Le 10 janvier 1984, les Etats-Unis et le Saint-Siège annoncent l’établissement de relations diplomatiques. Cette décision s’inscrit dans un contexte de tensions accrues entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union soviétique après la détente qui avait caractérisé les années 1970. L’accord idéologique semble parfait entre Ronald Reagan et Jean-Paul II, tous les deux connus pour leur anticommunisme farouche. Le rapprochement constaté dans les années 1980 a conduit certains à évoquer l’existence d’une alliance entre Rome et Washington ayant visé à précipiter la chute des régimes marxistes. Pourtant, une analyse plus poussée de leurs relations pendant cette période tend à infirmer cette lecture. Le Vatican ne va pas toujours approuver les politiques de déstabilisation des régimes marxistes menées par l’Administration Reagan, contrairement aux attentes de cette dernière. Washington, pris au dépourvu, va consentir des efforts importants pour convaincre Rome du bien fondé de sa politique étrangère. Négociations de désarmement, Initiative de défense stratégique, Amérique centrale et Pologne seront autant de sujets abordés pour essayer d’emporter l’adhésion du Saint-Siège, ou tout du moins pour éviter une condamnation, ne serait-ce qu’implicite, de sa politique. Parfois, le Saint-Siège va agir dans un sens favorable aux intérêts américains, mais quelle que soit l’effet de ses prises de position sur Washington, ces dernières s’expliquent par le fait que le Saint-Siège a agi selon des intérêts qui ne sont pas tous liés à la lutte contre le communisme. / On January 10, 1984, the United States and the Holy See announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The decision was made in a context of revived tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union after the détente of the 1970s. At first sight there seems to have been a perfect ideological convergence between President Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II, as both were famous for their vocal anticommunism. The rapprochement witnessed in the 1980s has led some to posit the existence of an alliance between Rome and Washington, the aim of which was to hasten the collapse of Marxist regimes. Yet, a closer analysis of Vatican-American relations during that period contradicts such an interpretation, as the Vatican did not by any means endorse all of Reagan’s Cold War-related policies. This led to efforts on the part of Washington to convince the Holy See of the legitimacy of its foreign policy options. Arms reduction, Strategic Def! ense Initiative, Central America, and Poland were some of the topics brought up by Washington in order to secure Vatican approval, or at the very least to prevent a condemnation, even an implicit one, of US policies. Sometimes, the Holy See did act in a manner construed as favorable to US interests. However, this was always in keeping with its own interests, which were not solely Cold War-related, and which the Vatican always pursued, whether they tallied with those of the United States or not.

This thesis examines the nature and impact of the Reagan administration’s self-described projection of “peace through strength.” It argues that Reagan’s defense spending surge, “Star Wars” (SDI) missile shield policy, and 1983 invasion of Grenada gave the president confidence and political cover that allowed him to withdraw U.S. Marines from Beirut in early 1984. Analysts and commentators focus on his muscular power projection like defense spending, SDI, and the invasion of Grenada, but in practice Reagan exercised a high level of restraint in troop deployment. These projections of power and the avoidance of protracted war in Lebanon gave Reagan further confidence and cover to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, against the protestations of anti-Soviet hardliners. Although Reagan supporters have credited the administration with either frightening or bankrupting the Soviets into disarmament, these policies—particularly his military restraint in Lebanon—did more to bring Reagan himself to the negotiation table. These power projection measures contributed to a “peace through strength” narrative embraced by much of Reagan’s domestic audience, allowing him to fend off accusations of Munich-style appeasement. While the defense spending surge helped give Reagan the confidence to ink an arms control agreement, the buildup created nonlinear consequences that will outlive arms control treaties.

