This dissertation presents three essays. The first essay finds that the household risky ratio, the ratio of high risk assets over low risk assets directly owned by households, is a strong negative predictor of the equity premium on the US stock market. The predictability is robust to definition of the asset classes, first versus second half of sample, and the finite-sample bias of Stambaugh (1999). The predictability is stronger than, and not subsumed by popular predictors like price-earnings ratios, yield spread, equity share of issues, or consumption-wealth ratios. The main predictive power is decomposed into three similar parts: 1) the household tilt of risky assets, which is novel and generally orthogonal to known predictors; 2) a valuation ratio component; and 3) an issuance component of high risk versus low risk assets. / Economics

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effect of two specific external, to the principal-agent relationship, influences on executive pay practices in the UK, namely pay consultants and the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, I examine the role of pay consultants in UK CEO pay practices. The results illustrate that their role is not consistent with the predictions of the managerial power theory. More specifically, pay consultants do not try to help managers towards the expropriation of shareholders' wealth; on the contrary I show strong indications that pay consultants urge firms towards the adoption of more incentive based CEO compensation. Moreover, I report that economic characteristics (e.g. firm size, complexity of the contract) rather than CEO power explain the firm's choice to hire a compensation consultant. These results are robust to selection bias controls. The results of this essay indicate that pay consultants play a less "sinister" role than what the managerial power theory suggests and that their advice and expertise can assist firms design an optimal executive pay contract. In the second essay, I examine the existence of managerial opportunism at the switch from UK GAAP to IFRS. I find strong indications that the restatements from UK GAAP to IFRS have not been manipulated by managers. I examine the existence of such behaviour under different specifications and for different types of CEOs that one would expect to engage in opportunistic behaviour to maximise the expected personal wealth. The research design that I adopt makes the results less prone to methodological issues common in studies in this area. Positive Accounting Theory literature has established that managerial opportunism seriously affects accounting choice. The results of this essay imply that with respect to IFRS restatements, where managers had strong incentives to manage future earnings, I find no signs of manipulation. This essay thus puts into question the Positive Accounting Theory Paradigm. In the third essay, I examine the effect of IFRS on the use of performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managers. This essay illustrates that firms make less use of accounting based performance measures due to the introduction of IFRS. I explain these results based on the predictions of optimal contacting theory. I claim that IFRS adds unnecessary "noise" to accounting numbers not relevant to the managers' actions. This is mainly due to the adoption of "fair value" accounting, which makes accounting earnings more value relevant and therefore useful for firm valuation purposes; however, "fair value" accounting also makes accounting numbers more volatile and sensitive to market movements. If this increase in volatility is related to events outside the managers' control, this makes the use of accounting based performance measures less useful for evaluating and rewarding managers. The results of this essay imply that IFRS might have made accounting earnings more useful for stock market purposes, e.g. firm valuation, but this has happened at the expense of other purposes that accounting serves, e.g. contracting.

This dissertation consists of two essays, both co-authored with Ugur Lel. The first essay (Chapter 1) examines whether high CEO pay inequality (CPI), the share of total managerial pay captured by the CEO, is an outcome of poor corporate governance, and its implications for shareholder wealth. We exploit the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ governance reforms that mandated firms to have majority independent boards as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in the internal governance environment of firms. Results show that CPI decreases following the passage of these exchange listing regulations, but only in firms with entrenched CEOs affected by the exchange listing regulations. Firm value also increases for these firms. These results are robust to a variety of robustness checks such as a matched sample analysis and placebo tests. Overall, our results suggest that poor governance environments are associated with high managerial pay differences and consequently lower firm valuations, supporting the view that high CEO pay inequality reflects managerial entrenchment. The second essay (Chapter 2) examines whether shareholders use executive compensation channel to align managerial horizon with their investment horizon. We utilize a newly emerged empirical measure, pay duration, to measure managerial horizon. For shareholder horizon, we use the fraction of long-term institutional ownership in the firm. Results show that there is a positive association between long-term institutional ownership and CEO pay duration, suggesting that shareholder horizon is a determining factor in compensation contracts. We address reverse causality using indexer institutions. We also establish a causal link from investor horizon to CEO pay duration using institution mergers as a source of exogenous variation in investor horizon of the firm. We extend our results to hedge fund activism and document a negative relation between hedge fund activism and pay duration, which is consistent with our argument. Overall our results suggest that shareholders structure CEO pay in a way that is consistent with their investment horizon. / Ph. D. / CEOs play a crucial role in today’s financial world. They are the ultimate decision makers in companies and their goal is to maximize the shareholder wealth. Motivating the CEO to work hard and maximize shareholder wealth hinges on optimally designed compensation contracts. Shareholders delegate company directors to design these pay contracts. However, conflicts of interest between directors and CEOs, between shareholders and CEOs, and even among shareholders, affect the design of CEO pay contracts. It is important to study these conflicts of interest and their effect on CEO compensation to ensure well-functioning companies and a fair market. The objective of the first chapter is to examine whether the CEOs are overpaid when the company directors are not able to monitor the actions and decisions of the CEOs. We document that powerful and established CEOs are overpaid, both in dollar terms and relative to other managers in the company, when they are not properly monitored. We also document that regulations that aim to improve monitoring quality in companies bring CEO pay to fair levels, leading to an increase in company valuations. These findings point out the importance of regulations that improve the governance of companies. In the second chapter, we examine short-termism (or myopia) in the context of CEO pay. Basically, short-termism is any action that saves today but is costly in future. While short-term shareholders invest in companies for short periods to take advantage of temporary changes in company valuation, long-term investors invest for long periods and aim to benefit from long-term increase in company valuation. We document that the conflict of interest among shareholders with different investment periods is reflected in the design of CEO pay contracts. In particular, CEOs wait more to receive their compensation if the dominant investor type in the company has longer investment period. This finding explains how shareholders use CEO compensation to achieve wealth maximization, highlighting the power and importance of CEO pay contracts.

Four essays, or chapters, model the capital structure, governance, and investment decisions as part of a sequential game. Each chapter is separate in its context, assumptions, and conclusions. The titles of the chapters are below. Abstracts of each essay or chapter can be found at the beginning of each chapter. The titles of the chapters or essays are as follows: I. Managerial Ownership with Rent-Seeking Employees, II. Financing Professional Partnerships, III. Sunk Cost Efficiency with Identical Competitors, and IV. Business Stealing and Bankruptcy. With the exception of Chapter III, which is meant to complement Chapter IV, these essays argue that the structure of financial contracts can affect the real behavior of firms. The first chapter argues that financial governance policies affect the behavior of rank-and-file employees. In Chapter II, the governance and capital structure of professional service firms affects clients’ expectations of the firm’s quality. In Chapter IV, the enforcement of financial contracts by bankruptcy courts affects the number of firms that enter and exit the industry.