This thesis analyzes the kinds of verbal and nonverbal signals elites manifest to show leadership qualities. Launching from Max Weber’s conceptual framework of charisma as a power term and Harold Lasswell’s study of propaganda, this study takes a multidisciplinary approach to studying political leadership with elements of communication methodology and an ontological basis in evolutionary psychology. The study’s goal is to offer a framework for defining and evaluating the diverse signal patterns employed by political elites in three real-life situations. These are the Malta Summit, the 1992 Virginia Presidential Debate, and the 2012 South Carolina Republican Presidential Primary. The cases were chosen because they display a diverse set of signal variations during different types of interactions. The three case studies are evaluated by measuring frequency and patterns of occurrence of the five different interaction constructs (indicator of interest, indicator of disinterest, demonstration of high value, demonstration of low value, and compliance testing) to explain different interaction patterns. A simple frequency distribution of the different signals during a given interaction is used to display the empirical findings and to compare patterns across the case studies. This study reveals that the presence of DLV (demonstration of low value) signals weaken an elite’s position in relation to other elites and the public while the presence of DHV (demonstration of high value) signals strengthen an elite’s position. It is largely the presence, absence, and frequency of these two signals that determines who conveys leadership qualities effectively regardless of leadership style. Studying the signaling patterns of political elites would allow scholars to understand better the kinds of signal patterns and signal frequencies that are used in different types of leadership styles and norm ranges for signals including for political elites belonging to different cultures and subcultures