This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining the relationship between technological trajectories and environmental policy in the automotive industry, focusing on the role of environmental policies in unlocking the industry from fossil fuel path-dependence. It first explores the inducement mechanism that underpins the interaction between environmental policy and green technological advances, investigating under what conditions the European environmental transport policy portfolio and the intrinsic characteristics of assignees' knowledge boost worldwide green patent production. Subsequently, the thesis empirically analyses the dynamics of technological knowledge involved in technological trajectories assessing evolution patterns such as variation, selection and retention, in order to study the impact of policy implementation on technological knowledge related to electric and hybrid vehicle technologies. Finally, the thesis sheds light on the drivers that encourage a shift from incumbent internal combustion engine technologies towards low-emission vehicle technologies. This analysis tests whether tax-inclusive fuel prices and technological proximity between technological fields induce a shift from non-environmental inventions to environmentally friendly inventive activities and if they impact the competition between alternative vehicle technologies. The findings provide insights into the effectiveness of environmental policy in triggering inventive activities related to the development of alternative vehicle technologies. In addition, there is evidence that environmental policy redirects technological efforts towards a sustainable path and impacts the competition between low-emission vehicles.

This dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper "Ethnicity, Migration and Conflict: Evidence from Contemporary South Africa” exploits some of the institutional changes intervened in South Africa during the end of apartheid to investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict. I find within-ethnic polarization to be significantly related to the intensity of armed confrontations among black-dominated groups. My investigation thus gives strong and robust empirical support to the theoretical arguments which identify ethnic diversity as one of the determinants of civil conflict. The second chapter, "Pre-Colonial Centralization, Colonial Activities and Development in Latin America", investigates the hypothesis that pre-colonial ethnic institutions shaped contemporary regional development in Latin America. I document a strong and positive relationship between pre-colonial centralization and regional development. Results are in line with the view that highly centralized pre-colonial societies acted as a persistent force of agglomeration of economic activities and a strong predictor of colonial state capacity. The results provide a first evidence of the existence of a link between pre-colonial centralization, colonial institutional arrangements and contemporary economic development. The third paper "Bite and Divide: Malaria and Ethnic Diversity” investigates the role of malaria as a fundamental determinant of modern ethnic diversity. This paper explores the hypothesis, that a large exposure to malaria has fostered differential interactions that reduced contacts between groups and increased interactions within them Results document that malaria increases the number of ethnic groups at all levels of spatial disaggregation and time periods (exploiting historical and current ethnic diversity). Regressions' results show that endogamous marriages are more frequent in areas with higher geographic suitability to malaria. The results are in line with the view that malaria increases intra-ethnic interactions while decreasing inter-ethnic ones.

This thesis consists of three self-contained papers. In the first paper I analyze the labor supply behavior of Bologna Pizza Delivery Vendors. Recent influential papers analyze labor supply behavior of taxi drivers (Camerer et al., 1997; and Crawford and Meng, 2011) and suggest that reference-dependence preferences have an important influence on drivers’ labor-supply decisions. Unlike previous papers, I am able to identify an exogenous and transitory change in labor demand. Using high frequency data on orders and rainfall as an exogenous demand shifter, I invariably find that reference-dependent preferences play no role in their labor’ supply decisions and the behavior of pizza vendors is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the standard model of labor’ supply. In the second paper, I investigate how the voting behavior of Members of Parliament is influenced by the Members seating nearby. By exploiting the random seating arrangements in the Icelandic Parliament, I show that being seated next to Members of a different party increases the probability of not being aligned with one’s own party. Using the exact spatial orientation of the peers, I provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that interaction is the main channel that explain these results. In the third paper, I provide an estimate of the trade flows that there would have been between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the Euro. As an alternative approach to the standard log-linear gravity equation I employ the synthetic control method. I show that the aggregate trade flows between Britain and Europe would have been 13% higher if the UK had adopted the Euro.

