Abstract not available.

Abstract not available.

This thesis investigates by conceptual analysis the nature of moral disagreements and examines the methods that must be needed to settle them. I begin by examining disagreements in general. A disagreement of any kind is a complicated relation which presupposes (1) the object or issue, (2) two disputants, (3) the disputant's beliefs about, attitude to, or action towards the object or issue concerned; it consists in (4) the relation between the things in (3); and it has (1) - (4) as necessary conditions. I then distinguish and consider three kinds of disagreement: disagreement in belief, disagreement in attitude, disagreement in action. Further, disagreements in which the disputants have a common ground, logical or psychological, are distinguished from those in which they have not. In terms of these distinctions, the contrast between moral disagreements and disagreements in science is made. Both moral disagreements and disagreements in sciences might, I argue, fall in either of these last-mentioned categories (chapter 1). Disagreements in morals are those in which two disputants have contradictory judgments on an object belonging to any one of the different orders of morality: Moral acts, moral rules, and moral principles (chapter 2). To answer the question of how moral disagreements are settled, I examine the logic of moral discourse and moral reasoning. Moral judgments are based on reasons which are descriptions of the object or issue concerned; to say that an act is right or wrong implies that we have some reason for saying this; and this reason must be universalizable in the sense that all acts similarly situated are to be similarly treated. Further, when one says that an act is right or wrong he also implies that, other things being equal, he is prepared to do it in the appropriate circumstances. These two features are logical requirements of all moral judgments, and thus no principle can be a moral one unless it satisfies them (chapter 3). With the help of these two formal requirements of universalizability and prescriptivity, we can see, I submit, that moral reasoning can be valid or invalid. And to justify the rightness or wrongness of an act, we can show that it is a case of or is subsumed under a moral rule that can in turn be proved by appealing to a moral principle. A moral principle, being a fundamental criterion of the rightness or wrongness of action, is not susceptible or logical proof "in the usual acceptance of the term". However, to say this does not imply that it cannot be proved in a broader sense of the word; there are, I contend, tests of a valid moral principle, namely, that it should satisfy the two logical requirements of prescriptivity and universalizability and should serve the purpose of morality, (chapter 4). According to the logic of moral judgment and moral reasoning, we can rationally settle moral disagreements. If the disputants hold the same moral point of view, their moral disagreement may be settled logically, when their beliefs about the object or issue in point are the same; the methods utilized to settle it are scientific and logical. In certain cases, in which the disputants hold conflicting fundamental moral principles, the moral disagreement can be settled either by proving that the principle or judgment of one disputant does not satisfy the formal requirements of moral judgment or by proving that his principle or judgment to be invalid (chapter 5). The validity of moral principles or moral judgments relies on a rule of validity of moral argument; therefore, to settle a moral disagreement does not necessarily imply that the two disputants accept what is proved; in other words, the disputant's acceptance of a moral judgment is not relevant to a valid settlement of a moral disagreement, just as the acceptance of the truth of a belief of two disputants is not relevant to the valid settlement of disputes in other disciplines. Finally, and in conclusion to this thesis, I argue for the claim that moral disagreements can be settled rationally, just as can disagreements in the sciences. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Since we accept a democratic society as desirable, it is important to have a sound basis for ethical action. To substantiate such a basis it is necessary to controvert the ethical relativity which has become widespread as a result of the anthropological evidence of the diversity of customs and standards in different societies. This thesis maintains that it is possible to adopt a naturalistic position and at the same time hold that ethical value transcends culture. If it is assumed that within man is focussed the highest development of the universe, the ethic relevant to humanity acquires a universal character. An evolutionary approach provides the justification. Ethical value concerns the "ought" and comes into being when one person considers the rights of others and modifies his conduct accordingly. Ethical action has two manifestations: (1) Intrinsic value conferred on others; and (2) Ethical value, the expression of an obligation, which incidentally leads to an accession of intrinsic value by the agent performing an ethical action. Ethical value is viewed as a basic function of human nature regardless of any specific culture and the corresponding "ethical ought" is distinguished from the "social ought" which is a rule of conduct imposed implicitly by society. It is maintained that there is a universalism implicit in the ethical ought--man is an ethical creature; the ethical ought is an obligation to foster what is right and can not be reduced to custom or convention. After considering briefly the influence of psychology on ethics, the evolution of man's ethical nature is traced, and the endeavour made to show that ethical value is an evolving capacity of man. Anthropological data showing the influence of training and society on personality is reviewed, and criteria for comparing cultures advanced. It is suggested that our present culture with all its faults is superior to others and that the final influence of Western democracy, if its full implications are realized, may be beneficial. Four criteria are presented as constituting the essential marks of ethical conduct; reverence for life, honesty, truth telling, and respect for personality. A rapid survey of a number of societies suggests that while no definitive pattern can be found, it is a reasonable hypothesis that men behave within certain limits of acceptable conduct, and that a social need lies behind departures from the criteria mentioned. The conclusion is drawn that ethical value, the moral imperative, is the expression of a capacity natural to man as a species (although it can be manifested fully only under conditions of mature development of personality and environment) and that since humanity is greater than any specific culture, ethical value does transcend culture. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