La période suivant la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale connut à la fois le démantèlement des Empires coloniaux et la montée de la guerre froide. La place de l’Afrique constitua un enjeu crucial dans ce contexte de reconfiguration de l’ordre mondial. Après avoir déterminé les protagonistes politiques et culturels des processus de décolonisation, nous nous proposons d’étudier ses enjeux tels qu’ils s’incarnaient dans les différentes définitions que chaque acteur donnait à sa société, toujours associée à l’« Afrique ». En suivant ainsi l’évolution de la référence « africaine », cette étude veut mettre en lumière la transformation des valeurs dans les sociétés coloniales et postcoloniales de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, afin d’y trouver la genèse des nationalismes. Tout en puisant les exemples dans trois pays ouest-africains, il s’agit de s’intéresser à l’aspect constitutif de chaque entité. Celle-ci fut pensée en interaction avec d’autres entités coloniales, régionales et impériales, souvent au-delà des frontières. À travers l’analyse de l’ensemble du processus de la décolonisation, cette thèse permet de comprendre l’articulation qui s’est opérée entre les deux dynamiques qui le composent : le panafricanisme et le nationalisme. / The post-Second World War period saw both the dismantlement of the colonial empires and the beginnings of the Cold War. The place of Africa became a key issue in the configuration of the new world order. This thesis examines the processes of decolonisation through the examples of certain political and cultural protagonists, and the different ways in which they tried to shape their respective societies in relation to their visions of “Africa”. By following the evolution of the notion of “Africa”, this study aims to shed light on the changing values of the colonial and postcolonial societies of West Africa, linking these to the emergence of their nationalist movements. While drawing its examples from three West African countries, this work also seeks to highlight the constitutive aspects of each of these entities, which were conceived through interactions with other colonial, regional and imperial units, often across borders. By examining the process of decolonisation as a whole, this thesis offers an understanding of the complex dynamics between its two constituent forces: pan-Africanism and nationalism.

Orientador: Carlos Alberto Sampaio Barbosa / Banca: José Luis Bendicho Beired / Banca: Mary Anne Junqueira / Resumo: Em 1960 era lançado o filme O Álamo, dirigido, produzido e protagonizado por John Wayne, um dos maiores atores de Hollywood. O Álamo tratava da história de 180 combatentes que tomaram o forte de mesmo nome para lutar contra as tropas mexicanas lideradas pelo presidente General Antonio Lopes de Santa Anna. O filme de Wayne retrata um evento controverso da história compartilhada entre México e Estados Unidos. A Batalha do Álamo, como ficou conhecido o conflito revivido pelo filme de John Wayne, ocorreu entre 23 de fevereiro e 6 de março de 1836, e foi o cerco de 13 dias ao forte Álamo, pequena missão fundada por espanhóis no século XIX. Esta batalha está inserida no contexto da Revolução do Texas, conflito gerado por colonos da província de Coauhilia y Tejas que buscavam maior autonomia na gestão da colônia, assim como liberação da utilização de mão-de-obra escrava, abolida no México desde 1829. O filme de Wayne se insere no contexto político da Guerra Fria, conflito que polarizou o mundo entre Estados Unidos e União Soviética, apresentando um conflito entre um governo autoritário, o de Santa Anna, e rebeldes que lutam pela liberdade, grupo liderado Jim Bowie, Davy Crockett e William Travis. O Álamo ainda proporciona compreender quais as visões de mundo e tendências políticas seguidas por John Wayne, bem como o que ele entende sobre este conflito, que habita o imaginário americano desde o século XIX / Abstract: Battle of the Alamo, as it became known, occurred between February 23 and March 6, 1836, and was the siege of 13 days to the Alamo, a small mission founded by Spaniards in nineteenthcentury. This battle is embedded in the context of the Texas Revolution, a conflict generated by settlers from the province of Coahuila and Texas who sought greater autonomy in the management of the colony, as well as liberation from the use of slave labor abolished in Mexico since 1829. Wayne's film fits into the political context of the Cold War, a conflict that polarized the world between the United States and the Soviet Union, presenting a conflict between an authoritarian government, that of Santa Anna, and rebels fighting for freedom, group led by Jim Bowie, Davy Crockett and William Travis. The Alamo still provides an understanding of John Wayne's world views and political tendencies, as well as what he understands about this conflict, which inhabits the American imagination since the nineteenth century / Mestre

acase@tulane.edu

No description available.

