By combining a descriptive meihod with a comparative one, this thesis attempts to understand the ideas of method of Muslim learning as illustrated in a medieval Muslim treatise, Ta'lim al-Muta'allim Tariq al-Ta'allum (Instruction of the Student: the Method of Learning), of Burhan al-Din al-Zarnuji (flourished circa 620/1223). It is apparent throughout the present study that the method of Muslim learning is not simply a technique by which a student seeks to deal, in an appropriate manner, with any academic assignment, but rather, an approach, the very heart of which rests on the problem of ethics, which brings a student into a situation where he maintains his commitment to God, his respect to his teacher, and his invigorated desire in the search for knowledge. The fundamental reason for such an approach to learning is that knowledge ('ilm) in Islam is placed in a religiously special position in that it is recognized as derived from God and given by Him for the nobility of human beings, so that the search for knowledge is a part of the Muslim's religious manifestations of submission to God ('ibadah li-Allah).

Many studies have been done of Fakhr al-Dinal-Razi and his system of thought, taking into account his contributions from theology, philosophy, and exegesis. However, works specifically devoted to his exegetical thought have been few. In fact, none of these has dealt with al-Razi's exegetical methodology in the light of his basic assumptions regarding the Qur'an. In view of this fact, the present thesis aims at elucidating Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's methodology in interpreting the Qur'an in his magnum opus, known by the title al-Tafsir al-Kabir or Mafatih&dotbelow; al-Ghayb. In order to achieve this purpose, we will focus on his interpretation of the third chapter of the Qur'an, printed in volumes 7, 8, and 9 of the standard edition of his work. / In overall terms, al-Razi contributed greatly to the dissemination of a rational approach to the study of the Qur'an. Yet, he could not avoid the debate over theological issues, which were common in his time. In many parts of his al-Tafsir al-Kabir, therefore, he defends Ash'arite thought against the views of Mu'tazilites, Z&dotbelow;ahirites, and the H&dotbelow;ashwiyyah, among others. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

This thesis will partly compare the approaches of two pioneers in Islamic philosophy to the soul-body problem: the philosophical psychology of Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta'allihin Shirazi 975-1050/1571-1640) and that of Ibn Sina (370-428/980-1037). Our main concern will be with the former, the founder of "trancendent theosophy", particularly his ideas regarding the corporeal generation of the soul. / A brief historical background of the problem is presented in the first chapter. In order to evaluate the real philosophical value of Mulla Sadra's doctrine, the thesis will investigate the soundness of Mulla Sadra's novel psychological findings. "Substantial motion" (al-harakah al-jawhariyyah) and the "gradation of existence" (al-tashkik fi maratib al-wujud) are the two main philosophical principles formulated and implied by our philosopher regarding the elaboration of his theory on the soul's developmental process. / In our study, we discuss the nature of the soul-body relationship, the evidence which indicates their mutual interaction, and finally, the various forms of this relationship. In the final chapter, we focus on the developmental process of the soul's substantial motion up to the stage of union with the active intellect. Our analytical discussion is centered on whether or not the theory of the corporeality of the soul's generation yields a meaningful conception of the soul's evolution from materiality to immateriality. / Considering the serious challenges and unsolved difficulties that still remain, it is an open question whether Sadra's theory, particularly its emphasis on the corporeality of the soul's generation, can adequately account for the soul's developmental process up to the stage of unity with the world of intellects.

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The question of perception constitutes one of the most complex and important sections of philosophical psychology. Unlike the Intellectual perception (al-idrak al-$ sp{c}aql bar i)$, which met with more or less agreement among philosophers, particular perceptions (al-idrakat al-juz'iyah) and more specifically, sensory (al-idrak al-hissi) and imaginal perception (al-idrak al-khayali) were felt to be problematic. How do these kinds of perception occur and what is their reality? Is there any difference between particular and universal perceptions? This study deals with these problems from the standpoint of Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), one of the greatest Islamic philosophers in the 16th and 17th century, whose work in this field is barely known. Comparing Mulla Sadra's contribution with that of his predecessors from both the Peripatetic and Illuminationist Schools, namely Ibn Sina and al-Suhrawardi this thesis attempts to explain what Mulla Sadra has offered as new ideas and new analyses in this regard. "The immateriality of perception," "unification of the subject and the object" and "the role of the soul in particular perception" are the main issues that are dealt with in this thesis.

