Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, January 2010. / Electronic version restricted until 28th January 2015.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Freie Universität, Berlin, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 276-290).

Thesis (LLM) --University of Pretoria, 2009. / No abstract available. Includes bibliographical references .

This dissertation examines the role of the social struggles and alliances in shaping the Constitutional Court rulings that structure core political controversies in Turkey. By adopting Joel Migdal’s State-in-Society approach, the Court is conceived as an organization that exists in an environment of conflict. By following a process oriented approach, this study analyzes the ways in which the relation between the Court and other actors influence the Constitutional Court of Turkey’s motives, capacity and manner of activism mainly during the period under the 1961 Constitution. This study argues that the limits of the Court’s power and its role in structuring the core political controversies that define and divide society can be explained by looking at the alliances formed between the Court and other actors. Alliances extend the jurisdiction of the Court by opening new avenues for political intervention and creating a support network for the reasoning and the justification of its rulings. By comparing the Court’s activism under the 1961 Constitution and under the 1982 Constitution, it is demonstrated that neither the nature nor the influence of these alliances remains static. In fact, this dissertation points out that we need to make a conceptual differentiation between two forms of alliances; strategic alliances and judicial coalitions. Strategic alliances refer to implicit alliances between the Court and other actors formed around an issue, whereas judicial coalitions refer to alliances based on a common normative framework and a shared identity. Whereas the Court’s activism in the first period is best described in terms of a strategic alliance, its activism in the 1990’s and 2000’s is best described with the term judicial coalition. / 10000-01-01

Constitutional approaches have been frequently employed in recent international legal literature. This unavoidably triggers the question of the quality of international law as a constitutionalized legal system. This thesis attempts to answer such a question by determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionalized international legal system and whether or not, at present, such minimum requirements have been fulfilled. The main difficulty in the articulation of these conditions is the semantic problem regarding the contours and content of constitutionalism caused by the transfer of this highly contested concept to the international context. In order to understand the destination context, a cosmopolitan paradigm will be consulted to provide explanations for the state-centred character of international law as part of the world’s multi-level governance. The thesis argues that the conditions for a constitutionalized international legal system must be articulated based on the viability of the proposed legal structure and its capacity to fulfil the underlying aims of international constitutionalism. The viability criterion demands compatibility with the pluralist structure of international society. The capacity criterion requires that the proposed legal structure can fulfil the underlying aim of international constitutionalism, which is, due to its complementary relationship with domestic constitutional sites, to create international self-governance with a limited mandate for peace and fundamental human rights. Thus, it is proposed that, in order to qualify as a constitutional legal system, international law must first be sufficiently equipped with secondary rules which will provide efficacy for international law to exist as a legal system. Secondly, there must also exist a hierarchy conferring a constitutional status on certain international primary rules protecting peace and fundamental human rights. Finally, international constitutionalization requires the institutionalization of international constituted power. The examination of whether or not each condition has been met in the current international legal structure is undertaken in order to determine the constitutional quality of international law, paying particular attention to the role of jus cogens rules and the United Nations in the process of international constitutionalization. It is argued that with the existence of the three elements, international law has already been constitutionalized to a large extent. However, there remain some deficiencies especially with regard to the legitimacy of the exercise of power on matters of peace and security by the Security Council, which require further constitutionalization.

It has become almost universal practice for countries to adopt written constitutions that include a bill of rights. Yet we know little about the origins and evolution of the practice of constitution-writing on a global scale. Are bills of rights defining statements of the nation’s character and identity? Or are they more standardized documents that are similar across countries, and vary only at the margins? Are substantive constitutional features rooted in the society for which they are written, or are they borrowed from elsewhere? What are the origins of the world’s “words of liberty”? This thesis presents the first-ever systematic substantive exploration of the world’s written constitutions. It introduces a new database, based on the coding of the constitutions of 188 countries, for the period 1946-2006. With this data, it explores the historical trajectory of the world’s written constitutions and offers explanations for their substantive content. This thesis's most important finding is that constitutions are inherently “transnational” documents. As it turns out, substantive constitutional choices are remarkably unrelated to local needs and values. Constitutions do not express identity or national character. Instead, the most important predictor of whether any particular country adopts any particular constitutional provision is whether other countries previously did the same thing. Constitutions do not tell stories of the nation’s history, but rather tell stories of transnational interactions and international politics. As a result, constitutions have become at least partly standardized documents that vary along a small number of underlying dimensions. But this thesis also shows that not all constitutions are the same, and that there exists no evidence of a global constitutional convergence. Instead, the world’s constitutions divide in a limited number of constitutional families. This thesis is not currently available in ORA.

