The primary object of this dissertation is to explain Marx's theory of metallic money and to show how this theory can be integrated with Marx's theories of capital accumulation and crisis. In the first chapter the current interpretations of Marx's theory of money are subjected to a critical examination. Of primary concern is the interpretation advanced by Suzanne de Brunhoff in Marx on Money. De Brunhoff's proposition that the theory of money set forth in Part I of Capital should be understood as a "complete theory of money" is criticized. In opposition to this, it is maintained that the theory of money presented in the first part of Capital should be understood as a first formulation of a theory of money, and that this theory is developed and transformed as the discourse of Capital proceeds. In the second chapter Marx's definition of money is examined and the various functions that Marx ascribes to money are explained. The third chapter examines the theory of money set fourth in the first part of Capital and offers detailed arguments to support the proposition that this theory should be conceived as merely a first formulation of a theory of money. In the fourth chapter the role that Marx assigns to hoarding in simple reproduction is analyzed. This analysis serves as the basis for an integration of Marx's theory of money with the theory of capital accumulation. Associated with this, the transformation that takes place in Marx's theory of money as the discourse of Capital proceeds is specified. The final chapter of this dissertation examines the relationship between monetary processes and the development of crises in a capitalist social formation. Here it is argued that Marx does not conceive money as "neutral." Instead, monetary processes are conceived as relatively autonomous and, as such, play an important role in the development of crises.

The concept of the rate of surplus-value occupies a central role in Marx's theory of the "laws of motion" of capitalism. The rate of surplus-value (the ratio of surplus-value to variable capital) expresses quantitatively the main conclusion of Marx's theory of surplus-value, that surplus-value is purely the result of an increase in the variable capital which is exchanged for labor-power. One important prediction of Marx's theory is a tendency for the rate of surplus-value to increase as a result of the development of the productivity of labor in capitalism. This dissertation subjects this prediction of Marx's theory to an empirical test by deriving estimates of the rate of surplus-value in the United States from 1947 to 1977. There are three main theoretical issues involved in the estimation of the rate of surplus-value, which have to do with the specific features of observable reality to which Marx's concepts of surplus-value and variable capital refer: (1) Do Marx's concepts of surplus-value and variable capital refer to measurable quantities of labor-time or to measurable quantities of money? (2) Does Marx's concept of variable capital refer to the wages of all employees of capitalist firms or only to the wages of employees engaged in production activities? (3) Does Marx's concept of variable capital include the taxes paid by workers and/or the income provided to workers by the government? The empirical results of this dissertation show that the rate of surplus-value in the United States increased 19 percent over the period of study. Thus, these empirical results are consistent with the prediction of Marx's theory of a secularly increasing rate of surplus-value. Further analysis of these empirical results reveals that the ratio of unproductive labor to productive labor increased a very significant 82 percent over this period. This increase was the primary cause of the decline in the conventional profit to wages ratio and of the decline in the percentage of surplus-value available for capital accumulation.

The recent psychological research called into question the conventional notion of self as a coherent, non-contradictory unity representable by a one-dimensional preference ordering. Unable to account for experimentally-demonstrated, and in part, morality-induced intransitivities and irregularities in the preference pattern of the self, and failing to capture the rich spectrum of diverse and potentially conflicting ethical and other motives and considerations underlying preferences, the conventional notion of one-dimensionally representable self, however useful it may have been in modeling certain economic phenomena, appears to miss much of the richness and complexity that characterizes human behavior. This dissertation explores possibilities for an enriching critique and reconstruction of economic theory so as to meet some of the challenges posed by the recent psychological research on human self. To undertake such a critique and reconstruction, we, first, introduce a notion of multidimensional self that modifies the conventional model. Based on this alternative formulation, we attempt to extend the theories of morality-inclusive individual and social choices, and the theory of value, and prove a number of results. The first set of results include several theorems that demonstrate possible ways in which a multiplicity of conflicted, heterogeneous dimensions underlying preferences could lead to intransitivities in the overall preference pattern of the self. Some of these theorems explore the relations between morality and rationality in individual choices. The second set of results deal with a number of social choice paradoxes. First, we extend and generalize the current results on the Paretian Liberal paradox and the paradox of majority decision in a framework that takes into account the possibility of intransitive individual preferences. Second, we study the relations between morality and economic efficiency in social choices, and attempt to determine whether there is a trade-off between Ethical Pluralism and Pareto efficiency, and whether the presence or absence of intransitive individual preferences affects that trade-off. The third set of results consist of "cases" that illustrate ways in which multiple dimensions underlying individual preferences render problematic the conventional theory of value.

This dissertation surveys the literature on consumption across diverse paradigms in economics. It presents a critique of theories that posit an "authentic" mode of consumption free of contradiction. I argue that the view of the consumer constructed within neoclassical economic discourses as rational and utilitarian should be subjected to epistemological critique. While there have been economists who have challenged the conventional wisdom on consumption, their critiques have relied on notions such as manipulation and alienation--notions that presume the existence of a free and sovereign human subject waiting to be liberated from the evils of the consumer society. Both views--the mainstream and the heterodox--accept the premise that an "authentic" relationship between the subject and object of consumption is possible, and indeed desirable. This "modernist" understanding of consumption is contrasted to developments in other disciplines that have explored consumption from a postmodern perspective. In a postmodern framework, consumption is not viewed as a process in which a consumer is or is not rational, but rather as a contradictory process in which consumer subjectivity is endogenously produced, contested and negotiated. The dissertation concludes by examining how postmodern theory could be applied to consumption within economics, and illustrates its significance with case studies of the natural foods and discount retail industries.

