The rapid growth of network access and the development of Web 2.0 have resulted in the popularity of virtual communities (VCs), such as Wikipedia, Facebook, and LinkedIn. Although these online communities provide no monetary incentive for sharing knowledge, as most businesses will do, they still become a popular platform for knowledge sharing. The purpose of this study is to investigate the motivation for people to contribute in virtual communities, whether their motivations differ in different types of virtual communities, and whether their behavior and motivations will be affected by monetary reward. Social exchange theory and self determination theory were adopted to explore the relationships between behavior and motivations of virtual community members. Motivation crowding theory was used to examine the effect of monetary reward on knowledge sharing. The research framework includes two types of motivators (intrinsic and extrinsic), two different virtual community types (common identity vs. common bond), and one treatment (monetary reward). An online survey and an experiment with monetary incentive were conducted on two virtual communities: ITToolbox and LinkedIn. The results showed that there were significant moderating effects between these two types of virtual communities. A strong positive relationship was found between intrinsic motivation and knowledge sharing for the professional community (common identity). In contrast, the relationship between extrinsic motivation and knowledge sharing was stronger in the social networking community (common bond). The results also confirmed the existence of the crowding effect that the intrinsic motivation was significantly declined when an extrinsic monetary reward was provided.

<p>The right to personal data is compared with the right to land. The concept of rights may be regarded as bundles of rights of which the right to use of scarce resources, the right to exclude and the right transfer rights are the most important ones. The development of Information Technology has reduced considerably the cost of using personal data leadingto an increased use of the data in the context of direct marketing by different firms. However, the use and processing of personal data may cause externalities, both positive and negative ones, on the individual to whom the data relates. This situation can be analysed with the Coase Theorem, where the transaction costs have important function. In a state of zero transaction costs the parties, firms and individuals, can make agreements of an optimal use of the personal data, independently of the assignments of rights to the personal data. Such agreements internalise further the externalities. However, in the real life the transaction costs are high meaning that the assignments of rights are most significant leading to that the externalities remain. To pass by the problem of transaction costs and externalities, zoning procedure with transference of rights can be used. The background of bundles of right to personal data together with the Coase Theorem and zoning procedure are applied to the Directive 95 /46/EC adopted by the European Union regarding the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy. This Directive may however be interpreted in different ways leading to that the assignment of rights and level of direct marketing is different between Member States.</p>

The right to personal data is compared with the right to land. The concept of rights may be regarded as bundles of rights of which the right to use of scarce resources, the right to exclude and the right transfer rights are the most important ones. The development of Information Technology has reduced considerably the cost of using personal data leadingto an increased use of the data in the context of direct marketing by different firms. However, the use and processing of personal data may cause externalities, both positive and negative ones, on the individual to whom the data relates. This situation can be analysed with the Coase Theorem, where the transaction costs have important function. In a state of zero transaction costs the parties, firms and individuals, can make agreements of an optimal use of the personal data, independently of the assignments of rights to the personal data. Such agreements internalise further the externalities. However, in the real life the transaction costs are high meaning that the assignments of rights are most significant leading to that the externalities remain. To pass by the problem of transaction costs and externalities, zoning procedure with transference of rights can be used. The background of bundles of right to personal data together with the Coase Theorem and zoning procedure are applied to the Directive 95 /46/EC adopted by the European Union regarding the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy. This Directive may however be interpreted in different ways leading to that the assignment of rights and level of direct marketing is different between Member States.