by a review of the existing literature and secondary historical sources, as well as a survey of the English-language press of Burma and foreign periodicals for the years 1962 to 1967. The Burmese periodicals surveyed were The Guardian (daily) and Forward (fort-nightly); and the non-Burmese periodicals were The New York Times and the Far Eastern Economic Review. Use was also made of a Who's Who in Burma, published in 1961. It was found that according to the rank of offices held, the Burmese political elite is by no means exclusively military. The military component of the elite consists of a large proportion of the veterans of the Burma Independence Army, which has comprised the officer corps of the Burma Army since shortly after Independence. Many of the administrative offices continue to be held by veterans of the colonial Civil Service, although their superiors are Army officers. In addition, many posts in the single Army-sponsored party are held by veterans of former extremist "left-wing" parties. Very few positions in the current regime are held by former political leaders. It was found that representation of ethnic groups other than the Burman majority was very low, being restricted to 2 out of 54 from the military component and 9 out of 44 of the civilian component, 6 of the latter being Ambassadors. The current elite is shown to be considerably less representative of minority ethnic groups than that of the civilian governments, and this difference is partly explained by institutional changes. The extent of achievement orientation in recruitment is considered by an examination of the formal education and professional experience of elite members. It is shown that the level of formal education of the current elite is at least slightly lower than that of the civilian governments, with less than half holding university degrees. The period in question also shows a decline in the professionalism of the military as compared to the period of civilian government and to the military Caretaker Government of 1958 to 1960. This is explained as a consequence of the recruitment to party and administrative posts of former "oppositionist" politicians, which has upset a balance between professional and political orientations in the military. The experience of elite members is also found to include service as military administrators in minority ethnic group areas, a position not conducive to the stimulation of attitudes of equality and non-discrimination. This, then, eliminates a possible substitute for ethnic group representation in the elite. It is concluded, finally, that none of these recruitment practices are conducive to further political development in Burma, but constitute part of a defensive posture oriented towards counter-insurgency, minority-group regulation, and the short-run political security of the elite. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines the nature of Burma's military regime which came to power in March 1962, and which has portrayed itself, somewhat successfully until 1988, as a regime which has constructed a "Burmese" socialist political order in Burma. Though this self-image was more or less accepted by many observers, there nonetheless could be detected in writings on the regime some degree of scholarly unease regarding the nature of the regime stemming from its many glaring failures not only in economic management, but also in arresting political decay which has transformed Burma into a poverty-stricken, debt-ridden, and almost pre-modern authoritarian polity. This thesis is an attempt to provide a less particularistic explanation of the regime, to show that such a regime is not unique, and that the downward slide of Burma can be understood with reference to existing theories and concepts derived from the study of Third World politics and conditions. Accordingly, the anti-colonial "nationalist" movement in Burma, the Dobama Asiayone of the Thakins, and the various Dobama "armies" which became the national armed forces, the Tatmadaw, and the underlying historical and socio-economic and political conditions are re-examined and analysed within the theoretical framework of comparative Third World politics. The thesis argues that the leaders who led the Tatmadaw to the summit of power in 1962 were not modernizing military leaders, but were foremostly politicians in military garb whose agenda was shaped by parochial Burman ethnonationalism, a peculiar kind of anti-foreign "Burmese" socialism, and the myth of their triumph over powerful foreign opponents — the British and the Japanese. The thesis examines the military regime -- Ne Win's Tatmadaw dictatorship -- and endeavors to explain the paradoxical configuration, subsequent to the military seizure of power, of a strongly autonomous and highly coercive state in Burma, on the one hand, and the clear evidence of political and economic decay (stemming from the regime's poor performance and/or capacity), on the other hand, from the perspective of Third World politics. The explanation is framed in terms of Ne Win's personal rulership; the transformation of the Tatmadaw, on which the state and the regime is based, into a patrimonialized personal instrument of the patrimonial ruler, Ne Win; the subsequent general and widespread erosion of the integrity of various institutions; the undermining of legal-rational norms; and the increasing reliance of Ne Win and the regime on the use of terror to maintain power as its legitimacy waned over time, and the corresponding greater degree of disengagement of society from the control and perview of the state. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

published_or_final_version / Comparative Asian Studies / Master / Master of Arts

Thesis (doctoral)--Charles University, Prague, 1974. / Letter from the author dated 30th October 1985, including errata inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 480-488) and index.