Due to increased adoption of irrigation and advancements in technology, producers in the Mississippi Delta have been unsustainably depleting the water stocks in the Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVAA). This research investigates the impacts of various regulatory threats uniformly applied to heterogeneously located producers to avert further overexploitation of the MRVAA. If a regulatory threat successfully incentivizes reduction of producers’ extraction rates, costly implementation of a binding limited-use regulation could be avoided. Laboratory experiments incorporating the major characteristics of the MRVAA were conducted to test two threatened uniform policies, limited-use and moratorium. The main finding of the research is that even with the threat of a moratorium, the regulatory trigger point was too lax to result in significantly slowing over exploitation of the water resource.

A Common Pool Resource (CPR) is a natural or man-made resource system with open or widespread access where the resources are depletable with increased use. CPR examples include forests, pastures, irrigations, rivers, lakes, and fisheries. This research examines a common pool resource in Thailand, i.e. a canal in Nonthaburi Province (NP). The canal, named Klong Om-Klong Bangkok Noi-Klong Bang Kruai, is utilised for agriculture, transportation, commerce, tourism and aesthetics. Currently, urbanisation threatens the canal through changes in land use along the canal. Also, an increasing amount of garbage and water hyacinths in the canal are degrading the quality of the canal environment and waterway transportation. The aims of this thesis were to identify essential factors in the canal system that support the success of collective action in environmental management. This study analyses CPR management in the NP canal system by applying design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions. These have been identified by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990; 1992) and by analysing the situational variables as barriers or resources for collective action. The research was conducted on five communities in Thailand. The primary data collection techniques were qualitative and consisted of two different interview processes and five focus groups. The interviews were completed with local residents and government officials while the focus groups were completed with individuals from five communities. The N6 computer program for handling qualitative data was used to analyse the responses.

The aim of behavior analysis has always been to apply technologies rooted in basic behavioral principles to problems of societal importance (e.g., Skinner, 1948; 1953; 1987). One such problem is the Tragedy of the Commons - a phenomenon arising from systemic failures among a community, leading to the total collapse of a critical resource (Hardin, 1968). Elinor Ostrom's Eight Design Principles were developed to provide a framework for the self-management of common pool resources (CPRs; Ostrom, 1990/2015). When applied as an independently manipulated variable, Ostrom's design principles have shown strong effects in the management of CPRs within the context of a tabletop board game Catan® (Smith & Becker, 2023). This preparation included both rewards (i.e., positive reinforcement) and sanctions (i.e., positive punishment) as a feature of the independent variable. However, it has been well documented that punishing and coercive contingencies can lead to problematic outcomes for individuals and societies (e.g., Sidman, 2001; Skinner, 1976). This study evaluated the effects of utilizing only rewarding consequences in lieu of sanctions in an effort to produce the previously observed control over self-management of a CPR, utilizing the previously adapted rules of the Catan® board game.

