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This is a study of the development of post-war Iraq after the downfall of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003. The thesis examines the actions and consequences of the coalition led by the United States to facilitate the re-construction of Iraq as a democratic nation-state. The thesis examines the geo-political, economic and ideological motivations behind the US actions in Iraq in order to explain why the coalition plans to reconstruct the country along the lines of a democratic nation-state have failed so profoundly. The thesis develops a typology of policies that lead to successful nation-state building in post-authoritarian and post-conflict scenarios and applies this typology to the actual policies implemented by the US-led coalition after the fall of Saddam in 2003. The thesis illustrates that many of the policies implemented by the coalition undermined successful nation-state building. These policies failed to ensure the security and stability of Iraq after the invasion and thereby hampered economic development. Rather than re-defining Iraqi nationhood in democratic terms, the implemented policies enshrined ethno-sectarian divisions in the political landscape and in the social fabric of Iraq. The new Iraqi state lacked a stable constitutional and legal foundation and a functioning judiciary to ensure the rule of law. Finally, the political order established by the US-led coalition is marred by partisan conflicts and Kurdish independence tendencies which weaken the central government and the operation of its various departments and further threaten the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state. The thesis argues - based on evidence gathered through a nation-wide survey, in-depth interviews with influential stakeholders in the public sectors and other material - that Iraq after 2003 has become a failed state.