The number of dynamics needed to model the motion between a Chief and Deputy satellites has grown greatly since the introduction of the Hill, Clohessy-Wilshire (HCW) equations of motion were introduced. The models have grown to include various things like perturbations, specifically drag, J2, and solar radiation pressure. Dynamics models have also been developed that use True Anomaly as the independent variable instead of time. A lot of work has been put forth to also include cases where the Chief is in an eccentric orbit. While these models have increased the fidelity of relative dynamics these models become very complicated to implement. That is why the HCW equations remain extremely popular after all these developments. However, their simplicity causes issues when there is In-Track separation between the Chief and Deputy satellites. The error in the dynamics increases as this separation increases which leads to a typical constraint that the separation between the Chief and Deputy needs to be much smaller than the radius of the Chief's orbit. That is where this works starts, by examining into ways to increase the accuracy in the HCW equations as the In-Track separation between the Chief and Deputy grows. In which, this will be done by using a curvilinear coordinate system. Furthermore, a technique of using a Virtual Chief satellite will by employed to allow for the HCW equations to be valid for cases where the Chief is in an eccentric orbit. / Master of Science / There are many different models that are used to model the relative motion between two satellites. These models vary from low to high fidelity in the different types of perturbation and ranges that they can model. These higher fidelity models because very complex to implement and while useful the low fidelity models are still popular, specifically the HCW equations. This thesis works on making the HCW equations valid for a larger range of cases.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Dallas, 2008. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. James Ang, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Finance. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 10, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 169 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2003. / Supervisor: James Westphal. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Dissertation :European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel, 2006. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-271).

Dissertation :European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-271). Also available in print.

Diss.

The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky investment and hence reduce the credit risk. On the other hand, while the equity compensation brings the interests of managers in alignment to shareholder it may encourage managers to take opportunistic corporate strategies and to exploit the wealth of creditors. As a result, creditors may response to the CEO compensation package by imposing different covenant restrictions according to their perception of the credit risk. Supported with empirical evidence, this research finds that loan agreement contains more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of option compensation to the total compensation, but contains less restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of stock compensation to the total compensation. It implies that creditors view that the increase in the use of option compensation would increase the credit risk of the firm, while the increase in the use of stock compensation would decrease the credit risk. This research also investigates the relation between the CEO option compensation and some specific financial covenants. The finding shows that the use of liquidity covenant and minimum net worth covenant is positively related to the CEO option compensation.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wyoming, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on July 15, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31).