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Das japanische Antimonopolgesetz im Lichte des deutschen Kartellrechts /Hwang, Shen-Chang. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Heidelberg.
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Coalition structuresDiamantoudi, Effrosyni. January 2000 (has links)
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impact on game theory. Additionally, it presents and motivates the significance of the three following chapters. / The second chapter investigates how rational individuals partition themselves into different coalitions. We propose a notion that determines simultaneously the coalition structures that are likely to prevail in a game, as well as the feasible payoff configurations associated with them. Our solution concept is built in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern stability, but it overcomes the overoptimism associated with it when employed in our context. Moreover, in doing so, we achieve consistency and resolve the problem of myopia embedded in previous notions. We prove existence for a general class of games, and investigate the efficiency of our solution. / The third chapter ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can negotiate with each other and their actions have externalities. Naturally, the environment is depicted by a normal form game. The solution is a collection of pairs, each consisting of a coalition structure and a strategy profile. Although this chapter addresses the same question the Ray and Vohra (1997) paper did, it does so in a manner that overcomes the problems embedded in their approach. In particular, we assume that once a coalition deviates it fears the worst, given that the non-members do the best for themselves. In doing so, we improve upon previous solution concepts (e.g. strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria) by NOT assuming that all other players will stay put. Yet, unlike the Ray and Vohra approach, we do not endow the deviating coalition with the power of imposing its will on all of the other players. A general solution concept is defined and its properties (efficiency, etc.) and applications are discussed. / The fourth chapter analyzes cartel stability when firms are farsighted. It studies a price leadership model a la D'Aspremont et al. (1983), where the dominant cartel acts as a leader by determining the market price, while the fringe behaves competitively. According to D'Aspremont et al.'s notion of cartel stability, a firm will not remain in a cartel as long as it prefers the outcome where it is the only member leaving the cartel for the fringe. Such an approach implies that the firm is myopic since it ignores whether the outcome of its deviation is stable itself. Our notion captures foresight by employing a solution concept built in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set, yet adopting an indirect dominance a la Harsanyi. We show that there always exists a unique, non-empty set of stable cartels.
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Die Entwicklung des deutschen Zwangskartellrechts seit Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts /Andreae, Robert. January 1935 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität zu Frankfurt am Main.
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Die Kündigung von Kartellen /Berkenhoff, Friedrich-Gustav. January 1930 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen.
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Submissions-Kartelle /Brügger, Karl. January 1933 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Köln.
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Die Strafbarkeit und Strafwürdigkeit von Submissionskartellen und Bietungsabkommen /Franzen, Karheinz. January 1970 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Köln.
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Die Verwendung der GmbH zu Kartellzwecken : unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Schweizer Entwurfs /Gross, Georg. January 1936 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern.
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Der Bruch des Kartellversprechens /Krohn, Edgar. January 1914 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau, 1914. / Includes bibliographical references ([vii]-x).
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Der Organisationszwang im deutschen Recht /Lippert, Ernst. January 1929 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen, 1929. / Includes bibliographical references (p. ix-x).
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La nature juridique des syndicats de prêt et les obligations des banques dirigeantes et gérantes : aspects de droit des obligations, de droit bancaire et de droit cartellaire /Bovet, Christian. January 1991 (has links)
Th. doct.--droit--Fribourg--Université de Fribourg Suisse, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. XXIII-L. Notes bibliogr.
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