"Electronic Surveillance", the mechanical technique to monitor private communications of the suspect is one of the most powerful weapons of the police in modern crime-prevailing societies. In Canada the attempt to set up a legal framework to balance the police need for electronic surveillance against the citizen's right to privacy resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act proclaimed on June 30, 1974. In Japan, in contrast, with no specific legislation governing electronic surveillance, the police refrain from resorting to this enchanting method of criminal investigation. The purpose of this study is to propose a desirable electronic surveillance law in Japan, taking advantage of the Canadian precedent in this field. The introductory portion of this study focuses on the concept of privacy in the West and Japan. Despite the vast difference in traditional privacy consciousness between Canada and Japan, privacy has been recognized as a legally protected interest in both countries. In the first half of the main portion, the study analyzes the Canadian electronic surveillance legislation from the standpoint of the police. While providing the most powerful investigative tool, the law also has had a negative impact upon the Canadian police in that it brought about undue interference, judicial or otherwise, in the operation of criminal investigation. In the last half of the main portion, the study deals with the Japanese system for electronic surveillance. The conclusion reached is that the Canadian legislative precedent can, with some necessary modification, be an appropriate model for Japan, and that Japan should introduce an electronic surveillance system with less intrusive power than in Canada while preserving the traditional independent authority of the police in criminal investigation. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Inaug.-Diss.--Bonn. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 6-21.

No description available.

Communications-related investigatory powers are ostensibly regulated within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, under the descriptive headings: 'interception of communications'; 'acquisition and disclosure of communications data' and 'investigation of data protected by encryption'. The scope, legality and extent of these hitherto infrequently examined powers experienced increased scrutiny following the controversial 2013 disclosures of fugitive United States National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, scrutiny generally founded on subjective conceptions of 'privacy', 'intrusiveness' or 'security'. This research however, adopts 'communications' as its conceptual common denominator. It comprehensively explores the separate politico-legal evolution of RIPA's communications-related investigatory powers, whilst identifying and critically analysing alternative statutory provisions that permit circumvention of RIPA's purported human rights-centric integrity. The detailed chronology provides conclusive evidence that current UK Secretaries of State and their executive agencies possess virtually unlimited communications-related information acquisition powers bequeathed by their predecessors. Perhaps more importantly, its simultaneous exposure of an executive culture of secrecy and deference to the UK's intelligence community assists in explaining why any fettering of the current powers will be so difficult to achieve. Drawing from Intelligence Studies, Information Science and Computer Science, this research logically deconstructs RIPA's communications-related powers, finding them more accurately describable as narrowly defined techniques facilitating the acquisition of communications-related data. Consequently, RIPA fails to envisage or regulate all types of acquisition, such as that obtained extra-jurisdictionally or via Computer Network Exploitation, thus partially legitimizing the status quo. The research also examines RIPA's seemingly all-encompassing definition of 'communication', finding it under-utilised, in that communications from the mind into electronic storage ('expression-related data') are not included. Consequently, the boundaries between 'communication', 'expression' and 'property,' and between RIPA's powers and those enabling Computer Network Exploitation are currently unnecessarily complicated. It concludes by recommending the enactment of a single statute regulating all investigative expression-related data acquisition.

Thesis (M.S. in Engineering Science (Electrical Engineering))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): David C. Jenn, Jeffrey B. Knorr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Craig R. Scott. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Eng.)--Carleton University, 1989. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-95).

A Constituição brasileira de 1988 estabeleceu o direito à inviolabilidade da intimidade, da vida privada e do sigilo das comunicações, apresentando-se os dois primeiros como princípios e o último como regra. A regra da inviolabilidade do sigilo das comunicações se fez acompanhar de cláusula de exceção pela qual o constituinte admitiu hipóteses de restrição a esse direito, notadamente para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer. Uma das formas de restrição vem a ser a interceptação das comunicações telemáticas, que o trabalho se propõe a analisar, de modo a verificar os limites da atuação estatal no uso desse método de investigação. Em tal análise, de modo a definir o âmbito de proteção dos direitos acima citados, o autor considera, além dos dispositivos da Constituição e legislação brasileiras, convenções internacionais de direitos humanos e a interpretação que lhes é dada por cortes regionais de direitos humanos e adota, como critérios e métodos, o princípio da proporcionalidade, os padrões doutrinariamente concebidos para a construção de um processo penal que se aproxime de uma meta de eficiência e garantismo e as experiências de outros países pesquisados. / The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the rights to inviolability of intimacy, privacy and confidentiality of communications, presenting the first two as principles and the last one as a rule. The rule of the inviolability of the secrecy of communications was followed by an exception clause which specifies the hypotheses in which such right may be restricted, notably for purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedure, in the cases and in the form provided by statutory law. One of the possibilities of such restriction is the interception of electronic communications, which this paper aims to analyze in order to verify the limits for state action in the use of such criminal investigation method. In such analysis, in order to define the scope of protection of the abovementioned right, the author considers, in addition to the provisions set forth in the Brazilian Constitution and law, international human rights conventions and their interpretation given and adopted by regional human rights courts, and, as criteria and methods, the principle of proportionality, the doctrinally conceived standards for the construction of a criminal procedure system closer to an objective of efficiency and fundamental individual rights protection, as well as the experiences of other researched countries.

A Constituição brasileira de 1988 estabeleceu o direito à inviolabilidade da intimidade, da vida privada e do sigilo das comunicações, apresentando-se os dois primeiros como princípios e o último como regra. A regra da inviolabilidade do sigilo das comunicações se fez acompanhar de cláusula de exceção pela qual o constituinte admitiu hipóteses de restrição a esse direito, notadamente para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer. Uma das formas de restrição vem a ser a interceptação das comunicações telemáticas, que o trabalho se propõe a analisar, de modo a verificar os limites da atuação estatal no uso desse método de investigação. Em tal análise, de modo a definir o âmbito de proteção dos direitos acima citados, o autor considera, além dos dispositivos da Constituição e legislação brasileiras, convenções internacionais de direitos humanos e a interpretação que lhes é dada por cortes regionais de direitos humanos e adota, como critérios e métodos, o princípio da proporcionalidade, os padrões doutrinariamente concebidos para a construção de um processo penal que se aproxime de uma meta de eficiência e garantismo e as experiências de outros países pesquisados. / The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the rights to inviolability of intimacy, privacy and confidentiality of communications, presenting the first two as principles and the last one as a rule. The rule of the inviolability of the secrecy of communications was followed by an exception clause which specifies the hypotheses in which such right may be restricted, notably for purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedure, in the cases and in the form provided by statutory law. One of the possibilities of such restriction is the interception of electronic communications, which this paper aims to analyze in order to verify the limits for state action in the use of such criminal investigation method. In such analysis, in order to define the scope of protection of the abovementioned right, the author considers, in addition to the provisions set forth in the Brazilian Constitution and law, international human rights conventions and their interpretation given and adopted by regional human rights courts, and, as criteria and methods, the principle of proportionality, the doctrinally conceived standards for the construction of a criminal procedure system closer to an objective of efficiency and fundamental individual rights protection, as well as the experiences of other researched countries.