No description available.

Iaaug.-Disc.--Heidelberg. / Vita. Bibliography: p. xxxiv-xxxvii.

Children ages 5 and 8 dropped a marble into a box and made predictions about which of two doors the marble would exit. Participants provided explanations and certainty ratings for each of their predictions. A lucky charm was used in a second round of the game, in which half of participants experienced an increase in success and half did not. Results indicated that older children were more cognizant of the chance nature of the game, however both age groups exhibited misconceptions about the predictability of chance outcomes. When asked to explain their overall success in Round 2, only 8 year-olds who experienced an increase in success and a perfect success rate reliably endorsed the lucky charm. Results are discussed with reference to literature on children’s and adults’ understanding of chance. We also discuss developmental patterns in the use of luck as an explanatory tool. / text

Jag fick ett flaskskepp i present när jag föddes. Det är ett rangligt skepp som ser ut att kunna falla sönder när som helst fast det är skyddat från yttre påverkan genom den tjocka flaskan. Flaskskeppen byggdes ofta av sjömän ute på långa resor på den tiden då en resa tog månader och inte timmar. De symboliserar en värld då tid sågs med andra ögon och där den manifesterades i objekt byggda av en yrkeskår som inte hade någon särskild koppling till konst. De hade framför allt tiden att bygga dessa båtar och kanske blev miniatyrerna de skapade objekt för dagdrömmar och resor som utspelade sig på ett mentalt hav samtidigt som de befann sig på ett fysiskt? / Thesis

This thesis analyses the concept of 'chance' as it is understood by two Muslim philosophers, Ibn Sīnā (Lat. Avicenna, CE 980-1037) and Ibn Rushd (Lat. Averroes, CE 1126-1198). On the philosophical plane, I seek to ascertain whether they are determinists, i.e., whether they hold that everything that happens is necessarily conditioned by its causes so that it could not have been otherwise. This analysis discusses chance from a physical and a metaphysical perspective. Physics is here understood in the Aristotelian sense as the study of nature and change, and metaphysics as the study of being qua being (ontology) and of the divine (theology). Hence a particular stress on natural causation and on divine providence and causation. On the historical-philosophical plane I endeavour to determine the historical/philosophical sources of their views, namely the Graeco-Arabic philosophical tradition - Aristotelian and Neoplatonic on the one Band, and the tradition of Islamic theology (kalām) on the other. Particular emphasis is laid upon the original way in which Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd combine these two traditions.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, June 1945. / Bibliography: p. 80-84.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Jena, 1909. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [7-8]).

No description available.

No description available.

In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.