Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, 2008. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [136]-140).

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John Macmurray was a Scottish moral philosopher who wrote during the middle part of the twentieth century and was influenced but not dominated by many schools of philosophy such as personalism and empiricism. The main task of this study is to examine critically, Macmurray's concept of community and its importance for his understanding of religion, the self and Christian ethics. John Macmurray presented three modes of apperception, which are variously labelled, but are most commonly called the scientific, artistic and religious modes. Macmurray considered the first two modes to be negative or inadequate and the third mode, i.e. the religious mode, to be the only positive or adequate mode. The focal point of the mode of religions is the personal relations within the context of community. Macmurray substituted ‘I do' from Descartes' ‘I Think' which introduced the assumption that action is primary and reflection is secondary. Macmurray argued that immediate experience is broken by reflection, but relection is necessary since it makes it possible to examine actions without ‘changing the world'. Macmurray held that the relation between the self an dthe orther within the community is seminal to all other activities and modes of relection. The relationships motivated by love an din terms of the other, i.e. personal relations, are the basic constituent of community as opposed to society which is motivated by fear and is based upon impersonal relationships. Macmurray asserted that the religious mode of apperception, i.e. the communal, is central to all human activity and reflection. MacMurray drew the well founded conclusion that man's whole life is rooted in religious mode. This places religion in the sphere of every day experience, while dismissing the assumption that religion is confined to rare, subjective and particular experiences. Macmurray also pointed out that religion is beneficial to the community on the practical level, since it contributes to the community's self-aware-approach to ethics, i.e. the scientific and artistic modes, as a basis for ethics and argued that the communal mode of apperception was the only adequate perception of ethics. The concept of community and its concomitant conceptions of fellowship and the personal ‘I-Thou' relation are the foundation upon which Macmurray based his explanation and examination of the self, religion and ethics. Macmurray has placed the concept of community at the very centre of his definition and thinking about religion, the self and Christian ethics. However, I have argued that a completely communal or relational view does not represent adequately or explore fully the concepts of the self, religion and Christian ethics. I have argued that Macmurray's dependence upon the idea of community and his utilisation of the concept of community is threatened by a serious internal contradication within the concept of community, i.e. there are two opposing and irreconcilable elements, which are the exclusiveness of the 'I-Thou' relation as opposed to the all inclusive nature of the fellowship within the community. In my view the idea of community by itself is inadequate when used to explain completely and to define the self. Macmurray rejected the idea of the 'isolated-I' and only considered the self in terms of the 'I-Thou', i.e. in terms of its communal elements. However, the rejection of the 'isolated-I' means that only the instrumental valuation will be applicable, while the intrinsic, unique value of the individual, upon which the instrumental valuation is predicated, is overlooked. I would argue that Macmurray's emphasis upon the community implies that the community is the primary phenomenon, while reducing the individual to an epiphenomenon. I have argued that Macmurray's approach threatens to reduce religion to nothing more than a constituent of society, by overlooking the solitary aspects of religion, i.e. the individual straggle and quest. I have argued that a heterocentric, i.e. mainly communal, view of ethics is over-simplified and will lead to questionable conclusions. Heterocentrism presents problems since it threatens to become nothing more than altruism which may lead people to make incompatible and different decisions. Since the basic element in the communal mode of morality is the harmony of the community, one might only apply what may be described as the minimal interpretation of morality. I have argued that Macmurray's idea of community, when applied to ethics and in particular to Christian ethics, threatens to reduce Jesus' teachings about ethics to simply an anthropological study. There is an inherent danger in trying to understand God in anthropological terms, since one cannot fully understand the eternal in terms of the temporary. Macmurray has over-emphasised the love between neighbours and not given God's love its central mediating and modifying place in human relations. The theocentric approach cannot be totally defined heterocentrically. Macmurray's thought contained valuable insights and it should be carefully studied and' utilised. However, there is a danger in viewing things only in terms of community, since the community may well become the principle phenomenon to be investigated. One might say that Christian ethics and the Christian religion is not merely a matter of community, but that the community is an integral part of our understanding of both Christian ethics and the Christian religion.

