This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on defined benefit (DB) pension provision in the United Kingdom (UK). In particular, in the first paper, I examine the effect that labour market incentives, managerial incentives and the adoption of FRS17 by UK firms, have on DB plan retention decisions. In this paper, I also examine the role of insider trustees, defined as trustees that are also company executives, on the firm’s decision to keep DB plans open. I find that firms for which human capital is especially important are more likely to retain their defined benefit plans. In addition, CEO and CFO membership in the same pension plan that is provided for other employees positively influences the retention of defined benefit pension plans. Additional analysis using a sub-sample for which data on pension plan trustees are available suggests that being a CEO and a trustee increases the probability of DB plan retentions. Moreover, being a CEO/CFO trustee and a member of the DB plan offered to all employees increases the likelihood of DB plan retention. However, I do not find any evidence that voluntary adoption of FRS 17 influences DB plan retention. In addition, I find that insider-trustees have a positive influence on the decision to maintain DB plans, especially when they are members of these plans. In the second paper, I look at the effect of DB plan retentions and executive membership in them, on corporate credit ratings and the investment and dividend decisions. Empirical findings suggest that firms which continue to sponsor DB plans are more likely to have lower credit ratings which are exacerbated when these plans are underfunded. Despite the above effect however, I find that if the CEO is a member of the DB plan, it positively affects credit ratings. In addition, I find some evidence that the participation of CEOs in the main DB plans in conjunction with overfunded pension plans, negatively affect investment decisions when these schemes remain open. I do not find any association between CEOs membership in the main DB plan and dividend payments which may be explained by the market signalling effects of dividends. Finally, in the third paper, I provide a thorough analysis of the pension buy-in and buy-out market in the UK, and I empirically examine the determinants of such transactions from a firm and plan perspective. I find that firms that implement buy-ins have larger and more funded pension plans, are more profitable and have higher union densities. Moreover, firms that complete buy-outs have larger pension plans and allocate less pension assets in equity. Moreover, the number of employees is negatively associated with both transactions implying it is costlier for firms to conduct either a buy-in or buy-out transaction. While union density is positively associated with buy-ins, it has a negative effect on the likelihood of buy-outs suggesting that unions support buy-in but not buy-out transactions. This may be potentially explained by the fact that the latter are associated with with plan winding-ups.

This dissertation examines a bank’s right to unilaterally terminate its contractual relationship with a customer on the basis of reputational risk. The law of contract allows a bank to terminate the bank-customer agreement when the customer is in serious breach of the contract. Over the years, however, a pattern has started to develop by which a bank can unilaterally terminate the bank-customer relationship of high-risk customers based on reputational risk. Banks are reluctant to facilitate the transactions of individuals surrounded by negative publicity, due to fears of how the bank’s investors, customers or counterparts might perceive the bank. Compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and counter financing of terrorism (CFT) requirements, as set out by both domestic and foreign legislation, results in higher costs for the bank. As such, the profitability of a particular bank-customer relationship may ultimately decline to such an extent that the bank rather decides to make an appropriate business decision by terminating the relationship. Correspondent banking relationships are agreements in terms of which one bank will provide services for another in jurisdictions where the first bank lacks a physical presence. As such, whenever there is a perception that a local bank does not comply with the relevant AML/CFT laws as set out by its domestic legislation, the correspondent bank might decide to terminate its relationship with the local bank, leaving the latter financially excluded from the correspondent banking market. Such a situation would hinder the growth of the South African economy and may also cause a systemic event in the financial industry. Adequate customer due diligence (CDD) measures assist a bank in formulating a clear understanding of the business of its customers. The information obtained through CDD may also assist the bank in determining the reputation of a particular customer. This information can also assist law enforcement in combatting financial crimes. In this regard, it is recommended that a bank should be able to trace the information that was shared with Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and law enforcement agencies, so that the bank may reasonably determine the level of reputational risk involved in the relationship. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Mercantile Law / LLM / Unrestricted