Negoplan is a domain-independent decision support system which can be customised for different application domains. Negoplan enables the representation, simulation and support of sequential, context-dependent decision-making problems that involve the interaction between two participants and their decision environment. This thesis presents extensions that increase the expressiveness of Negoplan's constructs. They enable Negoplan to represent decision-making problems that involve more than two participants. This enlarges substantially the class of Negoplan's applications. The usefulness of the extensions is demonstrated on a managerial decision-making application that involves more than two participants. This Negoplan application concerns self-training of a Business Administration student to test his managerial decision-making skills in an environment in which Negoplan represents two other autonomously behaving participants. The application also demonstrates the suitability of customised Negoplan as an automated training tool.

The purpose of the study was to determine the effectiveness of the Oman Football Association (OFA) in selected dimensions, namely, complexity, formalization, centralization, activities to ensure resources, work flow activities, and control activities, identification activities, and homeostatic activities. The study used a document analysis to gather qualitative data, and a survey to collect constituent perceptions on these dimensions. Four constituent groups were identified: administrators, official referees, national team athletes, and coaches. Their perceptions were assessed by a nine point scale ranging from $-$4 to +4. Fifty-eight participants responded to a survey questionnaire. A Kruskal Wallis non parametric test was carried out to test differences between constituent's perceptions in the five dimensions. From the overall perceptions all dimensions were perceived to be contributing to organizational effectiveness. The only significant difference was found between administrators, and referees and coaches in the control dimension. This finding supported the statement problem examined in the current study, and indicated that there is need for a valid evaluation process for programs and personnel within the organization. The constituent's comments to the open-ended questions revealed some important issues, the employee involvement in decision making, the recruitment of professional administrators, and the influence of the General Organization of Sport and Youth activities (GOSYA) in OFA's activities.

This study investigated internal participators' evaluation as an intervention to enhance organizational learning capacity. In particular, this study examined the nature and causes of observed effects. A national, not-for-profit training organization where the present study's author was employed, served as the site of the research. The research process inquiring into the effects of internal participatory evaluation on the organization employed qualitative methods. Data were collected, over approximately two years, via retrospective observations, participant observations, archival data, interviews with key informants of the evaluation process, and from a focus group held approximately six months following the completion of the project. The data were collected, analyzed, displayed and interpreted according to a conceptual framework. The design of the study utilized several features to ensure the validity of the findings such as examining data from different sources, involving an independent interviewer, and providing respondents with the opportunity to make a collective response as to the effects of the internal participatory evaluation, as well as to assess the interpretations given to the data by the author. The results of the study were then compared and discussed in the light of what is known about participatory evaluation and organizational learning. It was concluded that internal participatory evaluation can positively affect the constructs associated with organizational learning capacity including causing organizational members to unearth and questions fundamental assumptions about how the organization is operating (i.e., double-loop learning). It was further concluded that longitudinal designs that incorporate qualitative methods geared to measure complex phenomena within a particular context are needed in this domain of research. It is believed that the present study has extended our knowledge about the power of evaluation as an organizational change phenomenon and has provided a more solid basis from which to make conclusions regarding its potential for impact. Finally, in spite of the fact that the present study was exploratory in nature, recommendations were listed for evaluation practitioners interested in pursuing further study. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Cette these procede a une analyse integree de differentes pratiques de ressources humaines afin de (a) verifier leur relation avec la performance financiere d'une organisation, (b) identifier les pratiques qui contribuent le plus a la performance financiere, (c) et si les couts d'agence sont lies aux pratiques de ressources humaines dans la prediction de la performance financiere. L'etude developpe une approche analytique innovatrice en ce sens qu'elle se base sur la theorie de l'agence pour expliquer la rentabilite des investissements dans les pratiques de dotation, de formation-developpement et de remuneration globale. Ainsi, l'approche avance l'hypothese que les investissements dans ces pratiques permettent de reduire les conflits d'interets entre le principal et son agent, donc les couts d'agence, et de fait ameliorer la performance financiere de l'organisation. L'echantillon a l'etude comporte 30 entreprises canadiennes dans le domaine de la haute technologie. Les resultats montrent que les pratiques ressources humaines sont positivement associees a la performance financiere de l'organisation et a la reduction de certains couts d'agence. Par contre, les resultats ne permettent pas de conclure que ces pratiques augmentent la performance financiere de la firme parce qu'elles reduisent les couts d'agence.

