Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. James Ang, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Finance. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 10, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 169 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2003. / Supervisor: James Westphal. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Dissertation :European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel, 2006. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-271).

Dissertation :European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-271). Also available in print.

Diss.

The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky investment and hence reduce the credit risk. On the other hand, while the equity compensation brings the interests of managers in alignment to shareholder it may encourage managers to take opportunistic corporate strategies and to exploit the wealth of creditors. As a result, creditors may response to the CEO compensation package by imposing different covenant restrictions according to their perception of the credit risk. Supported with empirical evidence, this research finds that loan agreement contains more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of option compensation to the total compensation, but contains less restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of stock compensation to the total compensation. It implies that creditors view that the increase in the use of option compensation would increase the credit risk of the firm, while the increase in the use of stock compensation would decrease the credit risk. This research also investigates the relation between the CEO option compensation and some specific financial covenants. The finding shows that the use of liquidity covenant and minimum net worth covenant is positively related to the CEO option compensation.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wyoming, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on July 15, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31).

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-59). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

An inquiry into the perceptions of chief executive officers: What exactly needs to be known about chief executives and information technology in the organisation to gain this understanding? Clearly, it is not related to an expectation that chief executives do, or should, participate in the daily or departmental micro-management of information technology. Neither is it dependent on an expectation that CEOs should have a grasp of all the technical and philosophical issues relating to information systems or technology management and development. Rather it stems from a view that technology, as an enabler of change, should receive the attention of the chief executive in order to best harness its power to achieve corporate goals. / What is it that chief executives actually do when considering information technology issues in their organisations? If they are not computer literate and have limited understanding of the technological possibilities for the organisation, what are their sources for such information? If they are comfortable with technological concepts and terminology, how much does this affect their relationship with the senior information officer? How do chief executives communicate with their senior technologists? What are the CEOs' perceptions and assumptions about technology and the future? How is their decision-making affected? Do CEOs' use criteria or processes for technology projects other than those normally applied? Does the educational level, qualifications, years of experience as chief executive, or domain expertise, affect their approach to aligning the strategic direction with technology? Will different leadership styles map consistently with different ways of influencing the corporate technology function? Are there other factors that affect what strategies they choose? / Summary: The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of the perceptions of chief executive officers relative to the actions they take when faced with leadership of organisational change using information technology as the enabler. To that end, the literature is reviewed, the research methods for the project are described, and the research findings are presented. Relationships and relevant theories are discussed, a new theory is proposed, conclusions are drawn, and further research is suggested. / Thesis (MBusiness-Research)--University of South Australia, 2001.