I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020. / University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018) / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted