Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research study analyzes the Mexican drug war’s impact on the state’s federal political system of shared sovereignty. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) such as drug cartels have grown in strength due to shifting dynamics of the global drug trade. This growth in power, both in relation to the use of physical force and the influence over Mexican society, has challenged the state’s authority and monopoly of violence. After the inauguration of President Felipe Calderón in 2006, the government launched an all-in offensive, dedicating the entire state system to ridding the country of the drug cartels. Results of the offensive have been mixed and vary from area to area. However, trends indicate that the offensive has caused power vacuums and increased rivalry among the drug cartels. National homicide statistics show the government offensive has distorted the balance of power among the drug cartels, causing increased competition in an already hypercompetitive market. The majority of Mexico’s modern history consists of the era of single-party dominance, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated the political system on both vertical and horizontal levels. The recent growth of federal executive power during Calderón’s administration has caused concern about whether the democratic progress made during the last decade could be reversed – returning the country back to former autocratic practices of governance. This reversal also involves the concentration of power in the center. For the last few decades, the country has been decentralizing its political system in accordance to federal principles laid down by its Constitution. The involvement of the military, a federal instrument of security that has in some cases taken over jurisdiction from state and local authorities, has been causing debate on whether the executive power is violating its constitutional limits of power. With this, the primary research question of this study uses theoretical concepts and is formulated thusly: How do violent non-state actors (VNSAs) impact federalism in Mexico? Mexico was chosen as a case study because of its growing struggle against the drug cartels, a sub-branch of non-state actors (NSAs). The Westphalian state order has changed dramatically with globalization, changing realities with regard to the use of physical violence. This is especially the case in reference to VNSAs, where the use of violence maintains an informal system of order. With the rise of the powerful drug cartels, a direct result of the global drug trade that hides in the shadows of globalization, Mexico’s case is not unique. Colombia struggled with a similar scenario during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the security situation in Mexico has proven to be constantly evolving and very intense during a time of political transition. This study shows that the federal executive branch of the Mexican government has not violated its constitutional limits of the use of power, although the Mexican Constitution of 1917 has proven to be vague in reference to the use of the military in peacetime. This vagueness could undermine regional sovereignty and federal principles laid down by the Constitution. The study also indicates that the increasing levels of violence are affecting the functionality of regional governance, as well as freedom of the press. Homicide statistics show that since the government launched its offensive in 2006, there has been a significant increase in assassinations targeting both mayors and journalists. Overall, there is no indication that the drug war has influenced federalism in Mexico. Rather, the drug war has exposed institutional weaknesses, causing increased demand for and investment in professionalizing state institutions. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie navorsingstudie analiseer die impak van die Meksikaanse dwelmoorlog op Meksiko se federale politieke stelsel van gedeelde soewereiniteit. Transnasionale kriminele organisasies (TKO’s), byvoorbeeld dwelmkartelle, se mag het toegeneem as gevolg van die verskuiwende dinamika in globale dwelmhandel. Die staat se gesag en magsmonopolie word uitgedaag as gevolg van hierdie toename in mag, beide met betrekking tot die owerhede se gebruik van fisieke mag en hul gesag oor die Meksikaanse gemeenskap. Na die inhuldiging van president Felipe Calderón in 2006, het die regering ’n alles insluitende offensief van stapel gestuur om van die land se dwelmkartelle ontslae te probeer raak. Hierdie offensief toon wisselende vordering en die impak daarvan verskil van area tot area. Ten spyte van hierdie mate van vordering, het die offensief egter aanleiding gegee tot magsvakuums en ’n toename in wedywering tussen dwelmkartelle. Nasionale moordsyfers dui daarop dat hierdie regeringsoffensief die magsbalans tussen dwelmkartelle versteur het, wat gelei het tot ’n toename in kompetisie in ’n reeds uiters kompeterende mark. Meksiko se moderne geskiedenis bestaan hoofsaaklik uit ’n era van eenpartydominansie, waar die Institusionele Rewolusionêre Party (Institutional Revolutionary Party, IRP) die politieke stelsel op beide vertikale en horisontale vlak gedomineer het. Die onlangse opkoms van die federale uitvoerende mag tydens die Calderón-administrasie wek kommer dat die vordering wat in die laaste dekade gemaak is ten opsigte van demokratisering van die politieke stelsel, omvergewerp sal word en dat Meksiko die gevaar sal loop om terug te keer na sy voormalige outokratiese en gesentraliseerde regeerpraktyke. Oor die afgelope paar dekades het die land juis pogings aangewend om sy politieke stelsel te desentraliseer na aanleiding van federale beginsels soos neergelê in die grondwet. Die weermag – ’n federale instrument vir sekuriteit – het alreeds op sekere plekke jurisdiksie by staats- en plaaslike owerhede oorgeneem. Dit het gelei tot debatte oor of die uitvoerende mag sy grondwetlike magsbeperkinge oorskry. Na aanleiding van Meksiko se huidige politieke situasie, asook teoretiese konsepte soos die staat, federalisme, nie-staatsakteurs en globale dwelmhandel, word die primêre navorsingsvraag vir hierdie studie soos volg geformuleer: Hoe beïnvloed gewelddadige nie-staatsakteurs federalisme in Meksiko? Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord, word daar gebruik gemaak van sekondêre bronne, (beperkte) insig oor die dwelmkartelle se handelspraktyke en ’n ondersoek na die linguistiese beperkinge op die gebruik van amptelike Meksikaanse regeringspublikasies. Meksiko is as gevallestudie vir hierdie navorsingsprojek gekies vanweë die land se toenemende stryd teen dwelmkartelle, ’n subvertakking van nie-staatsakteurs. Die Westfaalse staatsorde wat eeue lank die wettige gebruik van fisieke geweld beheer het, het dramaties verander met die opkoms van globalisering. Dit is veral die geval by gewelddadige nie-staatsakteurs, waar die gebruik van geweld tans ’n informele stelsel van orde handhaaf. Die opkoms van Meksiko se magtige dwelmkartelle, ’n direkte gevolg van globale dwelmhandel (wat in die skadu van globalisering skuil), is egter nie enig in sy soort nie. Alhoewel Colombië byvoorbeeld in die 1980’s en 1990’s ’n soortgelyke probleem ondervind het, het die sekuriteitstoestand in Meksiko getoon dat dit steeds ontwikkelend van aard en hewig ten tye van politieke oorgang is, wat dit toepaslik vir hierdie studie maak. Die gevolgtrekking waartoe daar in hierdie studie gekom word, is dat die federale uitvoerende tak van die Meksikaanse regering tot dusver nie sy grondwetlike beperkinge ten opsigte van die uitoefening van mag oorskry het nie. Die Meksikaanse grondwet van 1917 is egter vaag oor die weermag se bevoegdheid om gesag af te dwing tydens vredestye. Hierdie vaagheid kan moontlik die streeksoewereiniteit en federale beginsels wat deur die grondwet verskans word, ondermyn. Daar is ook bepaal dat die toenemende geweld sowel die funksionaliteit van die streeksregering as die vryheid van die pers, beïnvloed. Moordsyfers in Meksiko dui daarop dat daar sedert 2006 ’n beduidende toename in sluipmoordaanvalle op burgemeesters en joernaliste was. Alles in ag genome, is daar egter geen aanduiding daarvan dat die dwelmoorlog wel federalisme in Meksiko geraak het nie. Die impak wat dit wel gemaak het, is om institusionele swakheid in die regering te openbaar, wat tot ’n toename in die aanvraag na en investering in die professionalisering van staatsinstellings gelei het.

This dissertation examines how parties respond and adapt their behavior to political violence. Building a theoretical argument about strategic party behavior and party capture, I address the following questions: How do parties select and recruit their candidates in regions with high levels of violence and the pervasive presence of VNAs? Do parties respond to violence by selecting certain types of candidates who are more capable of fighting these organizations? Do parties react differently at different levels of government? And finally, how do VNSAs capture political selection across at different levels of government? I argue that in regions where there is high "uncertainty," candidate selection becomes highly important for both party leaders and DTOs. Second, I argue that as violence increases and the number of DTOs also, criminal organizations, as risk-averse actors, will capture candidate selection. I posit that as violence increases, there is a greater likelihood that candidates will have criminal connections. To test my theory, I use the case of Mexico. Violence in Mexico and the presence of criminal organizations across the country has experienced a great deal of variation since the 1990s. In Chapter 2, I find that violence affects the gubernatorial candidate selection of the PRI, PAN and PRD. In high violence states, parties select gubernatorial candidates with long experience in subnational politics compared to other types of experiences. In chapter 3, however, I find that at the municipal level not all the parties respond equally to violence. As a municipality becomes more violent, the PRI and PAN party leaders are more likely to select mayoral candidates who were either state or federal deputies or candidates who were both. In contrast, the PRD is likely to recruit state deputies as a function of violence, but not national deputies or candidates who were deputies at both the state and federal level. Interestingly, I find that as the municipality becomes more violent, party leaders are less likely to recruit inexperienced candidates. This result suggests that parties do indeed respond to levels of violence. Finally, in Chapter 5, I show that criminal organizations capture candidate selection to reduce uncertainty. As utility-maximizing actors, DTOs seek to influence the selection of candidates as a function of violence. At the state level, criminal organizations are more likely to capture candidate selection in states with the presence of multiple DTOs. Party capture is more likely to happen in states where more than one DTO are fighting to control the turf. I show that criminal organizations at the state level equally capture all parties. This finding reveals that DTOs are diversifying their political connections. While under the dominant party regime, they colluded with PRI officials, under the new political Mexican democratic configuration, DTOs are establishing other political relationships with different political parties.