This study of decentralization of managerial authority looks at the nature of authority and its relationship to organizations; factors which indicate a basis for greater decentralization of managerial authority; case studies of corporations that decentralized managerial authority; and the human relations aspects of decentralization of authority.

Thesis advisor: Robert G. Murphy / This paper seeks to further establish the effects of fiscal decentralization on income inequality. While many major world organizations, such as the United Nations, and politicians are promoting the use of decentralization policies, their effects on income inequality remain largely unstudied. I add to the literature on fiscal decentralization in order to determine if it should be used as a policy tool designed to decrease income inequality. I empirically study the effects of fiscal decentralization by using a model largely based off of Akai and Sakata (2005). I quantify fiscal decentralization with two measures in order to conclude what form of fiscal decentralization, if any, should be used in order to decrease income inequality. My hope is that this paper contributes to the literature on fiscal decentralization, specifically in providing caution to politicians who haphazardly institute policies calling for increased fiscal decentralization. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2007. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1980.

This dissertation examines Peruvian ministries' implementation of administrative decentralization, 2003-2006, and identifies factors shaping their decentralization policymaking. In administrative decentralization, implementation involves translating broad guidelines into sectoral transfer policies. Sectoral policymakers who execute decentralization mandates are, therefore, responsible for relinquishing authority and resources to subnational governments. Despite this challenging situation, little is known said about factors-- or otherwise--shaping the implementation of administrative decentralization. The initiation of state decentralization programs throughout Latin America has been examined and largely attributed to national political factors, rather than technical considerations. However, transferring power is not an assured outcome of national politicians' decisions to decentralize. This study explores a process that continued to be shaped by ministries after national political actors ceased to be involved; after a rapid start of top-down reforms, administrative decentralization virtually stalled under their control. Peruvian policy sectors are very heterogeneous, suggesting a need for distinct approaches to reform. Nevertheless, ministries' collective failure to implement rapidly has been attributed to generalized resistance to relinquish authority. This view is consistent with a bureaucratic politics-type understanding of public policymaking. However, my comparative analysis of decentralization policies reveals that self-interested resistance is significant but does not coherently explain policymaking or variation between policies. Furthermore, while resistance is ubiquitous, there are different types of resistance to reform, coming from autonomous offices, top policymakers, or the Presidency. In contrast, institutionalist lenses identify rules and processes that significantly condition possibilities for administrative decentralization. Policymakers face distinct challenges and opportunities in each sector; some ministries had deconcentration programs underway when national reforms started. While institutionalist lenses elucidate distinct conditions for reform, focusing on "audacious reformers" highlights the role of individual agency. The exceptional case of Health features a complex organization led by a reform-minded minister to the forefront of reforms. All three approaches to analyzing the implementation of administrative decentralization are complementary in providing coherent accounts of sectoral policymaking. Different combinations of institutional conditions, sectoral characteristics and individual motivations are ultimately responsible for variation among approaches to reform. Administrative decentralization emerges, not as one process, but as a constellation of particular paths of reform. / text

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1980. / Also available in print.

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1989. / Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / 1 electronic text (193 p. : ill.) : digital, PDF file. Title from title screen. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, committee chair; Andre G. Komenan, Jameson L. Boex, Neven T. Valev, Shiferaw Gurmu, Roy W. Bahl, committee members. Description based on contents viewed Mar. 23, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-192).

This dissertation explores the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption. Theoretically, it is shown that decentralization has a potential to induce public officials to reduce the bribes they charge from entrepreneurs. That would encourage firms to enter the economy. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find empirical evidence that suggests that fiscal decentralization causes public officials to reduce the bribes they charge per firm; thus decentralization lowers the bribery cost to entrepreneurs. Empirical analysis is based on cross country study and panel data study where appropriate. Secondly, not all aspects of fiscal decentralization have an equal impact on corruption. Based on a cross state analysis, we find that states that decentralize revenue raising authority and give more revenue authority to local governments were perceived to be less corrupt. Cross state analysis is appealing because many of the political and institutional factors are held fixed. Overall, the findings suggest that fiscal decentralization can potentially help to control public corruption and create favorable conditions for the private sector. If revenue authorities are devolved to subnational levels, then the effect might be even greater. The effects of various aspects of decentralization on corruptibility of government and the quality of public office have not been tested before and are of great interest to policymakers. These finding are of great interest to developing and transition countries trying to control corruption.