Since the early 1970s, regulation theory have analysed the restructuring of capitalist economies in historical time. As early studies within that political economic research were againt the structural-functionalism explicit in Marxist theories of capitalism at the time on the one hand, and the closed theoretical system of neoclassical economics on the other, regulationists soon resorted to an open-method analysis of stylised facts. Such a method is none other than a middle-range theory. This study touches upon Boyer&rsquo / s and Jessop&rsquo / s arguments on the antithetical consequences of this middle-rangeness for further as well as former theoretical research within regulation theory and their particular scheme of infl&eacute / chissement for that political economic heuristic in institutionalist and integral economic terms.

The aim of this study is to show how a possible philosophy of life can arise from Bergson&rsquo / s conception of time. In realizing this aim, I appeal to Hadot&rsquo / s description of the paradox of the human condition. I claim that in order to understand how a Bergsonian philosophy of life through Bergson&rsquo / s conception of time would arise we need to understand the paradox of the human condition. The reason for this is that there are a lot of dualities in Bergson&rsquo / s philosophy all of which, I claim, are based on this fundamental duality concerning the human condition. I believe that when this paradox and its possible resolution are restated in Bergsonian notions, a Bergsonian philosophy of life that consists of a life sub specie durationis, that is a life under the aspect of duration, would arise. Hadot considered the paradox within the context of phenomenology alone. This made me proceed by searching for other approaches to the paradox within Bergson&rsquo / s philosophy. I realized that the attempts in finding out possible solutions to this problem cannot be found in the context of phenomenology alone and that the vitalist and the existentialist aspects have to be considered in order to remain faithful to Bergson&rsquo / s philosophy as well as in order to construct a Bergsonian philosophy of life. The phenomenological aspect of the paradox arises around Bergson&rsquo / s notion of displacement of attention and when the notion of dur&eacute / e r&eacute / elle is considered with consciousness in the light of the notion of intensity. The vitalist aspect enters into our discussion when we analyze Bergson&rsquo / s notion of &eacute / lan vital around the consideration of true evolution. I believe that the existentialist aspect of the paradox of the human condition comes from Bergson&rsquo / s notion of freedom around the discussion of the superficial and the fundamental self. It emerges if the individual asks himself how to deal with this paradox that in turn defines his struggle to transform the tension the paradox involves and that tells him to bring his own attitude towards it.