This dissertation focuses on the spatial aspects of oil and natural gas production to investigate the extent and effects of inefficient and unnecessary spatial competition. Because oil and natural gas are migratory, operators can cause hydrocarbon resources to flow from a neighboring property onto his or her own through rapid extraction. This problem is compounded when productive leases are comparatively small, as is the case in Texas. Following an introduction and literature review, the third chapter takes advantage of a natural experiment to demonstrate how spillovers in production limit total cumulative recovery, and how the assignment of secure property rights can enhance economic outcomes. The chapter examines production from wells in Oklahoma and Texas near the panhandle border. While wells on either side of this line have similar geologies and so should be similarly productive they are exposed to different treatments: Oklahoma has a much higher rate of unitization (a contractual scheme where competing owners hire a common operator and share profits), whereas the unitization rate in Texas is lower. Using regression discontinuity design, I find that Oklahoma wells are produced more slowly early on, and that this results in greater cumulative recovery over the course of a well’s life (150% more relative to Texas). These results are robust after controlling for reservoir specific effects, and across parametric, semi-parametric and nonparametric specifications. xiiThe fourth chapter quantifies the degree to which competing owners interfere with each other’s production through spatial spillovers. I use a spatial econometric model that controls for spatial autocorrelation and spatial dependence and can therefore identify the spillovers in production. Additionally, by comparing leases owned by competing producers to leases owned by a common producer, I show empirically how securing property rights through common ownership can alleviate the externality in production. A priori, one would expect that when a common producer owns adjacent leases, the producer has the incentive to fully account for how spillovers in production affect neighboring wells. Conversely, when adjacent landowners are in competition to extract the resource, they will not account for the damage rapid production causes at neighboring wells. After controlling for secondary injection I find that this is indeed the case for Slaughter field of West Texas. The fifth chapter investigates the statistical properties of oil and natural gas production. I find striking evidence that both oil and natural gas production are power-law distributed with the exponent approximately equal to one. This distribution might arise from disequilibrium in production and exploration. Highlighting this distribution is important because it has potential consequences for the political economy of regulation as well as for resource management. For example, because the most productive wells lie in the far-right tail of the distribution, regulation geared to prevent a Deepwater Horizon scale spill need fall on a vanishingly small percent of wells. The distribution also has consequences for management because a company profitability depends disproportionately on how it manages its most productive wells. The sixth chapter provides a short conclusion.

This dissertation focuses on the spatial aspects of oil and natural gas production to investigate the extent and effects of inefficient and unnecessary spatial competition. Because oil and natural gas are migratory, operators can cause hydrocarbon resources to flow from a neighboring property onto his or her own through rapid extraction. This problem is compounded when productive leases are comparatively small, as is the case in Texas. Following an introduction and literature review, the third chapter takes advantage of a natural experiment to demonstrate how spillovers in production limit total cumulative recovery, and how the assignment of secure property rights can enhance economic outcomes. The chapter examines production from wells in Oklahoma and Texas near the panhandle border. While wells on either side of this line have similar geologies and so should be similarly productive they are exposed to different treatments: Oklahoma has a much higher rate of unitization (a contractual scheme where competing owners hire a common operator and share profits), whereas the unitization rate in Texas is lower. Using regression discontinuity design, I find that Oklahoma wells are produced more slowly early on, and that this results in greater cumulative recovery over the course of a well’s life (150% more relative to Texas). These results are robust after controlling for reservoir specific effects, and across parametric, semi-parametric and nonparametric specifications. xiiThe fourth chapter quantifies the degree to which competing owners interfere with each other’s production through spatial spillovers. I use a spatial econometric model that controls for spatial autocorrelation and spatial dependence and can therefore identify the spillovers in production. Additionally, by comparing leases owned by competing producers to leases owned by a common producer, I show empirically how securing property rights through common ownership can alleviate the externality in production. A priori, one would expect that when a common producer owns adjacent leases, the producer has the incentive to fully account for how spillovers in production affect neighboring wells. Conversely, when adjacent landowners are in competition to extract the resource, they will not account for the damage rapid production causes at neighboring wells. After controlling for secondary injection I find that this is indeed the case for Slaughter field of West Texas. The fifth chapter investigates the statistical properties of oil and natural gas production. I find striking evidence that both oil and natural gas production are power-law distributed with the exponent approximately equal to one. This distribution might arise from disequilibrium in production and exploration. Highlighting this distribution is important because it has potential consequences for the political economy of regulation as well as for resource management. For example, because the most productive wells lie in the far-right tail of the distribution, regulation geared to prevent a Deepwater Horizon scale spill need fall on a vanishingly small percent of wells. The distribution also has consequences for management because a company profitability depends disproportionately on how it manages its most productive wells. The sixth chapter provides a short conclusion.

