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This thesis focuses on two aspects of European economic integration: exchange rate stabilization between non-euro Countries and the Euro Area, and real and nominal convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries. Each Chapter covers these aspects from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Chapter 1 investigates whether the introduction of the euro was accompanied by a shift in the de facto exchange rate policy of European countries outside the euro area, using methods recently developed by the literature to detect "Fear of Floating" episodes. I find that European Inflation Targeters have tried to stabilize the euro exchange rate, after its introduction; fixed exchange rate arrangements, instead, apart from official policy changes, remained stable. Finally, the euro seems to have gained a relevant role as a reference currency even outside Europe. Chapter 2 proposes an approach to estimate Central Bank preferences starting from the Central Bank's optimization problem within a small open economy, using Sweden as a case study, to find whether stabilization of the exchange rate played a role in the Monetary Policy rule of the Riksbank. The results show that it did not influence interest rate setting; exchange rate stabilization probably occurred as a result of increased economic integration and business cycle convergence. Chapter 3 studies the interactions between wages in the public sector, the traded private sector and the closed sector in ten EU Transition Countries. The theoretical literature on wage spillovers suggests that the traded sector should be the leader in wage setting, with non-traded sectors wages adjusting. We show that large heterogeneity across countries is present, and sheltered and public sector wages are often leaders in wage determination. This result is relevant from a policy perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector.

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The thesis consists in three papers that investigate two debated topics in industrial organization (in particular in competition policy) through formal models based on game-theory. The first paper deals with potential effects of conglomerate mergers among leading brands in facilitating foreclosure of new suppliers through the retailing channel. The two remaining papers analyze antitrust policy with respect to monopolization of markets of spare parts and aftermarkets by monopolistic equipment manufacturers.

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This dissertation comprises three essays on the topic of industrial organization. The first essay considers how different intellectual property systems can affect the incentives to invest in R&D when innovation is cumulative. I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated technological knowledge, which plays a crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak intellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technological knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated, as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries. The second essay analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information on the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information on the quality of their competitors products (paying positive to go negative). It is shown that whether advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of media reports or not, ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers products. The third essay considers the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new technology. A population of agents can choose between two risky technologies: an old one for which they know the expected outcome, and a new one for which they have only a prior. Different environments are confronted. In the benchmark case agents are isolated and can perform costly experiments to infer the quality of the new technology. In the other cases agents are settled in a network and can observe the outcomes of neighbors. We observe that in expectations the quality of the new technology may be overestimated when there is a network spread of information.