Scholars have long examined the inherent trade-offs between control and capability when presidents politicize the executive branch through their appointment powers, including through political appointments to federal agency leadership positions. Empirical research over the past few decades connects high ratios of appointees to career leaders with decreased agency performance and higher voluntary turnover at the career senior ranks. However, less attention has been dedicated to the effects of such appointments on the attitudes of the civil service workforce, factors which has been shown to influence organizational performance. Employing a study of the U.S. Department of State, I evaluate the relationship between degree of agency politicization and self-reported measures of engagement, motivation, and job satisfaction among civil servants. Analysis suggests that the ongoing reliance on outside political appointees in senior leadership by successive presidents impedes the State Department's efforts to build and sustain positive workforce attitudes. This study examines the effects of the institutionalized use of outside appointments on the broader federal workforce, presenting a new perspective for scholarly understanding of the dynamics at play when presidents politicize the agencies they are entrusted to lead. / Doctor of Philosophy / U.S. presidents frequently use their appointment powers to exert control by placing trusted outsiders in positions of authority in federal government agencies. However, research has repeatedly shown that agencies with large numbers of outside leaders can struggle to perform effectively and lose experienced career civil servants at higher rates. While a connection between appointee leadership and performance is well established, researchers are less certain of what factors actually causes it to develop. In particular, little attention has been given to understanding the opinions of career employees of a federal agency about working within such a system or how those attitudes might help explain their behaviors at work. Through a study of one agency, the U.S. Department of State, I examine appointee-career relationships by exploring career employees' thoughts on leadership at the State Department, going beyond attitudes about specific leaders to evaluate whether using outside appointees to lead agencies creates barriers to employee recruitment, retention, and performance. The analysis suggests that, while the institutionalization of political appointments provides a president with greater control over an agency, the constant churn created through reliance on outsiders for leadership may harm an agency's ability to achieve its goals by undermining employee trust in leaders and the agency itself.