This paper is an attempt to relate ethics to the sciences, in particular to psychology. It is held that these two are closely, though complexly, related, in that human capacities (discovered by the sciences) must be known before minor moral imperatives can be formulated, and further, a major moral imperative is necessary to give meaning to the varied capacities which science enumerates as being within the scope of action. Chapter One deals with emergent morality, a natural manifestation of the process of evolution, and points out the uncritical attitude involved in the formation of mores and taboos. These are non-relative and absolute values (imperatives) found in modern as well as primitive societies, and, when adopted, form a mechanistic view of behaviour. The argument against a determined view of conduct is on three grounds: general observation of human action, and evidence from biology and the physical sciences. Man overcomes the mechanistic tendency of the natural evolutionary process by science, in the world of things (e.g. using the causality principle) and ethics in the sphere of ideas (e.g. understanding the dangers inherent in non-relative and absolute values). Chapter Two treats the two other broad types of value. Relative and non-absolute (Calliclean) values are criticized as being in reality not values at all, since to assert that any value will do is the same as saying that none are necessary. Relative and absolute values form the only other alternative. The relativity of values finds support in the general observation that values, to be meaningful, must be somehow related to the beings whose conduct they control. The absolute imperative assumed (as perhaps all basic imperatives must be) is simply that man ought to be healthy, in the fullest meaning of the terra. This assumption is based on 1) the misery of psychologically unsound individuals, and 2) the social necessity for healthy functioning. The chapter concludes with an examination of ascetic morality, and finds it invalidated if the assumed imperative is valid. In its place a morality of full physical and mental functioning seems to be indicated, the nature of this functioning being obtained after a study of the sciences, especially psychology. Chapter Three considers the extent of unhealthy human functioning and finds that psychologically unsound behaviour, which by definition is ethically bad behaviour, is exceedingly widespread, so much so that some writers have referred to the phenomenon as a mass neurosis. Adjustment to society can produce an unhealthy individual if the society itself is inherently unsound. Our own society appears in many ways to fall into this classification, which at once sets a major ethical problem--that of social rectification. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

It is my aim to present an argument against the view that there is a strict dualism of FACTS on the one hand and DECISIONS or DEMANDS on the other and to show that there are cases in which an OUGHT can be derived from an IS. I begin by examining the nature of facts in order to determine what they are and what connection there may be between them and events, situations or states of affair. I next examine the question as to whether there is warrant to stipulate a philosophically technical sense of 'pure fact' or the 'merely factual’ and give consideration to the relevance of the concepts of explanatory power and objectivity to this question, concluding that these concepts do not appear to furnish such a warrant. There follows an argument in support of my opinion that statements of fact presuppose viewpoints which are shared amongst men, thus presupposing in turn some form of community. By discussing several statements of fact and showing their dependence upon institutions or societal arrangements I attempt to support my denial of the claim that specifically MORAL premisses are ALWAYS required in order to derive demands or decisions from statements of fact. In considering several objections which a dualist might raise against my argument I deal with the question of genetic explanation of moral codes, with some of the possible OUTSIDER positions in respect of moral decisions or demands and with the requirement that rules of formal logic be observed in arriving at moral conclusions. Since I am not denying the strength in the dualist's position in insisting upon an analysis of statements of fact in an attempt to establish 'pure fact' or the 'merely factual' I next examine a restricted form of a dualistic view which deals with the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive contents in statements of fact. This shows that there are indeed sentences cast in the form of statements of fact which seem to have predominantly prescriptive content, and I concede the value of a dualistic analysis to bring this out. I claim that this does not militate against my argument as presented, that there are objective statements of fact from which by virtue of the viewpoint underlying them moral demands or decisions can be derived and that it would be extremely difficult to make intelligible the claim that they were not statements of FACT. In a speculative postscript I touch upon the problem of overriding moral demands. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

The plight of people suffering from the violence and deprivation of conflict attracts a great deal of aid. Such aid is often inspired by the thought that we have some responsibility to protect or assist innocent victims of war. However, this humanitarian response is vulnerable to abuse. Combatants can manipulate the supply of aid to achieve their ends, or channel aid to provide their forces with additional food or arms, and so extend the conflict. This poses a challenge to our obligation to assist victims of conflict: if the aid hurts more than it helps, a reasonable response is to refrain from giving aid. This may not help people in need, but it avoids hurting them further. A better response would be to find another means of helping people trapped by conflict which does not risk making their positions worse. This dissertation explores a variety of means that might enable us to help victims of conflict, such as redirecting aid, intervening militarily, or enacting sanctions. One promising strategy involves removing or altering certain international rules which have a role in encouraging conflict. Altering these rules requires concerted advocacy and political will, but given sufficient attention, such an approach could shorten or reduce the severity of some conflicts, or curtail their ill effects on civilians.

