Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2007

Zugl.: Darmstadt, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2008

Univ., Diss--Tartu, 2008. / Zsfassung in estn. Sprache.

Diss--Universität Trier, 2009.

The authors' Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 1996. / Extra t.p. with thesis statement inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 428-485).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität St. Gallen, 2003.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 223-234).

Zugl.: Heidelberg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2009.

Although managers rate concerns about being seen as committed disclosers as an important consideration in their voluntary disclosure decisions, prior research has paid limited attention to how investors view commitment to disclosure. This study experimentally tests two competing perspectives relating to how managers' commitment to disclosure and prior forecast accuracy jointly influence managers' forecasting credibility. The first perspective (the normative perspective) draws on economic theory and the second perspective (the omission bias perspective) draws on theory from psychology. The normative perspective suggests that commitment to disclosure and prior forecast accuracy will independently influence managers' forecasting credibility. In contrast, the omission bias literature suggests that the influence of commitment to disclosure on managers' forecasting credibility depends on managers' prior forecast accuracy. In other words, the normative perspective suggests two main effects, whereas the omission bias perspective suggests a commitment to disclosure x accuracy interaction. To test the competing predictions relating to the joint impact of commitment to disclosure and prior forecast accuracy on managers' forecasting credibility, I conduct an experiment. Results of this experiment support the omission bias perspective. Participants in the role of investors rate more (less) committed managers as more (less) credible, but only when they are also accurate. When managers are inaccurate, however, this relationship reverses. That is, more committed managers are viewed as less credible relative to their less committed peers. These results suggest that managers' concerns about commitment to disclosure are indeed valid, but only when they are accurate. When managers are less accurate, commitment to disclosure hurts, rather than helps, managers' credibility. Participants' valuation judgments as well as their judgments relating to a current disclosure are positively associated with their judgments of managers' forecasting credibility, suggesting that their assessment of managers' credibility may have significant valuation consequences. This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature and has implications for managers who provide earnings forecasts and for investors who use these forecasts in their investment decisions. / text

This dissertation addresses concerns regarding corporate activities in relation to agency costs and studies the effect of the market for corporate control. In the first essay, we use the mid-1990s Delaware takeover regime shift as an exogenous shock to examine how the removal of takeover threats affects managerial decisions on corporate financing and investment and how it affects firm value. Based on a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach, we find that managers reduce debt financing and increase capital investment when they are protected against hostile takeovers, which is consistent with managerial agency models of capital structure and the free cash flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986). We demonstrate that engaging in these entrenched behaviors consequently destroys firm value. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the effect of the takeover regime shift is more pronounced in firms with fewer institutional holdings or lower managerial ownership, supporting the argument of Jensen (1993) that effective internal control systems can alleviate the negative outcomes of a weakened market for corporate control. The substitution effect of internal controls is more substantial than that of the external product market competition. Finally, we determine that empire building, rather than quiet life, is the main consequence of a weakened market for corporate control. In the second essay, we directly examine the causal relationship between managerial entrenchment and diversification. We demonstrate that more entrenched managers adopt higher levels of diversification than do less entrenched managers. We verify the result by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression and treating entrenchment as endogenous. In addition, based on an exogenous change in takeover legislation in Delaware in the mid-1990s, we adopt the differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach and demonstrate that managers increase diversification activities when they are protected against hostile takeovers. Given that diversification destroys value, these results are consistent with the agency costs explanation of diversification. We then explore the motivations that drive managers to diversify. We document that entrenched managers diversify to gain private benefits and to reduce firm risk. Finally, we demonstrate that CEO equity-based incentives increase when takeover-protected firms diversify, suggesting that firms proactively respond to counterbalance the increased costs associated with discretional diversification, which is consistent with theories of optimal contract. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy