This article outlines the research program of a “criminology of crime avoidance” using the example of the preemptive use of legal opinions by white-collar actors to shift the boundaries of the law in their own favor. For this purpose, the term creative compliance is introduced and explained with regard to the Cum-Ex scandal in Germany. Then, a look is taken at possible criminological explanations for the phenomenon. Finally, the hypothesis is developed that law enforcement personnel is deterred from investigations by the reputational capital of certain legal advisors.

In this research I analyse how the existence of regulations that allow private funding of election campaigns have created opportunities for crime. Three specific questions are addressed here: 1. Do electoral donations increase political corruption? 2. Why do companies give electoral donations? 3. How are electoral donors compensated? To address these questions, I adopted a nested analysis. This sequential, mixed method brings together the strengths of both regression analysis and case study research, while conducting a validity check—triangulation—by convergence of results via different methods and theoretical approaches. I first conducted a cross-national comparison of 78 countries; then, I conducted a survey of 302 private companies in Colombia; and finally, I documented one case that described how campaign contributions affect the political decision-making process. The main conclusion of this research is that electoral law creates opportunities for crime, because it legalizes the entrance of interested money into politics, disqualifies donors as perpetrators, and introduces regulations with null or limited deterrent effect on the delivery of undue reciprocities. Indeed, I demonstrated that electoral financing is used as a legal bribery by private corporations. The legal character of this political instrument is perverted when undue compensation is delivered to donors. This is not a crime with a single perpetrator; rather, donors and incumbents are equally involved. However, donors are protected by electoral law, because the money delivered as corrupt incentive is classified as legal. This suggests that the law is being used as a mechanism that neutralizes donors as perpetrators. This perspective points to the manipulative use of electoral law, or creative compliance, as the term is used by McBarnet (2006).

The period of crisis is ongoing and still poses challenges for companies. In the aftermath of Covid-19 pandemic, the effects of the Russian war of aggression and inflation increase economic pressures. This might lead to less expenses on Compliance and increase the vulnerability to Compliance-violations. At the same time, legal policy trends are moving toward a stronger commitment to Compliance and transparency (e.g., the German Act on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations in Supply Chains or implementation laws of EU Whistleblower Directive). In this edition, our authors address some of these legislative trends as well as the question of the limits of “Creative Compliance”.