This dissertation explores the transformation of American financial organization and governance over the postwar period. Through a case study of Citigroup, it seeks to explain how and why the global financial services supermarket became the dominant form of business organization in American finance and society. My core claim is that generational change in the late 1950s and 1960s swept into power a group of Interwar generation elites bearing with them a concept for the large financial firm and a vision of market order whose roots traced back to the Gilded Age. The timing and pattern of organizational and institutional change was, however, contingent on battles won and lost over particular features of their institutional environment.

On August 2, 2004, Citigroup traders based in the UK sold short more than $13 billion worth of government bonds only to buy them back seconds later at a profit of about $18.2 million dollars. This strategy was carefully planned, the consequences acknowledged by key participants, and it was profitable to the serious detriment of other market participants. The event is ethically questionable because it violates the spirit of European regulation. The purpose of this study is to investigate disclosures made by and about Citigroup surrounding a regulatory investigation into this short-sale within the contexts of legitimacy and institutional anomie theories.