Global ETD Search

1	The information front: the Canadian Army, public relations, and war news during the Second World War Balzer, Timothy John 02 March 2009 (has links) War news and public relations (PR) was a critical consideration for the Canadian Army during the Second World War. The Canadian Army developed its PR apparatus from nothing to an efficient publicity machine by war’s end, despite a series of growing pains. Canadian Military Headquarters in London appointed the first PR Officer, William Abel, in January 1940. PR services overseas grew along with the size of the army. The early days were marked by lack of coordination and often jurisdictional and personality conflicts between Abel and the other PR Officers and organizations. The 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid was the low point for both the accuracy of war news and Canadian PR involvement because Lord Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters minimized Canadian PR’s involvement in planning. This resulted in early portrayals of the raid as successful and the British censored a more honest explanation by the Canadian Army. The Sicilian and Italian campaigns provided a learning experience for the PR units. In Sicily, the news coverage of the Canadians was a public success, but PR had trouble with their allies in gaining national recognition and representation. Additionally, the question of correspondents’ priorities and delays getting to the front and transportation difficulties angered the press. Many of these problems continued in Italy until the appointment of Richard Malone, who enjoyed support from the politicians, press, and military. Applying the Mediterranean experience and participating in Allied publicity planning contributed to the excellence of Canadian PR during the Northwest Europe Campaign. PR maintained the confidence of the press while still controlling the correspondents. The army also largely overcame the temptation to censor bad news although this sometimes embarrassed Ottawa. Allied regulations sanitized war news preventing the reporting of the more disturbing aspects of war. Through censorship, the army exercised a great deal of control over the news media, yet this hegemony was incomplete because of need to keep the press friendly. Although a large sceptical minority remained, most Canadians considered their war news to be accurate. In sum, Canadian Army PR was generally successful, portraying the army positively and attracting media coverage. Canadian Army Public Relations War Correspondents Second World War Censorship Dieppe Raid Sicily campaign casualty report publication Normandy campaign Propaganda William Abel Richard S Malone Louis Mountbatten Italian Campaign
2	'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944 Seefeldt, Connor 26 September 2012 (has links) Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Intelligence Military Intelligence Liri Valley Second World War ELM Burns Burt Hoffmeister Darcy Kingsmill Eighth Army Italian Campaign 1st Canadian Infantry Division 5th Canadian Armoured Division Canadian Intelligence Corps British Intelligence Corps I Canadian Corps Gustav Line Hitler Line Edgar Bill Williams Chris Vokes North African Campaign Ultra Prisoner of War Interrogation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Counter Mortar Counter Battery Corps of Guides War Intelligence Course Intelligence Doctrine Intelligence Training Air Photo Intelligence Special Wireless Service Intelligence Planning Operation DIADEM Operation HONKER First Canadian Interrogation Team
3	'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944 Seefeldt, Connor 26 September 2012 (has links) Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Intelligence Military Intelligence Liri Valley Second World War ELM Burns Burt Hoffmeister Darcy Kingsmill Eighth Army Italian Campaign 1st Canadian Infantry Division 5th Canadian Armoured Division Canadian Intelligence Corps British Intelligence Corps I Canadian Corps Gustav Line Hitler Line Edgar Bill Williams Chris Vokes North African Campaign Ultra Prisoner of War Interrogation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Counter Mortar Counter Battery Corps of Guides War Intelligence Course Intelligence Doctrine Intelligence Training Air Photo Intelligence Special Wireless Service Intelligence Planning Operation DIADEM Operation HONKER First Canadian Interrogation Team
4	'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944 Seefeldt, Connor January 2012 (has links) Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Intelligence Military Intelligence Liri Valley Second World War ELM Burns Burt Hoffmeister Darcy Kingsmill Eighth Army Italian Campaign 1st Canadian Infantry Division 5th Canadian Armoured Division Canadian Intelligence Corps British Intelligence Corps I Canadian Corps Gustav Line Hitler Line Edgar Bill Williams Chris Vokes North African Campaign Ultra Prisoner of War Interrogation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Counter Mortar Counter Battery Corps of Guides War Intelligence Course Intelligence Doctrine Intelligence Training Air Photo Intelligence Special Wireless Service Intelligence Planning Operation DIADEM Operation HONKER First Canadian Interrogation Team

1

Page generated in 0.0547 seconds