Corporate governance refers to a complementary set of legal, economic and social institutions to protect the interests of corporate owners by securing long-term corporate stability. A corporate governance system is comprised of a wide range of practices and institutions, from accounting standards and laws concerning financial disclosure, through executive compensation, to the size and composition of corporate board all envisaging monitoring responsibility on the part of the investors to protect them from expropriation by managers. Managers’ power and prestige in running a large and powerful corporation give them superior access to inside information and thus a privileged position as compared to the numerous and dispersed shareholders. The principal concern of the present work is the UK-model of corporate governance and the role of institutional shareholders in the governance of their investee companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. The proportion of the listed UK equity market owned by major shareholders grew enormously between the early 1960s and 2008. Whereas in the early 1930s, individual investors had 80% of the securities traded on the London Stock Exchange, now the ownership structure of public listed companies has significantly changed so that institutional investors have become the dominant players on the British financial market with 88.7% share-ownership of listed companies. This significant growth of institutional ownership has coincided with the emergence of self-regulatory corporate governance practices. The British model has played a pioneering role for the development of a self-regulatory approach to corporate governance framework from the Code of Best Practices 1992 to the Combined Code 2008 and the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 and the Stewardship Code 2010. The self-regulatory approach on the basis of the ‘comply or explain’ principle adopted by the British model has now been in operation for the last two decades. The operational flexibility of the ‘comply or explain’ approach not only encourages the companies to adopt the general spirit of the code rather than the letter but also takes into account the monitoring responsibility of the institutional investors. This latter feature of the UK approach is based on the assumption that institutions have an economically-rational self-interest to monitor and actively engage with their investee companies to evaluate the veracity of their disclosure statements and thus to protect their investments.The crucial question asked by this thesis, however, is why institutional investors are not behaving as the model expects them to and thus why they have in fact been acting as ‘absentee owners’. Their perfunctory monitoring behaviour by adopting a ‘box-ticking’ approach on the basis of a ‘comply or perform’ analysis appears to have contributed significantly to the financial crisis. This thesis moves on from this observation, however, in order to consider whether there is anything that can be done to improve the monitoring behaviour of institutional investors. In this regard, it begins by noting that institutional investors are not homogeneous; some are companies while others are trusts; they face different problems of collective action, short-termism, conflicts of interest and managerial manipulation. The thesis accordingly considers whether there are any existing powers and remedies within company law and trust law that could be brought to bear in order to encourage or even enforce improved monitoring by institutional investors within the UK’s corporate governance model, which even in the aftermath of the financial crisis remains steadfastly wedded to self-regulation.

In the recent years, there have been many reports on the prevalence of corruption in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Corruption impacts negatively on the image of organisations since it erodes public trust and delegitimises such organisations. Therefore, good corporate governance practices should be adopted to prevent corruption. The purpose of this study was to analyse the governance system of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development with the view to identifying shortcomings in the system.

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Research report to the SBL, Unisa, Midrand. / The research project aimed to establish whether corporate governance is important to investors from a value perspective. The implications and recommendations for further research were provided.

This thesis is dealing with problems connected with the term The care of proper manager, that forms the basic requirement of quality of work margin in czech companies. The content is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter brings an introduction into the dilemma. It is stated here why have I chosen this topic, why do I consider this topic to be important and I am laying down the aims of my thesis. In the end, there are mentioned the methods which has been used while writting this thesis. The second chapter, the most extensive one, is focused on Proper manager' s care as a term. It is trying to define, describe and file this term legislatively; not only in terms of company law, but also in the scope of other legal enactments. Then the work focuses on subjects on which is laid the duty of conducting issues with Proper manager's care. Then there is mentioned the historical evolution of this term. In, according to my opinion, the most important part of this thesis; the term Proper manager's care is determined in comparison with the terms Appropriate care and Professional care. All these terms are later assigned to certain models of formulation of requirement of quality of work margin. The third chapter is dedicated to the issues of breaking of the proper manager's care and to the consequences of...

The specificity of the anglo-saxon and continental understanding of corporate governance The goal of my thesis is to characterise specifics of anglo-saxon and continental corporporate governance with regard to the different historic background, capital markets` development degree, theoretical issues, shareholder structure, methods of investment funding and the organizational structure models in both of these legal cultures. The scope of the research is focused only on comparison of two systems and concepts of the corporate governance rather than overall description and analysis of its every single aspect. Second part of this paper is dedicated to the takeover bids issue, as one of the external aspects of corporate governance. Subchapter 1.1 is introductory and endeavours to define the concept of corporate governance. Subchapter 1.2 examines the history and first ocuurence of the corporate governance issues that is very closely connected to the so called "separation of ownership and control" phenomenon. As far as the relationship between shareholders and management of the company is concerned, subchapter 1.3 deals with the agency problem in relation with its costs. The comparison of shareholder structure and company funding method is the core question of the subchapter 1.4. Following part describes...

Recent accounting scandals and current global financial crisis have brought new demands on the whole corporate world. The call for better corporate governance is strengthening in all business areas including tax. Tax non -- compliance brings substantial risks for both tax payers and tax revenue authorities. The way how companies manage their tax risks can significantly influence their overall financial performance and reputation. The paper deals with issues of tax non -- compliance as a lack of good corporate governance practice. The main goal of the paper is to put tax into the concept of corporate governance. Moreover, the paper deals with the concept of tax risk management as a way of how tax compliance in general could be enhanced and introduces the current international practice in this field.

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A research report submitted to the faculty of management, University of the Witwatersrand, in 25% fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management). / This research examines the existence and the degree of compliance and adherence to corporate governance processes and practices in the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). Its purpose was to examine whether the SABC as an institution has any corporate governance standards, and if those standards exist, whether they are adhered to, and the role of management in advancing or hindering organisational effectiveness. This research followed an interpretative social science approach. The approach adopted by the study is a qualitative approach. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews using purposive sampling. Three critical findings emerged from the study. First, that the SABC does have the right corporate governance internal systems, but fails to comply with them. Secondly, there is lack of effective leadership and stability in the SABC. The continuous change of senior strategic managers, with six Chief Executive Officers and four different boards of directors within the period of five years that the research focuses on has been detrimental to the institution’s stability. Thirdly, the nature of the relationship between the SABC and the government has compromised the organization. Based on the findings, the conclusions of this study are that the SABC leadership and management have failed to apply proper corporate governance standards, due to the weak leadership structure, and in some cases due to external factors such as the influence of government in the operations of the organization. The prevailing current situation has impacted on the effective implementation of corporate governance. The study recommends that the organization reviews its corporate governance practices and commit to acceptable corporate governance standards. / GR2018

Thesis (M.M. (Finance & Investment))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Graduate School of Business Administration, 2012. / No abstract provided