Programme evaluation research examined the criminological and socio-legal issues of a Claimant Fraud Investigation Program (CFIP) operating inside the workers' compensation system. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to evaluate the programmes' choice of deterrence as an instrumental mechanism for achieving compliance. Key aspects of the programme were analysed from both criminological and socio-legal standpoints. Justice and liberty tensions were examined in reference to the programmes' deterrence mechanisms and the perceptions of fourteen participants' were thematically analysed. The study develops an analytically useful concept of light blue-collar crime that could be applied to other organisations and scenarios. The study concluded the programme is not effective and has more of a symbolic than instrumental value. It conducts itself ethically, however, there are problems with its' choice of deterrence and the study indicates there is a low probability for a deterrent effect. Recommendations are made for other actors and institutions to play non-deterrence based roles intended to achieve compliance.

Multi-agency cooperation has been considered a very important aspect of crime investigation and crime prevention in modern time. The aim of this study was to explore the realities of multi-agency cooperation as experienced by Swedish crime workers from the police, the Prison and Probation Service and the Social Service. Previous research has shown that inter-agency cooperation’s success and/or failure is controlled by factors such as time, resources, amount of guidance and so on, however very little research has explored the modern Swedish crime workers’ perspective in the subject. Semi-structured interviews were conducted regarding the topics of cooperation between agencies, information exchange and secrecy. The results showed that while cooperation within the Swedish Judicial System was operating well, collaborative efforts with external agencies like the Social Service, was severely lacking. Collaborative efforts were experienced as less actual cooperation and more information exchange, which in turn was heavily controlled by secrecy laws and therefore often seen as one-way communication with external agencies. Additionally, when well-planned collaborative projects funded by the government are in place, the cooperation tends to work easier, however workers are less inclined to prioritize such efforts when the agencies’ own resources are being used.