It is an undeniable truism that the world at large and Africa in particular is facing serious environmental problems such as deforestation, water pollution, air pollution, wetlands destruction, poaching as well as global warming. These problems are mainly caused by economic pressure for industrialisation, technological advancement, population growth, poverty and ignorance. Efforts to tone down these environmental problems have been largely influenced by the employment and deployment of Western ethical theories like land ethic, deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology as well as scientific approaches. Whilst these strategies are credited for forming the foundation of environmental discourse, they have not been a one-size-fits-all approach. As a result, they have registered modicum results in mitigating environmental challenges especially with particular reference to Africa. This is simply because they have proved to be anthropocentric and they are not flavoured with socio-cultural realities which identify the indigenous folk and shape their relationship with the natural environment. It is against this backdrop that the researcher feels that African communitarianism as a theory embedded on Ubuntu, Indigenous knowledge system such as taboos and totems and African traditional religion and morality, can chip-in to supply a home-grown solution to African environmental problems. Conscious of the pejorative effects of colonial hegemony through Christianity and the ever-present modern world of scientific undertakings, the researcher recommends a formulation of an environmental ethic that integrates traditional African religion, Christian ethics and scientific conservation methods to ensure an environmental policy that informs and directs sustainable socio-economic trajectory in contemporary Africa. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Bibliography: pages 299-306. / Society never absolutely prohibits homicide: there are "grey areas" in which it is sometimes tolerated or even encouraged. Moral discussion of each area is usually carried on in isolation from the others, and perhaps for this reason, frequently ignores or underestimates the complexities of the morality of killing. This thesis attempts to identify a general method for analysing such issues, so that they can enrich one another. A contemporary theological survey indicates that there should be a balance in Christian ethical method between the polar values of obedience in respect of general standards, and freedom to exercise individual responsibility. This implies recognising a place for intuitions, and specifying a way in which these can be subjected to criticism. In contrast, the Sanctity-of-Life Principle seeks to impose a universal prohibition on the killing of "innocent" human beings. While the Principle provides a useful general guideline, it is deficient as a moral norm - partly because of fatal difficulties associated with the concept of innocence. The method adopted in this thesis is that suggested by Philip Wagaman: methodological presumptions are identified and then tested in a utilitarian way. For the ethics of homicide, I propose a primary presumption favouring the preservation of life, and various secondary and linguistic presumptions. The contextual framework of the thesis is limited to two specific issues - abortion and revolutionary violence.

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Even the most casual contemporary observer of Christianity must recognise that the notion of Christian community being identifiable through the mutual love of its members (John 13:35) is difficult to reconcile with the schismatic reality of current ecclesial life, dominated in the public sphere by divisive debates on matters such as gender or sexuality. Given the constant presence of disagreement throughout the church’s history, it remains an ethical subject neglected by scholars. This study examines how New Testament texts might inform Christian approaches to disagreement. It is the first systematic consideration of disagreement as a New Testament theme; it follows, and critiques, the methodological approach of Richard Hays in The Moral Vision of the New Testament. The context is public disagreement among Christians: how the church speaks in public when facing its inevitable disagreements, and what theological and ethical concerns might inform how this speech proceeds. The thesis is in three parts. Part One is an examination of the New Testament in relation to disagreement, following Hays' 'descriptive task'. In Part Two, the 'synthetic' and 'hermeneutical' tasks of Hays' methodology are critiqued and some modifications are proposed; a theology of disagreement that emerges from the New Testament is outlined. Part Three considers some ecclesiological implications of this theology of disagreement. Following Hays' 'pragmatic task', it examines how moral theological insights from the New Testament interact with the life of the contemporary church. Illustrative examples consider the church's public theological witness, its pneumatology, and its liturgy, to demonstrate the need for a Christian ethic to engage with extra-Biblical authority with greater enthusiasm than Hays. The thesis concludes by affirming the particular value of reading the New Testament in pursuit of ethical wisdom, but without excluding insights from tradition, reason and experience. The challenge for the church is identified as a move Towards Loving Disagreement; an integral part of its mission is to disagree Christianly.

Synthetic biology is a relatively new discipline within the field of biotechnologies. In essence it is the artificial creation of microorganisms. Though similar in principle, it differs from genetic engineering because it creates an organism from scratch, rather than cutting and pasting DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) between existing organisms. This study investigates the ethical aspects (both rational and theological) concerned with synthetic biology through the use of a literature analysis. The study starts by investigating and describing the origins, pioneers, science and uses of synthetic biology. Secondly, it describes and ethically assesses the rational arguments for and against synthetic biology by comparing its benefits and risks. Lastly, the study describes and ethically assesses synthetic biology within the Reformed tradition, mainly by using the creational perspective of Christian ethical evaluations (including concepts such as creatio ex nihilio; creatio continua and imago Dei) and secondary the re-creational and eschatological perspectives. The final conclusion reached shows that synthetic biology is acceptable from a Reformed theological-ethical perspective, because humans as the image of God can create, just as God constantly creates new things and created a new universe from nothing. The rational arguments state that the potential benefits of synthetic biology surpass the risks it poses. Hence, it supports the idea that synthetic biology can be used to fulfil God’s commandment to love one’s neighbour, by improving his circumstances and activating hope. Nevertheless, Christians should always stay vigilant about motives and possible uses when dealing with new technologies. How and for what synthetic biology is used should in the future be constantly reviewed. In this way Christian scientists can still inquire about their work: Does it glorify God? / MA (Ethics), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015