American diplomatic historian’s consideration of the role of ideology in the formation of American foreign policy has only recently begun to receive more attention. Traditional focuses on economics and relations among great nation-states have predominated the historical literature. This work examines the powerful effect that ideology, particularly race and anti-communism, played in developing the U.S.’s relationship with a small power nation-state, Australia, between 1933 and 1953. This work is comparative in nature, relying on archival research in both American and Australian archives and examines the attitudes of both elite policymakers as well as common individuals in shaping the alliance between the two states. Theoretically, this work draws upon theories about whiteness that historians such as Theodore Allen and Matthew Frye Jacobson have formulated over the past twenty years. This dissertation concludes that a commitment to an ideology of race and anticommunism played a central role in the development of the American – Australian alliance contrary to standard historical interpretations that have placed economics or pragmatic national security interests at the center of the bond between the two states. The outcomes of this study offer new insights into the nature of alliance building by the U.S. in the twentieth century as well as a how ideology effects coalition warfare.

La diplomatie énergétique russe qui est au cœur de ce travail diffère des politiques industrielles classiques adoptées régulièrement par les Etats afin de développer leur pays, relancer son économie ou certains secteurs industriels. Elle entend en effet utiliser les ressources naturelles de la Russie, et singulièrement son potentiel énergétique (sachant que la Russie est à la fois producteur, consommateur, pays de transit) afin de retrouver son statut de grande puissance. Ce retour de puissance devant permettre à la Russie de sortir de la période de transition pour redevenir un acteur de premier rang dans un monde global redessiné par la fin de la guerre froide. Il s’agit pour elle de faire entendre sa voix, de participer en qualité de partenaire égal aux décisions et à l’élaboration des nouvelles normes rendues nécessaires par le bouleversement engendré par la fin de la guerre froide. La diplomatie énergétique russe s’affirme pendant les années 2003-2004, comme une démarche pragmatique, un moyen opportuniste de rencontrer un projet politique en utilisant un des rares leviers dont dispose ce pays appauvri et affaibli – sa puissance énergétique qu’il s’agit de transformer un outil de puissance politique, raison pour laquelle la politique étrangère russe va être mise au service de ce projet. Le travail fait donc référence aux spécificités internes de la Russie et au contexte international afin d’identifier les faiblesses et les forces de cette diplomatie spécifique. Russian energy diplomacy, with which this work is uniquely concerned, differs from the classic industrial policies adopted by states in order to re-launch their economies or certain industrial sectors. It has consisted of putting Russia’s natural resources and particularly its energy potential (as a producer, a consumer, and a transit country) to the practical purpose of restoring its status as a great power. For Russia, the return to power would permit the country to emerge from its period of transition and become a leading actor in the world reshaped by the ending of the cold war. It is a matter of making its voice heard, as an equal partner in international decisions and the formulation of the new political norms necessitated by post-cold war upheaval. In 2002-2004 Russia developed this energy diplomacy as a pragmatic and opportunistic means of attaining a political objective with one of the few levers at the disposal of an impoverished and enfeebled country – that is to say, its energy potential, which it turned into a political tool. To this effect, Russian foreign policy has been made to serve the same project. Consequently this work deals with internal specificities and the international energy context, in order to probe both the weakness and the strength of this particular form of diplomacy.

No description available.

This work aims to analyze the responses of Syria to two international changes comparatively. After the end of the Cold War, US initiated a foreign policy doctrine based on American hegemony. This policy was firstly manifested in the war on Iraq as a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on January 17, 1991. It was noteworthy to see Syria aligning with the US during the Gulf War (1990-1991), as the country had been allied against the US during the Cold War period. Syria was also the first state accepting US proposal for a peace conference known as Madrid Peace Conference. All these developments reveal that Syria had been cooperated with the US in the aftermath of the Cold War. The second international change analyzed within the framework of this study is the September 11 events. Following the September 11 attacks, the US declared a &ldquo / war on terror&rdquo / to recover its superpower position and intervened in Afghanistan and then Iraq. In that process, Syria opted for countering the US and became the leading critique of the invasion of Iraq. This study examines the different responses of Syria to the end of the Cold War and the post-September 11 period through using neoclassical realism as a model.