This paper studies the contribution behavior and cooperation of subjects in different immigration situations via a dynamic public good game. This dynamic environment, in which a subject’s income at the end of the decision will become an endowment for the next decision, also offers an opportunity to study growth as measured by group income and inequality via the Gini coefficient. Overall, contribution does not converge to zero, nor does it decrease over time, and subjects are very contributive in nature. The best scenario to boost contributions among subjects is when immigrants reduce a subject’s income in the current period, but promise to increase growth in the future. In all treatments, inequality significantly increases over time for the unsuccessful group (below the median group income), while the successful group (above the median group income) mostly has lower inequality with a constant, or slightly increasing, trend. There is a positive relationship between growth and inequality in the treatment where immigrants have no impact on subjects’ income, and also where immigrants reduce subjects’ income without future promise. This positive relationship implies that the group growth can be achieved only with an increase in inequality (or less cooperation between subjects). However, a slightly negative relationship occurs in the scenario where the immigrants reduce subjects’ income in the current period, but promise to increase growth in the future. This negative relationship implies that group growth can be achieved without any inequality (or more cooperation between subjects). The overall findings in this paper provide insights into the contribution behavior and cooperation of subjects, when considering the different economic impacts of immigrants in their society.