The exponential growth of the human population has contributed to the overuse and degradation of common pool resources. Using science as a tool for informed policy-making can improve the management of our common pool resources. Understanding the conditions that influence groups of individuals to make ethical self-controlled choices may help solve problems related to the overuse and degradation of common pool resources. Ethical self-control involves the conflict of choice between one that will benefit the individual versus one that will benefit the group. The cumulative effect of many individuals behaving in an ethically self-controlled manner with common resource use may offset some of the harm posed by overuse of common pool resources. Metacontingency arrangements involving ethical self-control may provide some insight as to if and how groups may cooperate to manage a common pool resource. This manuscript proposes an experimental preparation and methodology to evaluate the effects of competing magnitudes of cultural consequences on culturants and their cumulative effect on common pool resources; and provides an analysis and discussion of five trends that might result from such a line of research.

No description available.

This paper concerns the planning for sustainable development of a global common pool resource within an autocratic region. The study is focused on the coral reef of the Red Sea, shared between the basin countries; Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Israel, Jordan and Eritrea, where most nations are autocracies and developing countries. The viewpoint of this research is the only multinational project within the region focused on the conservation and sustainability of the coral reefs in the Red Sea, the “Regional Action Plan for the Conservation of Coral Reefs in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (RAP CCRRSGA)”. The aim of the research in this paper is to study the planning of this project in relation to sustainable development, through an interpretation of Ostrom’s framework using seven out of eight design principles. This research is executed through a method of ideal-type analysis, in order to assess how ideal-types of these design principles correlate with the planning of this project through similarities between the project and the design principles. This research has resulted in and demonstrated the importance of clarified compliance and cooperation, to reach effective and successful planning of sustainable development pertaining to a shared common pool resource within an autocratic region.

<p>This paper deals with relationship between irrigation and agriculture and conflicts within an irrigation system and as well between other stakeholders concerning the water. Irrigated lands are up to 2.5 times more productive compared to rain-fed agriculture. They are important element in the agriculture sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, and have been favoured by governments and donor agencies for their high rate of return. Without proper technical equipments or support negative impacts on the environment are linked to irrigation activities. Furthermore, a case study was made in Tanzania, Kiru Valley, regarding the tension between big scale and small-scale farmers as result from the water decline. The results demonstrate that the institutions do not have the power to solve the conflict. It is difficult to define the different stakeholders and the boundaries of the area that affect the amount of water in the valley.</p>

This dissertation examines the organizational aspects of fish and wildlife management for Native American nations. Fish and wildlife management is an arena of great importance to many Native nations in subsistence, economic and cultural realms. Additionally, fish and wildlife, being common-pool resources, offer interesting management challenges. My research focuses on what happens when Native American nations exercise self-determination in this arena which requires them for both political and practical reasons to interact with state and federal governments and for economic reasons to deal with markets, all while attempting to meet the needs of their nations. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and drawing upon survey and case study research with Native American fish and wildlife programs, I examine how tribes manage their fish and wildlife resources and with what results.This research helps identify under what conditions tribes may achieve various management goals. In some important ways, tribes are limited in what they can do, particularly in regards to land base size and degree of jurisdiction over non-Indians. More importantly, however, this research identifies some of the many ways tribes can work to take charge of or support tribal fish and wildlife management without having to appeal to outsiders. While there are some very real limitations to fish and wildlife management external to tribes, within those limits, tribes have opportunities to assume and be effective in resource management.This dissertation also provides evidence to suggest that as tribes are better able to determine their own management and governance paths, elements of clan structures and logics develop where the organizational literature would predict they would not. Studying tribal fish and wildlife programs in particular offers an examination of these clan-like features typically found only on the societal fringes. Perhaps even more importantly, this dissertation research demonstrates that there are different governance structures, or logics, co-existing and operating in hybrid forms. For tribes, these hybrid structures create some challenges and inconsistencies that more pure governance structures would not. Nevertheless, these hybrid structures also allow for flexibility and effectiveness in responding to the diverse stakeholders invested in or influencing tribal fish and wildlife management.