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This study examines restructuring in which, (i) two firms exchange operating units (asset-for-asset exchanges), and (ii) a firm divests assets in exchange for an equity stake in the firm acquiring the assets (asset-for-stock exchanges). These transactions are called asset exchanges, as distinct from divestitures primarily for cash. Since liquidity is not the primary consideration, asset exchanges are more suitable than sales of assets for cash when examining the role of synergy in the divestiture decision. An asset-for-stock exchange is similar to a partial merger and creates an alternative form of cooperative strategy and organization to mergers and joint ventures. We do not find evidence of gains to firms in asset-for-asset exchanges. While portfolios of divestors and acquirers in asset-for-stock exchanges gain, an analysis of matched pairs of firms in each transaction reveals that both firms gain only in a third of all cases. Overall, an asset-for-stock exchange leads to an increase in the combined value of the divestor and the acquirer. The gains in dollar value terms are fairly large relative to the gains in takeovers. The sharing of gains is related to the percentage of stock acquired, appointment by the divestor of directors on the acquirer's board, voting restrictions on stock, the use of cash as a part of the consideration and the financial condition of the divested unit. The results of this study suggest that returns to firms undertaking asset exchanges cannot be explained by synergistic motives alone and indicates a need to examine other possible motives in asset exchanges as well as in other forms of divestitures.

This dissertation deals with the relationship between executive compensation and corporate control. The chapters II and III deal specifically with the effect, on the compensation of a chief executive officers (CEO), of changes in the perceived threat of a hostile takeover of their firm. Chapter IV considers the general problem of the executive pay in theories of the control and behavior of firms, and the effect of market liberalization on income distribution within firms. In Chapter II, a simple efficiency wage model of CEO pay is combined with a model of a firm constrained by a threat of hostile takeover. Three versions of the model are specified, corresponding to three different assumptions about who controls the pay-setting process (the shareholders, the board of directors, or the CEO). I then ask how the level of CEO pay changes with an exogenous change in the cost of a hostile takeover, and conclude that the sign of the change depends upon who controls the pay-setting process. Chapter III is an econometric exploration of the models in chapter II. The probability of hostile takeover is modeled as a function of time, industry, and a firm's financial characteristics. Probit estimates of this probability are included as a variable in CEO wage equations for large US firms from 1979-1988. An increased threat of takeover is found to cause a small but statistically significant increase in CEO pay. This is consistent with the view that CEO pay is determined by the CEO, and inconsistent with the view that the CEO is the agent of either the shareholders or the board of directors. Chapter IV begins with a critical appraisal of research on executive pay which has been based on the assumption that the locus of control of the firm can be inferred from the relationship between executive pay and various measures of a firm's performance. I show that these inferences are mostly wrong. Next, I show that recent developments in agency theory have undermined the conventional view that the governance structure of the firm can be interpreted as an optimal contract. Finally, I consider the large unexplained differences in the level of CEO pay, between industries and countries, and between time periods. I use a simple efficiency wage model to provide a consistent explanation of how various institutional differences, and differences in industry characteristics, cause differences in the level of CEO pay.

This thesis consists of three essays that attempt to provide novel empirical analyses of important problems in finance. The first essay deals with the returns of actively managed mutual funds; the second and third essays attempt to bring further understanding to ultra high-frequency market microstructure data. The thread that binds these chapters together---if any---is the use of latent structure models. The first chapter attempts to identify unobserved populations of managers, the second looks for hidden structure in order book shapes, and the third searches for connections between order book events. Evaluating the performance of actively managed equity mutual funds is among the most important topics in the field of finance. In the first chapter, I present a new assessment of the stock picking ability of actively managed funds that accounts for the occurrence of false positives, an issue that complicates traditional assessments. I find that while the data is consistent with a small group of alpha-generating funds, the composition of this population experiences significant annual turnover and is, therefore, difficult to identify in advance. Between 1975 and 2015, the returns to a fund selection strategy based on the classification method fail to generate alpha. The second chapter begins a study of high-frequency limit order book data. With a view towards exploring the information content of limit orders, as opposed to market orders, I propose a factor model of order book shape. I start by building a unique dataset of Nasdaq limit order books that tracks order activity at ultra high-frequency. Analyzing over 20,000 stock-days, I find that the limit order book comprises three common factors, which I characterize as level, slope, and curvature. By combining these factors alongside price increments in a vector autoregression, I demonstrate that the factors not only explain limit order book shape but also predict returns over one-minute time intervals. In agreement with the claim that high-frequency traders serve a role in increasing market efficiency, I find a negative correlation between predictability and high-frequency trade activity. In the third chapter, I explore a continuous-time, event-driven model of limit order book dynamics. It is the first analysis of its kind to examine the microstructure of a broad cross-section of markets, as well as the first to introduce a Bayesian framework for the study of mutually-exciting Poisson processes in order-driven microstructure models. The picture that emerges is that of a strongly self- and mutually-exciting process characterized by intensity ``spikes'' lasting mere fractions of a second. The largest of these spikes are expected to generate between 0.5 and 2.0 order book events--up to 120 times the number of expected events per second. In the typical order book, market orders demonstrate a significant influence on limit orders and cancellations, but the relationship is non-reciprocating: while limit orders and cancellations exhibit strong interactions with each other, they have no effect on the arrival of market orders. Over 99.5% of the markets examined are stable, and in every market examined, the network model significantly improves in-sample fit relative to a baseline Poisson model. I argue that this improvement is due almost entirely to the most active 20-25% of connections.