The Preamble to the Constitution embodies the dreams, aspirations, wishes and hopes of most South Africans who elected to opt for the freedom without violence path during the 1994 referendum and subsequent democratic elections in South Africa. Due to its progressive nature and protection of human rights the South African constitution is often described as the envy of the liberal world. The constitution grants equal rights to life, equality, freedom and dignity to all citizens. The sad reality for the Rainbow nation is that moral decline and ethical apathy has taken the centre stage and drictly influences the lives of most if not all its citizens. This calls into question the prevailing views and actions of the Christian tradition and community which rests in the power centres of religion; the churches, Christian institutions and communities.The breakdown of morality in South Africa and the contrasting fact that as a nation South Africa implores God to protect and bless her, raises the question as to why South Africa is still shying away from seeking a spiritual - religion based solution to redress the waning ethical narrative of South Africa? The moral fibre of a dominant Christian country has become brittle and tacky with very few strands still hanging onto some respectable form of morality. The research followed the qualitative method and whilst incorporating the most recent empirical research highlighting the relevance and importance of people’s responses to and opinions of morality and ethical conduct it considers the historical, current and future of ethical conduct and morality in South Africa. The theoretical findings and proposals are incorporated into a theoretical construct built on Virtue ethics and presented as an alternative which provides the opportunity and possibility to influence and arrest the decline of morality in South Africa. / Dissertation (MTh)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Biblical and Religious Studies / MTh / Unrestricted

BACKGROUND: It is unconstitutional for the government of the United States to uphold a religion as its national church. Yet, this is exactly what America is doing through policy that essentially oppresses and disenfranchise its black citizens to this day. This thesis is for the purposes of disclosing America’s national religion as white supremacy, a religion animated largely through ritual practice as faith and practical mimesis as liturgy, practiced only by white people, abetted by the government. The effects of this grand liturgy will be explored thereafter, consequent of black people not being treated as full citizens. Subsequently, I will propose a theological response to what is a theological and religious issue, with the hope that the woeful religion of white supremacy that has been at the core of American governmental policy will finally be meliorated. DISCUSSION: Why religion? Why that seemingly stilted terminology to describe an ideology of superiority? Surely there must be other ways of describing the phenomenon of white supremacy, ways that do not seem to insist on the sensationalist. Yet, this is no sensationalist appeal or alarmist demagoguery, this description is rooted in the tangible facticity of white supremacy in America. White supremacy in America is a highly systematized, ritualized program of being, filled with dedication and devotion that is only reminiscent of a faith-based tradition—instituted by greed, routinized by policy, emboldened by quietly radicalized adherents. It is not aberrant as many suppose, the activity of some lone actors, who are abstracted from the realities of a trenchant past that motivates the action of the present. Rather, it is an ecology of the prescription of whiteness as economical and sociological power and infrastructural discrimination that has strengthened and encouraged many to live into its promises of exceptionalism, and that has obfuscated, alienated, and isolated many by their millions for no other reason than that they were and are of a different skin color. This is the religion of white supremacy. This is Towards a Ritual to Die For.

Chronic pain is a national public health problem. Poor availability of treatment leads to increased costs, unnecessary suffering for patients, and a significant economic burden to society. The experience of chronic pain is multifaceted; while it is a physical phenomenon, it is often accompanied by complex psychosocial effects. Chronic pain is better understood through the biopsychosocial model. This biopsychosocial model highlights physiological, psychological, and social impacts and how they can prolong or exacerbate the pain experience. Effective treatment of this complex condition requires a management and treatment strategy that covers the full scope of the disease experience. Multidisciplinary pain management is an evidence-based, holistic approach to treating chronic pain that addresses the complexity of the condition by assembling a multidisciplinary team of medical experts to develop a thorough treatment strategy for the patient and treat pain through the lens of the biopsychosocial model. Compared to conventional methods of managing chronic pain, which ignore the psychosocial aspects of chronic pain and place more emphasis on its physical component, this treatment is more efficient and less expensive. The best ethical course of treatment for those with chronic pain is a multidisciplinary one that addresses all facets of the pain experience. Unfortunately, there is a widespread lack of access to this care due to a lack of availability, funding, and awareness of this treatment style. Today, telehealth and internet-based platforms provide new ways for patients to access outpatient treatment and other forms of healthcare remotely. This kind of access can be a cost-effective, accessible, and convenient way for patients to engage with multidisciplinary pain management and provides a solution to the challenges of delivering multidisciplinary pain management. / Urban Bioethics