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There are many recent studies which try to find the evidence of the Laffer curve in national economies or aggregated OECD data. In this Master Thesis I focus on testing of the primary linear relation of the corporate income tax rate and the corporate tax base, that I call herein adjusted Laffer curve. The adjusted Laffer curve is then transferred through the simplification into the ordinary Laffer curve. The linear regression analysis is performed on the OECD data of 34 countries across years 2000 to 2014. Firstly, the countries are split by the national tax system criteria, such as tax quota, tax revenue allocation or tax structure of revenues that I consider essential for further analysis. Based on the results of linear regression I can only find Laffer curve in set of countries that aim to collect tax revenues mainly from direct taxes. However, there are also other major findings, such as the fact that negative relation of the corporate income tax rate and the corporate tax base, can be found in countries with the higher tax quota, while not in those with the lower tax quota.

This thesis analyses the potential for international cooperation in the issue of corporate tax rates. Using newly created dataset we study the relationship between the foreign direct investments and corporate tax rates in order to confirm that countries benefit from competing in setting their tax rates. Lowering one's corporate tax rate pays off in increased FDI. Furthermore, under the assumption that competitive behavior is individually rational, we analyze through the use of coherent country clusters the extent of competition within selected clusters, as compared to the situation on the global level. We find that the degree of competitive behavior is lower within coherent block of countries than globally. Thus, there seems to be less mutually harmful competition within coherent clusters of countries, mainly in EU 15, OECD and ASEAN, than on the global level.

[pt] Desde 1996, a legislação fiscal brasileira permite que as empresas distribuam lucros para os seus acionistas em duas maneiras distintas: Dividendos e Juros sobre o Capital Próprio. Os Juros sobre o Capital Próprio pagos aos acionistas são dedutíveis do imposto de renda da firma pagadora, mas são tributados no nível do acionista beneficiário. Os dividendos pagos, por outro lado, não podem ser deduzidos do imposto de renda da firma pagadora, mas em contrapartida, não são tributados ao nível do acionista. Tudo o mais, há uma vantagem fiscal em distribuir lucros em Juros sobre o Capital Próprio ao invés de dividendos. Entretanto, muitas empresas brasileiras de capital aberto dispensam essa vantagem fiscal ao distribuir lucros exclusivamente via dividendos. Eu proponho que problemas de agência seriam responsáveis por esse puzzle. Caso uma firma opte por pagar dividendos, os custos fiscais de não distribuir lucros em Juros sobre Capital Próprio são igualmente divididos entre todos os acionistas. Os acionistas controladores, por outro lado, arcam com grande parte do ônus fiscal dos Juros sobre o Capital Próprio recebidos caso a firma possua uma estrutura acionária piramidal. Apresento evidência de que tal assimetria na distribuição dessa carga fiscal pode ser a razão pela qual tantas firmas abdicam de distribuir lucros via Juros sobre Capital Próprio. / [en] From 1996 on, tax laws in Brazil allow firms to distribute cash to its shareholders in two ways: dividend payments and interest on equity. Firms that pay interest on equity can deduct them for tax purposes, but they cannot deduct dividend payments. Investors, in turn, do not pay taxes on the dividends they earn, but they do pay on the amount of interest on equity they receive. All in all, there is a tax advantage in paying interest on equity instead of dividends. And yet, many public firms in Brazil forgo the tax benefits of interest on equity. I argue that an agency problem explains this puzzle. If a firm pays dividends, the tax cost of forgoing the corporate tax deduction of interest on equity is split among all shareholders. In contrast, controlling shareholders bear most of the taxes on interest on equity, if the paying firm has a pyramidal ownership structure. I present evidence that this asymmetry on the tax burden may indeed explain why so many firms in Brazil pay dividends instead of interest on equity.