Many international companies have entered China because of its expanding opportunities. However, for expatriate managers to innovate and implement their strategic plans in order to exploit these opportunities, they must know and work with their Chinese subordinates. But conflict is inevitable within organizations, especially when people with different cultural backgrounds work together. Culture not only affects people’s preferred ways of doing things but also influences their styles to deal with conflicts. Compared with Westerners, Chinese people have been found to employ indirect ways and prefer to avoid conflict. To facilitate effective communication, it is imperative for Western managers to understand why local subordinates might avoid conflicts and what strategies they will use. This paper explores the dynamic structure of conflict avoidance between Western managers and Chinese employees; we want to understand the different strategies used to avoid conflict. Specifically, this study uses the theory of cooperation and competition to predict people’s responses toward conflict avoidance. We hypothesize that conflict avoidance is not always negative but depends on the specific actions the protagonists adopt and their perceptions of the goal interdependence with each other (cooperative or competitive) greatly influence their tactics to avoid conflict. The study extends research on conflict avoidance to foreign invested companies in China and develops a typology of the dynamics of conflict avoidance. Altogether 132 face-to-face interviews were carried out in Hong Kong and Beijing, China. Participants who work with Western managers were asked to describe an incident in which they avoided a conflict with their foreign superiors; it included the setting, what occurred, the reasons, and the consequences. Then they rated specific questions on 7-point Likert-type scale based on the recalled incidents. Employees whose bosses are local managers were also recruited as a control group. Structural equation modeling and other analyses will explore the proposed model and help to compare cultural differences in handling conflicts between the Western and Chinese managers. The paper draws implications for managing in foreign invested firms.

How do teams achieve their best performance? Why do some teams develop into top performers while others, seemingly the same, do not? The answers to these questions will provide a practical and theoretical team behavior understanding. Traditional models do not explain how teams work (Lembke and Wilson, 1998). A static model offers a snapshot on team behavior (Kelly and McGrath, 1984), but no real understanding of its dynamics. A dynamic team behavior model, on the other hand, captures the development processes. A dynamic model is required if insights about why and how team performance is created are to be obtained. In this work, I approach the problem of creating a complex dynamic model of team behavior. I offer a framework for developing such models by combining systems approaches and empirical team research. This framework allows a team to be formally represented as a system of mathematical relationships and parameters in order for its behavior, complexity and dynamics to be quantitatively explored. The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to demonstrate how models exhibiting complex behavior can be developed and to validate a sample model. To do this, first, a framework for complex model development is derived and presented. Second, using the framework guidelines and based on team behavior research, a team model is constructed. Third, the model relationships are quantified and a behavioral simulation is performed. Fourth, the relationships in the model are estimated from the data from the laboratory simulation, thereby allowing the theoretical model to be verified. Fifth, systems specific analytical tools are used to analyze the model. To provide data for the model, 72 three-member student teams conducted a behavioral simulation. Statistical analysis showed that all hypothesized relationships are significant, except Team Quality Performance. Based on the statistical results, simulation models were constructed and simulations performed. The simulations show the dynamics of the systems studied. Further, the simulated systems were analyzed to assess stability, equilibrium, equifinality and controllability. These analyses showed that the systems studied are stable, non-equifinal, not completely controllable and do not achieve equilibrium. Exploratory findings and future research opportunities are also discussed.