Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Julie R. Irwin. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Bethel Theological Seminary, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 207-211).

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 97 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-64).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains xiv, 225 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 204-209).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed on Nov. 2, 2006). PDF text: 207 p. : ill. ; 9.32Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3214105. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche format.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Virginia Commonwealth University, 2006. / Title from title-page of electronic thesis. Prepared for: Center of Public Policy. Bibliography: leaves 127-132.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--Kutztown University. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2957. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-110).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed April 26, 2007). PDF text: 142 p. : ill. UMI publication number: AAT 3229556. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

“[The] sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our thinking” (James, 1890). To make sense of the ever-shifting information in our environment, we constantly assess whether the world around us changes or not, if objects are the “same” or if they are “different”. This basic decision-making process is found from the lowest level of cognition (e.g. when contrasts are encoded by the retina), to the highest (e.g. when comparing concepts), and anywhere in between. In an experimental context, this process is studied with the “same-different” task, where subjects are asked if two stimuli presented sequentially are strictly identical or not. This experiment has been documented since the 1960s and its results have been replicated with diverse stimuli types (letters, shapes, faces, words, etc.). However, every attempt to model the subjects’ accuracy and response times on correct and incorrect answers simultaneously was unsuccessful so far. Part of the challenge in explaining this task is that “same” answers are faster than expected compared to “different” answers, a phenomenon called the “fast-same effect”. This thesis aims to assess whether a formal model based on the inhibition of “different” answers is plausible, effectively changing the problem from “fast-same” to “slow-different”. In the first chapter, I review the previous theories and models of the same-different task to learn why they failed. By elimination process, I identify the only cognitive architecture that seems congruent with the data. I then propose a model prototype based on the inhibition of “different” answers that implements this architecture. In the second chapter, I test this prototype with an experimental paradigm designed specifically to assess its plausibility. I conclude that resources should be spent in developing a formal model based on the inhibition of “different” answers, as the prototype’s qualitative predictions are confirmed by both the typical same-different data and the newly acquired data.

This thesis seeks to better understand the nature of, and relationships between knowledge, data and information. The context selected for this work was clinical practice in the UK National Health Service (NHS) beginning with the generation and use of clinical knowledge. The thesis undertakes a critical examination of the relationship between that knowledge and the data it produces, and the large-scale statistical data sets generated from it via a number of human, technological, systemic and mathematical processes. The statistical data sets were regarded as important because they were highly influential, being used as the basis for significant and far-reaching decisions about healthcare in the NHS. These decisions included policymaking, financial allocations, and allocations of services and other resources. This situation provided fertile ground for this research because the clinical knowledge and data were believed to be subjective to some unknown degree. The statistical data sets, however, were endowed with objective and scientific value. The thesis explores and explains this apparent contradiction. In addressing this issue, the thesis encompasses philosophical, sociological and technological concerns and develops explanatory theories grounded in data collected. Data was collected by a process of extensive qualitative field-based investigation undertaken with clinicians, and data collectors, handlers and users in their operating environments. Key concepts underpinning these theories involve the social construction of reality as a product of individual and group frames of reference; social construction of reality as a result of social arrangements for professional groups; social construction of reality as a result of the pursuance of ontological security; and lastly, the phenomena of structural contradiction and conflict. Of major relevance in this was Giddens' work (1976, 1984) on Structuration Theory, in particular in terms of exploring the effects of sociologically-based frames of reference on creation and transfer of meaning in informational terms. This work was also influential in terms of the notion of structural contradiction and conflict and its informational effects. Application of this abstract, meta-level theory to this real-world situation also led to one of the main contributions to theory. This engagement with reality enabled refinement of its underpinning model. It also demonstrated its explanatory power. This strengthens the validity of the theory and renders it more accessible to other researchers. The thesis indicates clinicians' use of information and subsequent recording of data represents a highly personalised area of professional activity. This does not subsequently translate easily into the data sets and statistical classification schemes that are in common usage in healthcare management. These findings led to conclusions which confirmed initial perceptions of statistical clinical datasets as having a tenuous connection with the clinical knowledge and events upon which they purport to be based. Drawing on evidence which describes knowledge as being situationally-dependent, the conclusions also assert that the transformation of original meaning this implies is largely due to social influences. Finally they claim that the apparent rationality of decisions made on the basis of the transformed meaning, while the result of calculative thought designed to justify related decisions, is misguided in that it has no foundation in the evidence presented. The document ends with a call for a fundamental reassessment of the types of knowledge processed routinely through systems, and of the ways in which those types are handled.