The thesis comprises four essays. The first essay provides a comprehensive survey of the implications of the theories of individual decision making most frequently used in behavioral economics for the optimal pricing strategy of the firm. The second essay focuses on habit forming behavior, namely the behavior when the valuation of the good in each period is affected by whether consumption occurred in preceding periods. It studies how consumers' habit formation affects the pricing policy of firms. Two types of consumers are considered, sophisticated and naive. The latter do not realize that their current consumption is affecting future consumption. Our main result is that under naive habit formation, the optimal pricing pattern is a three part tariff, namely a fixed fee, an amount of units for free and after their end pricing above marginal cost. The firm exploits naivety charging high price towards the end, and low in the beginning triggering the consumption of a forward looking consumer. The third essay studies a market that consists of one firm and habit forming consumers of different degrees of sophistication. The firm cannot observe the sophistication so it screens between the different types of consumers. The menu of contract offered consists of the frequently observed menu of a two-part tariff and a three-part tariff. Finally, the fourth essay proposes a second explanation of three part tariffs, based on the assumption that consumers are forward-looking but impatient. In a dynamic stochastic setting, prices that apply to large volumes tend to be paid towards the end of the contracting period and so are more heavily discounted by consumers. As a result, high prices for large volumes represent an efficient way of extracting surplus. Low prices for small volumes serve to stimulate early consumption, making it more likely that high marginal prices will apply later.

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This thesis comprises three essays on determinants and consequences of international labor migration at individual, family and country level. The first chapter explores the effect of parents' absence due to migration on the educational outcomes of children left behind. The estimated reduced form model relies on an educational production function where the total effect of migration is the combination of the positive effect of remittances, and the negative effect of a parent's absence. The results suggest that parental absence offsets the positive impact of remittances on children's schooling achievements and that a mother's absence is more detrimental than a father's absence. The second chapter examines the effects of family size and demographic structure on offspring's international migration. The potential endogeneity of parental fertility choices is addressed by using infertility shocks and miscarriage before first birth as exogenous variation in family size. The positive correlation between fertility and migration disappears when the potential endogeneity of sibship size is addressed. A deeper analysis reveals that the chances to migrate are not equally distributed across children within the family. Older siblings are more likely to migrate, while having more sisters than brothers may increase the chances of migration, particularly among girls. The third chapter studies the effect of granting the right to vote in local elections to non citizens of non Eu origin. In the spirit of a differences-in-differences strategy, election results and economic outcomes of municipalities with more immigrants entitled to vote are compared with municipalities with a smaller share of immigrant voters, before and after the introduction of a new law. Preliminary results indicate that, depending on the economic and demographic context, and on the immigration policies, the effect can vary substantially: the pro immigrants parties can either gain on lose votes, with relevant consequences for public good expenditures.

This dissertation consists of two papers. The first paper ``Do Electoral Systems Affect the Incumbent Probability of Re-election? Evidence from Italian Municipalities'' empirically investigates how electoral systems affect the incumbent likelihood of re-election in Italian municipalities. It also sheds light on the mechanism through which the electoral system affects the re-election probability. The overarching goal of the paper is to connect different aspects of the issue. I provide new insight into how different electoral systems affect accountability, politician selection and then economic policies. Results show that the probability of re-election is significantly higher in majoritarian systems for mayors but not for assessors and councillors. The majoritarian system defines a clear majority within the city council and its leader, which increases accountability toward the mayors. Indeed, in the majoritarian systems, the effort of mayors, measured as the probability of having a social welfare investment, is higher. Finally, We show that the observed evidence is not driven by political selection. The second paper ``Separated Under the Same Roof: Fiscal Inefficiency of Parties' Fragmentation and Mayor's Political Power" investigates the effect of political fragmentation of local government on fiscal policies. It shows that the effect of fragmentation on fiscal policies depends mainly on two factors: the presence of a binding budget constraint and the political power of the executive leader. Results show that, in the presence of a binding budget constraint, a more fragmented majority performs less public spending and collects less revenue. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of political fragmentation disappears while the political power of the mayor increases.

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The thesis comprises three essays that use experimental methods, one about other-regarding motivations in economic behavior and the others on pro-social behavior in two environmental economics problems. The first chapter studies how the expectations of the others and the concern to maintain a balance between effort exerted and rewards obtained interact in shaping the behavior in a modified dictator game. We find that dictators condition their choices on recipients' expectations only when there is a high probability that the the recipient will not be compensated for her effort. Otherwise, dictators tend to balance the efforts and rewards of the recipients, irrespective of the recipients' expectations. In the second chapter, I investigate the problem of local opposition to large public projects (e.g. landfills, incinerators, etc.). In particular, the experiment shows how the uncertainty about the project's quality makes the community living in the host site skeptical about the project. I also test whether side-transfers and costly information disclosure can help to increase the efficiency. Both tools succesfully make the host more willing to accept the project, but they lead to the realization of different types of projects. The last chapter is an experiment on climate negotiations. To avoid the global warming, countries are called to cooperate in the abatement of their emissions. We study whether the dynamic aspect of the climate change makes cooperation across countries behaviorally more difficult. We also consider inequality across countries as a possible factor that hinders international cooperation.

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