This thesis concerns the theoretical issues that arise in the application of the constitutional model known as the plurinational state, developed through the experience of such Western liberal democratic states as Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom, to non-Western contexts of national pluralism through the case study of Sri Lanka. There are two closely intertwined and complementary objectives to the thesis. Firstly, to provide a fresh analytical and prescriptive framework of understanding and potential solutions to the constitutionally unresolved problem of national pluralism in Sri Lanka that has so far only generated protracted conflict. Secondly and more importantly, to contribute in more general terms to the theoretical literature on plurinational constitutionalism by way of the comparative insights generated through applying the model to an empirical context that is fundamentally different in a number of ways to that from which it originally emerged. In this latter, comparative, exercise, there are three key empirical grounds of difference that are identified in the thesis. Firstly, the difference between the sociological character of nationalisms in the two contexts, defined at the most basic level by the civic-ethnic dichotomy; secondly, the different meanings of democratic modernity in the present, determined by colonial modernity and post-colonial ethnocracy; and thirdly, the differences in the substantive content of democracy as between liberal and nonliberal democracies. The thesis argues that the plurinational state may be adapted to have a role and relevance beyond Western conditions, by addressing the theoretical issues that arise from these divergences. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that ethnic forms of nationalism are not necessarily inconsistent with the plurinational logic of accommodation; that an exploration of pre-colonial history reveals indigenous forms of the state that are more consistent with plurinational ideals than the classical modernist Westphalian nation-state introduced by nineteenth century colonialism; and that plurinational constitutions may be based on a broader conception of democracy than political liberalism. Building on these discussions, the principal normative contribution of the thesis is the development of a constitutional theory for the accommodation of national pluralism that is based on the norm of asymmetry, as distinct from equality, between multiple nations within the territorial and historical space of the state.

On June 26th, 2015 the United States Supreme Court handed down a much anticipated decision answering whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex.[1] In a divisive 5-4 decision, the majority ruled that marriage as a fundamental liberty applies to same-sex couples. Although, Obergefell v. Hodges was facially related to the LGTBQ movement, in reality, this case was pivotally about the Supreme Court's role in our society. Obergefell was a fisticuff battle between liberal and conservative jurisprudence over the Court’s influence on the democratic process in America. This paper will attempt to show that the majority’s ruling, and the reasoning they used to reach it, was inconsistent with the Framers’ wishes for the role of the Court in our constitutional democracy. [1] "Obergefell v. Hodges." Oyez, 3 Dec. 2017, www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556.

The thesis is divided into four sections. The first section lays down a method of interpretation of S.91 and S.92 of the B.N.A. Act. The suggested method is comprised of making three enquiries:- Is the statute in question within S.92---is the statute within a S.91 enumerated power and is the statute within the residuary general power? The validity of this method rests on four propositions viz:- S.91 comprises the residue of powers after the provinces have been given certain basic heads of powers; the enumerated powers in S.91 are supreme over those contained in S.92; where the subject matter of the statute in question goes beyond local or provincial concern or interest it will fall within the general federal power under S.91 even though it might otherwise appear to come within S.92; where neither S.92 nor S.91 enumerated powers apply the statute in question falls under the residuary federal power in S.91. Each one of these propositions is examined and supported. The second section deals with the general rules of construction of the powers in S.91 and S.92. The matter is approached from the idea of a dichotomy between factors and formulae in constitutional interpretation. The factors are those matters that guide the court in answering the questions posed in the first section and the formulae are the rationales given for the decisions. This approach is inseverably connected with the concept of constitutional decisions being evaluative judgments. The evaluative judgment made in answering the original questions is referred to as the 'nexus' judgment. The place of precedent, evidence and extrinsic material in relation to the factors is then examined and the general ideas prevalent in Canadian constitutional interpretation such as the double aspect, ancillary, trenching, paramountcy and severability doctrines are looked at in the light of this 'nexus' judgment. The strength and identity of the factors will vary from individual power to power and the criminal law power is adopted as an illustration of the use of the factorial approach. This illustrative use comprises the third section of the thesis. The lack of logical limits to the power is first shown and then the general factors of construction, purpose and effect are used to provide a basis for constitutional prediction. The evaluation of factors is viewed both from the standpoint of federal legislation and that of the provinces. No attempt is made to give an exhaustive survey of the interpretation of the criminal law power. It is merely given as an illustration of the use of the factorial approach. The final section is the conclusion and recapitulates the major principles contained in the earlier sections. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

In Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that ss. 35(1) is “a solemn commitment that must be given meaningful content” the objective of which is to ensure that Aboriginal rights “are taken seriously.” Despite such a clear directive from the highest court, in Manitoba Métis Federation v. Canada [2007], MacInnes J. of the Queen’s Bench of Manitoba seemed incapable of taking seriously the Aboriginal title of the Métis under s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and in no way thought of its explicit recognition as ‘a solemn commitment that must be given meaningful content’. For his part, if Scott C.J. of the Manitoba Court of Appeal was able to find a ‘cognizable Aboriginal interest’ in the expression ‘Indian title’, and thereby recognize to some extent Métis Aboriginal rights, he seemed incapable of conceiving such interests as title. This thesis is basically an attempt to ‘take seriously’ the common law Aboriginal title of the Métis. In order to do so, it first looks at the treatment of the concept of Indian title and the Royal Proclamation, 1763, in the lower courts throughout the infamous St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber case. Subsequently, the existing common law doctrines of inherent Métis rights, those of the derivative rights doctrine, the empty box doctrine and the distinct Aboriginal people doctrine are all found to be inadequate to the task of providing cogency to the ‘constitutional imperative’ that was evoked in Powley. A fourth doctrine is therefore proposed, that of a Métis Autochthonous or Indigenous rights doctrine. In light of this, it is argued that the recognition of the ‘Indian’ title in s. 31 was not a mere ‘political expediency’ but is rooted in the underlying constitutional principle of the protection of minorities. Furthermore, insofar as the ‘Indian’ title of the Métis is taken seriously, it can be seen as having been extinguished through the federal power over ‘lands reserved for Indians’ under ss. 91(24). The legal implication is that they were, in the logic of the times, basically enfranchised ‘Indians’. Finally, by applying the grid established in Sioui for determining the existence of a ‘treaty’, it is argued that s. 31 is a ‘treaty’ or land claims settlement within the meaning of s. 35.