Theses--Berlin. / Includes bibliographical references.

The project examines the relationship between perception and action, and is divided into two parts. The first establishes a detailed philosophical critique of recent sensorimotor or enactive approaches to perception, targeting in particular the work of Alva Noë. In the second part I defend what may be called an 'action-space' account, according to which conscious experience is constituted by an agent's representing his surroundings in such a way as to enable a certain suite of actions. The enactive approach, I argue, misconstrues the relationship between perception and action and fails in its aim to provide an explanation of consciousness. It faces difficulties, too, when it comes to illusion, hallucination and non-visual perception. The action-space model, by contrast, drawing upon work by Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett and Philip Pettit, has the resources to provide a reductive, functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness; an account that locates consciousness where we want it - in the service of fluid world-engagement by embodied, active perceivers. Thus the perception/action interface is taken to be less direct than on the sensorimotor interpretation, but is nonetheless deep and important. The approach I endorse, furthermore, is consistent with and informed by empirical results from the cognitive sciences, including work on embodied, situated cognition and dual-streams analyses of visual processing.

Misinterpretations of William James' pragmatic account of truth are due to three main factors. First, the failure to see the connection between James' account of truth and his account of reality (that is, the connection between pragmatism and radical empiricism). Second, the failure to see James' philosophical project as essentially involving the reinterpretation of traditional philosophical concepts. Third, the mistaken belief that pragmatism provides a formula or rule for determining the truth or falsity of beliefs. In this thesis, these three factors provided a framework for my own interpretation of James' account of truth. In the introduction, I briefly discuss the connection between pragmatism and radical empiricism. In the first chapter, I show that philosophical notions like 'consciousness', 'perception', 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' are reinterpreted in James' account of reality. In the second chapter, I show how his reinterpretations of 'correspondence', 'coherence', and 'utility' lead to what is better called an 'account' of truth instead of a 'theory' of truth. The third chapter provides further elaboration on his account of truth by examining conceptual systems and 'necessary' truths. In the conclusion, I examine the emphasis which separates James' pragmatic account of truth from other versions, namely, the emphasis on individual experience in determining and constituting truth. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

This thesis examines key concepts from philosophers Nishida Kitaro, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Fredriche Nietzsche and applies them to elements of Michael Chekhov’s practice of acting. The three philosophers, in different ways, suggest an ‘optimal’ state, beyond a dualistic separation of the fictive from the real and the visible from the invisible, that challenges seemingly unbridgeable dualisms between inner and outer, subject and object, being and becoming and experiencer and experienced. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and understand these selected ‘optimal’ modes of consciousness in performance and, therefore, open up new ways of thinking about Michael Chekhov’s acting processes; in particular the ‘Psychological Gesture’. The thesis asks the following questions: 1. How can the application of selected philosophical paradigms to the Psychological Gesture through theory and practice further our understanding of Michael Chekhov’s work? 2. How do selected aspects of the fields of phenomenology, post-phenomenology, cognitive sciences, consciousness studies and philosophy of mind, aid in developing an articulation and understanding of an ‘optimal’ state of consciousness as a necessary aspect of the actor’s performance in Michael Chekhov’s work and theatre practice? 3. How can this project develop the way we are able to talk about Michael Chekhov’s work and wider acting processes?