Sadr al-Din Qunavi (605/1207-673AH/1274 CE)--stepson and pupil of Ibn $ rm sp{c}$Arabi (d. 638 AH/1240 CE)--played a pivotal role in the development of Islamic intellectual history. His contributions in the medieval period helped alter the course of mystico-philosophical tradition, which was then flourishing from Asia Minor and Persia to the major learning centers of the Arabic-speaking world. His importance was largely due to the complex mystical doctrine he expounded in the light of Ibn Sina's critique of knowledge. The age-old dilemma of knowledge was encapsulated in a famous declaration by Ibn Sina--the rationalist philosopher--who asserted that man is incapable of knowing intellectually "the realities of things," let alone the First Being. This did not imply that the realities were either unknowable in every sense, or that they did not exist. The question is in what sense and how are they knowable? It was Ibn Sina's special calling, Qunavi argued, to show the proper role and scope of reason in this quest. Philosophical knowledge may be represented chiefly through demonstrative logic, the only paradigm available to Ibn Sina. Qunavi on the other hand, set out to develop an exegetical grammar more suited to the movements of spiritual dialogue and paradox. For him, an intellectual knowledge of the "realities," in essence, rested on the relation between two distinct realities (subject and object). Yet all agreed that God's knowledge of Himself was the root of all knowledge. It had to transform utterly the distinction between the two realities. God's self-revelation is furthermore an unfolding book divulged through the infinite possibilities of linguistic construction. Mysticism's technical vocabulary had, therefore, to distinguish itself from, though without displacing, the bare skeleton of demonstrative logic.

This thesis is a study of one aspect of the Twelver-Shi'i doctrine of imamah.

This thesis is an examination of Mulla Hadi Sabzawari's commentary (1797--1878 or 1881) on the Mathnawi of Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273), entitled Sharh&dotbelow;-i Asrar-i Mathnawi. The purpose of this study is to analyze Sabzawari's approach and investigate how this synthesizer of the philosophy of Mulla S&dotbelow;adra and Suhrawardi interprets Rumi's message. Moreover, I will assess the details of his arguments and philosophical interpretations of Rumi's verses. Chapter one is a brief introduction to Rumi's biography and his works as well as a review of the commentary tradition on his Mathnawi. In chapter two a full account of Sabzawari's life, including a partial translation of his autobiography and a complete list of his writings, will be offered. In chapter three, I provide my translation of Sabzawari's Arabic preface to his commentary on Rumi, which is followed by a critical analysis of his comments on the Mathnawi. Finally, chapter four is dedicated to a comparative analysis between Sabzawari's commentary and that of another Iranian commentator, Furuzanfar's (d. 1970) Sharh&dotbelow;-i Mathnawi-i Sharif. It contains a parallel reading and examination of the two commentators' views on the subject of the rational soul, which is manifested in Rumi's language through the allegory of "the Reed" ( nay).

Human cognitive development is a matter of interest for different disciplines among which are philosophical epistemology and cognitive psychology. Shi razi (Mulla Sadra), a Muslim philosopher, deals, among other issues, with the problem of human cognitive development through his 'Irfani -philosophical methodology on the basis of the principles of his philosophy. These principles are the principality and gradation, tashki k, of existence and substantial motion through which Shi razi relates cognitive development to the existential progress of the human being. Piaget from the Western tradition of cognitive psychology focuses his work on the problem of human cognitive development, investigating the issue through a semi-experimental methodology and interpreting his findings on the basis of the principles of genetic epistemology, namely, the analogy between cognitive and physical organisms in terms of assimilation, accommodation and equilibrium. These two perspectives are studied and compared in this thesis with respect to their underlying principles, their scopes and methodologies. Finally, a multi-disciplinary approach is proposed for the study of human cognitive development.