Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

The current economic crisis has led the leaders of the European states to decrease their spending on defense. This paper argues that if this reduction in public spending is not offset by the increase in international cooperation than the military capability of the region is going to deteriorate in the near future. The argument that the defense budgets are decreasing is based on the analysis of the data available for the public defense expenditures. Further six case studies of EU states are presented showing that the potential decrease in capability is observable in a wide range of EU countries. The case for greater international cooperation is based on the economic theory of comparative advantage and benefits of competition in the defense market. Furthermore, academic literature supporting this hypothesis is also presented to the reader throughout the paper. The conclusion of this paper is that the current tendency of governmental politicians of EU countries to ignore the need for greater international cooperation in the defense sector is unsustainable and that if European Union wants to maintain its position as one of the world power blocks, systematic reform of the EU defense market will need to be introduced.

This thesis addresses the military capabilities gap between the US and European member states of NATO. It seeks to answer the question, why does the US-European capabilities gap persist despite apparent agreement between Allies on strategic capabilities objectives and cooperative solutions? The paper first establishes the need for a strong, independent European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, particularly since NATO's operations in Libya. It then defines and explicates the military capabilities gap within the Alliance, including its scope, history, and attempts to find cooperative solutions. This analysis demonstrates that there is broad agreement both on what the Alliance requires for military capabilities and for how best to obtain them (cooperatively), yet the gap has persisted and grown for two decades. In an attempt to solve this empirical puzzle, the paper employs a two-level games framework to analyze the NATO defense planning process, which links supranational capabilities planning for the Alliance to national-level execution, dependent upon funding from state parliaments. Faced with the general answer that fiscal constraints preclude states from following through on their commitments, the paper delves deeper to determine factors that may influence differences in defense...

Si, durant la Guerre Froide, les dépenses militaires américaines colossales étaient justifiées par une menace existentielle contre les États-Unis et leurs alliés, l'effondrement du camp et de l'idéologie communistes, suivi de la désintégration de l'Union soviétique, devrait inciter à une révision à la baisse de ces budgets militaires ou, à tout le moins, à les ramener à des niveaux proportionnels aux exigences du nouveau paysage sécuritaire international. Cette étude qui s'insère dans le cadre théorique de l'Economie de la Défense, est axée sur une exploration de la nature et des fondements réels des dépenses militaires américaines post-Guerre Froide. Elle suggère qu'elles semblent servir des finalités autres que la fonction constitutionnelle (besoin) de la défense de la nation américaine, qui sont celles de la préservation des intérêts politiques et matériels des élites politiques, économiques et militaires (une alliance d'intérêts créant une situation de dépendance chronique irréversible de l'économie américaine vis-à-vis des dépenses de défense). Ainsi, ces dépenses sont axées sur la projection de la puissance militaire à l'extérieur, servent à réaliser une hégémonie géopolitique et géoéconomique globales et non pas à pourvoir «la défense commune». / If, during the Cold War, the colossal U.S military expenditures were justified by an existential threat against the United States and their allies, the collapse of the communist camp and ideology, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, should have pushed to revising downward those spending or, at least, brought them down to proportional levels, commensurate with the new international security landscape. This study, which falls within the scope of Defense Economics and which is centered on exploring the genuine rationales and determinants of the U.S. post-Cold War military spending, suggests that they seem serving purposes (needs) other than the constitutional function of defending the American Nation, which are those linked to preserving the interests of the political, economic and military elites (an alliance of interest creating a state of chronic and irreversible dependency of the U.S. economy on the Defense spending). Henceforth, those spending are articulated, in our own point of view, on the projection of the military power abroad, serving to achieve a global geopolitical and geo-economic hegemony and not the “common defense”.