本研究旨在探討管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測意願、預測精確度、預測型態與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測能力較佳之管理當局所發佈之盈餘預測對投資人是否具增額資訊內涵。 實證分析結果顯示管理當局能力與管理當局發佈盈餘預測之機率呈顯著正相關，亦即管理當局能力愈好，發佈盈餘預測之機率愈高；再者，本研究發現能力愈佳之管理當局，其盈餘預測之精確度亦會較高；而實證結果亦顯示當管理當局能力較好時，較願意以資訊量較多之完整式財務預測型態發佈財務預測。增額測試結果則顯示市場對於能力較佳之管理當局發佈之自願性盈餘預測反應程度較高。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the managerial ability is related to management earnings forecast, earnings forecast accuracy , and disclosure format. Additionally, this thesis investigates whether managerial ability increases the informativeness of management earnings forecast for (potential) investors. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to announce management earnings forecast and when managers have better ability, they shall announce more precise management earnings forecast. About disclosure format, this thesis finds that managers with superior ability prefer to announce complete earnings forecasts than simple ones. Additionally, market reaction will be more to the informativeness of management earnings forecast which made by managers with better ability.