This dissertation is a critical evaluation of two modern thinkers debating the idea of intelligent design (ID), William Dembski and Francisco Ayala. Specifically, it focuses on Ayala's major theological critique of intelligent design, namely, the problem of dysteleology. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the problem of dysteleology as it relates to biology and offers a methodology for evaluating each thinker’s resolution to this problem. Chapter 2 examines Ayala's scientific critique of ID, and chapter 3 looks at Ayala's theological critique of ID. Chapter 4 summarizes Dembski's method for detecting design, and chapter 5 outlines Dembski's critiques of naturalism and materialism as well as his information-theoretic account of reality. Finally, chapter 6 analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of Ayala’s proposal that Darwin is a gift to theology in light of Dembski’s information-theoretic account of reality.

This dissertation argues that philosophers Barbara Forrest and Robert T. Pennock fail to discredit William A. Dembski's Design Inference as a legitimate scientific program. Chapter 1 is the introduction, explaining the problem and the research methodology used in the dissertation to ascertain a conclusion. Chapter 2 is a background survey and analysis of contemporary Intelligent Design (ID) theory and Dembski's part within the overall schemata of the Intelligent Design enterprise. Particular aspects of Dembski's Design Inference framework and its corresponding "explanatory filter" are explained in Chapter 3. Both Forrest and Pennock had significant influence on the judge's final opinion in the Kitzmiller v. Dover trial, which brought serious scrutiny against ID's scientific merit. Criticism against Dembski was an important part of Forrest and Pennock's respective expert testimony against ID. Based on this trial testimony and their respective academic writings, Chapter 4 therefore argues for the legitimacy of Forrest and Pennock as influential critics when considering Dembski's scientific relevance. The chapter also surveys their substantive arguments against Dembski. Dembski's own response to the categorical criticisms by Forrest and Pennock are addressed in Chapter 5. The concluding analysis is in Chapter 6, arguing that Dembski's Design Inference maintains as viable science, despite the critiques by Forrest and Pennock. / This item is only available to students and faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. If you are not associated with SBTS, this dissertation may be purchased from <a href="http://disexpress.umi.com/dxweb">http://disexpress.umi.com/dxweb</a> or downloaded through ProQuest's Dissertation and Theses database if your institution subscribes to that service.

The thesis is that contrary to the received popular wisdom, the combination of David Hume's sceptical enquiry and Charles Darwin's provision of an alternative theoretical framework to the then current paradigm of natural theology did not succeed in defeating the design argument. I argue that William Paley's work best represented the status quo in the philosophy of biology circa 1800 and that with the logical mechanisms provided us by William Dembski in his seminal work on probability, there is a strong argument for thr work of Michael Behe to stand in a similar position today to that of Paley two centuries ago. The argument runs as follows: In Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 1 I introduce the issues. In Section 3 I argue that William Paley's exposition of the design argument was archetypical of the natural theology school and that given Hume's already published criticism of the argument, Paley for one did not feel the design argument to be done for. I further argue in Section 4 that Hume in fact did no such thing and that neither did he see himself as having done so, but that the design argument was weak rather than fallacious. In Section 5 I outline the demise of natural theology as the dominant school of thought in the philosophy of biology, ascribing this to the rise of Darwinism and subsequently neo-Darwinism. I argue that design arguments were again not defeated but went into abeyance with the rise of a new paradigm associated with Darwinism, namely methodological naturalism. In Chapter 2 I advance the project by a discussion of William Dembski's formulation of design inferences, demonstrating their value in both everyday and technical usage. This is stated in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss Dembski's treatment of probability, whilst in Section 4 I examine Dembski's tying of different levels of probability to different mechanisms of explanation used in explicating the world. Section 5 is my analysis of the logic of the formal statement of the design argument according to Dembski. In Section 6 I encapsulate objections to Dembski. I conclude the chapter (with Section 7) by claiming that Dembski forwards a coherent model of design inferences that can be used in demonstrating that there is little difference between the way that Paley came to his conclusions two centuries ago and how modem philosophers of biology (such as I take Michael Behe to be, albeit that by profession he is a scientist) come to theirs when offering design explanations. Inference to the best explanation is demonstrated as lying at the crux of design arguments. In Chapter 3 I draw together the work of Michael Behe and Paley, showing through the mechanism of Dembski's work that they are closely related in many respects and that neither position is to be lightly dismissed. Section 1 introduces this. In Section 2 I introduce Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in the light of (functional) explanation. Section 3 is a detailed analysis of irreducible complexity. Section 4 raises and covers objections to Behe with the general theme being that (neo-) Darwinians beg the question against him. In Section 4 I apply the Dembskian mechanic directly to Behe's work. I argue that Behe does not quite meet the Dembskian criteria he needs to in order for his argument to stand as anything other than defeasible. However, in Section 5 I conclude by arguing that this is exactly what we are to expect from Behe's and similar theories, even within competing paradigms, in the philosophy of biology, given that inference to the best explanation is the logical lever therein at work. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in