It is over thirty years since the U. S. became embroiled in the Vietnam war. Only recently, however, have scholars begun to assess how that involvement in South East Asia affected America's relations with other countries. This thesis examines the impact of the Vietnam war on the relationship between the United States and one of its key allies, Great Britain, during the height of the conflict. It assesses how far Vietnam was a factor in the cooling of transatlantic relations during the mid to late 1960s. Scholars have long noted the decline in importance of Anglo-American relations during the 1960s. It is the contention of this thesis that the Johnson administration's preoccupation with events in South East Asia made the inevitable loosening of ties between the two countries strained and uncomfortable. Although it was not the only problematic issue troubling Anglo-American relations during this period, Vietnam was the one area where there was clear and open conflict. Whereas tensions over sterling and the decision by the British Government to remove its troops from East of Suez prompted feelings of disappointment, sadness and frustration, Vietnam provoked disagreement, misunderstandings, annoyance and accusations of betrayal. At the beginning of their period in office, the British Labour Government desired a `closer' relationship with the United States but by 1968 it was apparent that the Johnson Administration was not amenable to this. This was partly because Britain was now, just one of a number of close allies in Europe; partly because the American President did not develop a personal friendship with the British Prime Minister; but also because the Vietnam conflict had proved an issue - important enough and emotive enough - to cause open and deep disagreement between the two countries.

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This thesis considers the role of the Information Research Department (IRD) in countering Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda directed at British interests in the Middle East and Africa between 1954 and 1963. It argues that the 1956 Suez Crisis and its fallout was the catalyst that drove a significant expansion of IRD's remit and responsibility. From 1956 the department – which up to this point had had a purely anti-Communist function – was given the responsibility of countering the increasing flow of Arab nationalist propaganda emerging from Egypt. The same year, the Communist powers mounted a renewed and concerted effort to culturally and ideologically penetrate Africa. IRD, who to this point had been excluded from directly operating in Africa, began counter-Communist work in the face of stiff Colonial Office resistance. Analysis of IRD in the Middle East has rarely considered events beyond the immediate aftermath of Suez. IRD's work in Africa is almost wholly unexplored. It is a central contention of this thesis that the two regions cannot be viewed in isolation post-Suez. Egypt's standing was buoyed by the propaganda capital of victory over Suez, and Nasser's position as the figurehead of Arab nationalism was assured. In seeking the removal of colonial influence from the Middle East and Africa, Arab propaganda – particularly the Voice of the Arabs programme of Cairo Radio – ties the regions together. Communist and African nationalist propagandists were drawn to Cairo in the wake of the Suez Crisis. The former, building relationships through aid, sought to leverage Cairo's expanding influence to their own advantage. The latter sought facilities and support for their own propaganda efforts. After Suez, IRD sought to manage Egyptian propaganda whilst avoiding direct confrontation, seeking to normalise relations. In Africa, the department sought to build an infrastructure for information work aimed at influencing future leaders, their efforts constrained by the timetable of British decolonisation. In both regions, through developing relationships with local agencies and the BBC, and from initiatives such as the Transmission 'X' news commentary service, IRD continued to address Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda with a flexibility and responsiveness not recognised in the current literature on IRD.