L’Europe occidentale enregistre d’importants changements paléogéographiques entre la fin du Mésozoïque et le Paléogène, en réponse à des évènements géodynamiques en limites de plaques. Les déformations affectant le NW de la plaque européenne ont déjà bien été identifiées dans plusieurs bassins, mais elles sont en revanche mal contraintes en Manche. L’objectif de cette thèse est ainsi de reconstruire les évolutions sédimentaires et structurales de la Manche orientale au cours du Paléogène et de les replacer dans le contexte géodynamique du domaine Ouest-Européen à travers l’étude du Bassin de Dieppe-Hampshire, dont la stratigraphie et le calendrier des déformations ne sont pas précisément connus. Ces travaux s’appuient sur l’apport de nouvelles données de sismique réflexion très haute résolution et de nouveaux carottages. L’analyse du remplissage sédimentaire a permis d’établir le cadre stratigraphique, de proposer un découpage séquentiel avec l’identification de quatre cycles de 2ème ordre entre le Thanétien et le Bartonien, et de cartographier la partie méridionale du bassin. La corrélation de ces cycles avec les bassins cénozoïques proches a permis de mettre en évidence cinq phases de déformation ayant affecté le Bassin Anglo-Parisien. Grâce à une analyse structurale fine, nous avons également pu détailler le style et la cinématique de la déformation en Manche orientale, proposer un calendrier de cette déformation, et enfin établir le rôle joué par l’héritage structural régional sur l’évolution paléogène du domaine. / Major paleogeographic changes are recorded within Western Europe between the end of Cretaceous and Paleogene times, in response of tectonic events along European plate boundaries. The deformation affecting the NW part of the European plate are already well identified in the Paris Basin, the Belgian Basin and in Southern England, however it is poorly constrained within the English Channel. The objective of this thesis is thus to reconstruct sedimentary and structural evolutions of the Eastern English Channel during Paleogene times, and to replace these evolutions within the geodynamic context of the Western European domain. This thesis has been focalized on the Dieppe-Hampshire Basin, for which the stratigraphy and the timing of the deformation are not precisely known. This work is based on the contribution of new very high resolution seismic reflection data and of new coring samples. The analysis of the sedimentary filling allowed to establish the stratigraphic framework, to propose a sequence stratigraphic division with the identification of four 2nd order cycles between the Thanetian and the Bartonian, and to map the southern part of the basin. The correlation of these cycles with surrounding Cenozoic basins led to evidence five deformation phases which have affected the Anglo-Paris Basin. Thanks to a careful structural analysis, we also detailed the style and the kinematics of the deformation in the Eastern English Channel, we proposed a deformation schedule and we established the role played by the regional structural inheritance on the Paleogene evolution of the domain.

This thesis examines the handling of the public relations and subsequent news reporting of the 1942 Dieppe raid. Based on official communiques the Canadian newspapers initially portrayed Dieppe as success and featured human-interest stories written by war correspondents. The revelations of the heavy casualties and a more detailed explanation led some newspapers to criticize the raid, although their reactions reflected their political positions. The Canadian military conducted a campaign to sell the value of Dieppe to the Canadian public, largely patterned on the public relations plans of Mountbatten's Combined Operations Headquarters that distracted fiom failure by emphasising heroism, alleged successes, and the lessons learned. War correspondents actively assisted the military's publicity efforts. General McNaughton wanted a more truthful account, but ultimately chose coalition needs over accurate independent publicity. The information campaign although persuasive for many, left numerous Canadians unconvinced that the raid was successful.

War news and public relations (PR) was a critical consideration for the Canadian Army during the Second World War. The Canadian Army developed its PR apparatus from nothing to an efficient publicity machine by war’s end, despite a series of growing pains. Canadian Military Headquarters in London appointed the first PR Officer, William Abel, in January 1940. PR services overseas grew along with the size of the army. The early days were marked by lack of coordination and often jurisdictional and personality conflicts between Abel and the other PR Officers and organizations. The 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid was the low point for both the accuracy of war news and Canadian PR involvement because Lord Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters minimized Canadian PR’s involvement in planning. This resulted in early portrayals of the raid as successful and the British censored a more honest explanation by the Canadian Army. The Sicilian and Italian campaigns provided a learning experience for the PR units. In Sicily, the news coverage of the Canadians was a public success, but PR had trouble with their allies in gaining national recognition and representation. Additionally, the question of correspondents’ priorities and delays getting to the front and transportation difficulties angered the press. Many of these problems continued in Italy until the appointment of Richard Malone, who enjoyed support from the politicians, press, and military. Applying the Mediterranean experience and participating in Allied publicity planning contributed to the excellence of Canadian PR during the Northwest Europe Campaign. PR maintained the confidence of the press while still controlling the correspondents. The army also largely overcame the temptation to censor bad news although this sometimes embarrassed Ottawa. Allied regulations sanitized war news preventing the reporting of the more disturbing aspects of war. Through censorship, the army exercised a great deal of control over the news media, yet this hegemony was incomplete because of need to keep the press friendly. Although a large sceptical minority remained, most Canadians considered their war news to be accurate. In sum, Canadian Army PR was generally successful, portraying the army positively and attracting media coverage.

Cette recherche porte sur l'entraînement de la 2e Division d'infanterie canadienne pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et, plus particulièrement, sur le régiment des Fusiliers Mont-Royal. Il est possible de voir que l'Armée canadienne n'a pas été en mesure de fournir une formation adéquate à ses troupes pour l'opération Jubilee. Forts de leur victoire au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, il semble que les membres de la Force permanente n'aient pas été en mesure de remplir leur tâche : préparer les troupes au combat pour la guerre à venir. Certes, une amélioration du contenu a permis aux fantassins de la 2e Division canadienne d'être mieux préparés. Cependant, ce progrès tardif ne saura protéger les soldats lors du débarquement à Dieppe. Nul doute que leur formation déficiente a provoqué tant chez les officiers subalternes que chez les hommes du rang des lacunes fatales pour plusieurs.