I investigate the way in which Australian managers issue their earnings forecasts, and the impact this has on the reaction of equity investors and security analysts. Using a sample of 233 management earnings forecasts issued from 1994 to 2001, I find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts when they have bad earnings news than good earnings news. I find that a vast majority of forecasts are ???framed??? by the use of an accompanying earnings benchmark. Forecasts are issued with varying degrees of specificity (or precision) and also with variation in additional accompanying disclosures. Forecasts issued with negative framing (forecast earnings less than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by statements about factors external to the firm in explaining performance, while forecasts issued with positive framing (forecast earnings greater than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by additional verifiable forecasts of components of earnings. I find the market reaction to earnings forecasts released with positive framing is higher than for forecasts released with negative framing, after controlling for forecast news and other forecast properties. I also examine security analysts??? forecasts around the release of management earnings forecasts and find that after the release of a management earnings forecast, analyst activity increases, but that analysts??? forecasts become less accurate and more biased. Neither the extent of analyst activity nor changes in analysts??? forecast accuracy or bias is related to forecast framing.

I investigate the way in which Australian managers issue their earnings forecasts, and the impact this has on the reaction of equity investors and security analysts. Using a sample of 233 management earnings forecasts issued from 1994 to 2001, I find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts when they have bad earnings news than good earnings news. I find that a vast majority of forecasts are ???framed??? by the use of an accompanying earnings benchmark. Forecasts are issued with varying degrees of specificity (or precision) and also with variation in additional accompanying disclosures. Forecasts issued with negative framing (forecast earnings less than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by statements about factors external to the firm in explaining performance, while forecasts issued with positive framing (forecast earnings greater than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by additional verifiable forecasts of components of earnings. I find the market reaction to earnings forecasts released with positive framing is higher than for forecasts released with negative framing, after controlling for forecast news and other forecast properties. I also examine security analysts??? forecasts around the release of management earnings forecasts and find that after the release of a management earnings forecast, analyst activity increases, but that analysts??? forecasts become less accurate and more biased. Neither the extent of analyst activity nor changes in analysts??? forecast accuracy or bias is related to forecast framing.

ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the legal and theoretical basis of continuous disclosure regulation in Australia as it applies to listed companies. An empirical study is undertaken to further investigate the operation of the legislation. As part of the Enhanced Disclosure regime, the continuous disclosure provision was effective from 5 September 1994 as s1001A of the Corporations Law, now the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This statutory provision is replaced by s674, inserted by Schedule 2 to the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), and effective from 11 March 2002. The provision reinforces Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rule 3.1. The rule requires a listed disclosing entity to notify ASX immediately of information that would be expected to have a �material effect� on the share price of the company. However, the disclosure requirement is weakened by a number of specific exemptions or �carve-outs� to listing rule 3.1. If a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed, and if the confidentiality of the information is maintained, then disclosure is not mandatory in special circumstances. This study analyses 427 query notices, issued by ASX to listed companies from July 1995 to April 1996. The queries request information concerning unexplained movements in a company�s share price or a failure to comply with the listing rules. An analysis of the companies� replies to these notices provides a profile of the type of company that is likely to be queried. The study also attempts to evaluate the extent to which these companies have relied on the �carve-outs� as an exemption to the regulation.

ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the legal and theoretical basis of continuous disclosure regulation in Australia as it applies to listed companies. An empirical study is undertaken to further investigate the operation of the legislation. As part of the Enhanced Disclosure regime, the continuous disclosure provision was effective from 5 September 1994 as s1001A of the Corporations Law, now the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This statutory provision is replaced by s674, inserted by Schedule 2 to the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), and effective from 11 March 2002. The provision reinforces Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rule 3.1. The rule requires a listed disclosing entity to notify ASX immediately of information that would be expected to have a �material effect� on the share price of the company. However, the disclosure requirement is weakened by a number of specific exemptions or �carve-outs� to listing rule 3.1. If a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed, and if the confidentiality of the information is maintained, then disclosure is not mandatory in special circumstances. This study analyses 427 query notices, issued by ASX to listed companies from July 1995 to April 1996. The queries request information concerning unexplained movements in a company�s share price or a failure to comply with the listing rules. An analysis of the companies� replies to these notices provides a profile of the type of company that is likely to be queried. The study also attempts to evaluate the extent to which these companies have relied on the �carve-outs� as an exemption to the regulation.