For over one hundred years Marxian and non-Marxian theorists have wrestled with how demand conditions ought to be specified in the Marxian theory of value and price. Most often demand at best plays a secondary role to the conditions of supply. In other words, both proponents and critics have conceived Marxian theory as specifying a model in which production conditions ultimately—in the long run—govern values and prices. This dissertation presents a criticism of this tradition and develops a new way to conceive of the role of demand in a Marxian theory of value and price. It breaks with orthodox Marxian theory by showing, in sharp contrast to that approach, how both supply and demand conditions directly values and prices. The approach also differs from modern neoclassical theory in its use of the notion of labor time rather than utility to define the value of commodities. However, it is a notion of labor time which is not immune from changes in demand conditions. A model is developed that incorporates both intra- and inter-industry competition to show exactly how changes in demand affect all values and prices. The results suggest a completely new way to specify disequilibrium models in order to theorize the adjustment process of prices out of equilibrium. As a result it provides a basis for further research into questions which require analysis of disequilibria including economic crises, inflation/deflation, and even international fluctuations in exchange rates. Future research will explore these areas.

The market-based approach to controlling industrial pollution is a major innovation in environmental policy, and is rapidly gaining support among policy makers. It is likely that environmental quality standards can be achieved at much lower cost with market-based policies than with traditional command-and-control regulations because they provide sources of pollution more flexibility and greater incentives to find and implement cost-effective ways to control their emissions. However, a key component of market-based systems has not been adequately addressed; namely, how they should be enforced to achieve acceptable levels of compliance. This dissertation extends the theoretical analysis of compliance and enforcement in market-based environmental policies, focusing primarily on developing practical guidelines for the design of appropriate enforcement strategies. After a description of the structural design and enforcement strategies being pursued in two major U.S. market-based systems, three theoretical models are developed. Each of the models assumes that the enforcement objective is to achieve complete compliance to a transferable emissions permit system (each firm holds enough permits to cover its emissions) in a cost-effective manner. In addition, each of the models assumes that firms in a market-based control system are required to provide reports of their emissions to an enforcement authority. The first model of this dissertation assumes that regulated sources of pollution operate under a perfectly competitive transferable permit system. The model allows the development of a number of practical guidelines for enforcing competitive market-based policies that are focused primarily on the use and value of self-reporting, the value of firm-specific information to an enforcer, the desirability of targeted monitoring, and guidelines for setting penalties. The second and third models of this dissertation reconsider the design of effective enforcement strategies when certain market imperfections exist. Specifically, the second model considers the consequences of transaction costs on enforcing transferable emissions permit system. Finally, the third model considers enforcement design when a firm can exercise price-setting power in a market-based system.

With new tools such as evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling this, dissertation expands the traditional model of human behavior within the BPC model. All three essays involve heterogeneity. All model relatively simple agents playing a common social dilemma repeatedly with other randomly chosen agents from a large population. In the first essay agents come to their beliefs in different ways. In the second their social preferences differ. The third explains how heterogeneity could result given a new version of the public goods game with punishment. All three can predict high levels of cooperative behavior. This dissertation explores the state of the art in three areas. Chapter 2 models a heterogeneous population of artificial agents playing the Trust Game. Individuals learn which strategies yield the higher payoff according to one of a number of different learning rules. Given homogeneous agents, it is not likely that the most widely used learning models in economics will lead to much if any trustworthiness except by mistake. We show that heterogeneous learning can predict significant levels of trustworthiness and trust when the popular optimizing learning types are joined by Pavlovian and Conformist learners. In the model presented in Chapter 3 agents are heterogeneous in terms of their social preferences. I first review the literature on self and other regarding preferences revealing the deficiencies in existing models. Then I simulate mini punishment games with heterogeneous preferences. This model allows for selfish, altruistic, reciprocal, spiteful and egalitarian preferences using different parameterizations of the same function. With homogeneous preferences of any type the model predicts zero punishment and either near unanimous cooperation or defection. Alternatively, the coexistence of significant punishment, contributions and defection may be explained with heterogeneous agents. Chapter 4 presents a version of the public goods game with punishment. Socially costly punishment maintains cooperation and is shown to be stable in a single stage N-player game with mutation. In this game effort exerted during punishment is effort that would otherwise be available for primary public goods provision. This shows a reciprocity norm could evolve in large groups given selfish agents without the benefit of reputation.

This thesis studies identification and testability for three models of choice under uncertainty. Identification is concerned with whether the parameters of a specified model are uniquely recoverable from observable behavior. Testability is concerned with how to test the consistency between the model’s predictions and choice data. All models considered deviate from classic models in one of two ways: either randomness in preference varies with decision problems, or preferences violate expected utility theory. Chapter 1 studies a model of rational inattention. An agent can acquire costly information about uncertain states of the world before choosing an action from a menu. The choice of information depends on the menu of actions and is assumed unobservable. Due to the unobservability of private information, the choice of action appears random from an outside analyst’s perspective. I show that, given only stochastic choice from menus of actions, an analyst can identify the agent’s risk attitude, prior belief, and information cost function. Chapter 2 studies an instance of the classic question of whether preference can be identified from the choice behavior it implies. Specifically, the question is whether the distribution of risk preferences is identifiable from random choice of lotteries. It is known that the answer is affirmative under random expected utility. I show that such uniqueness fails if risk preferences are not restricted a priori to conform to expected utility, for instance, if they are assumed to conform only to weighted utility. I discuss the reason for such non-uniqueness and argue that uniqueness may be restored if data includes the joint distributions of choice across a limited number of feasible sets. Chapter 3 studies how to test non-expected utility theory given that data contain only finitely many observations on choice of lottery. While consistency of data with expected utility has been thoroughly studied in the literature, I derive conditions on data that are both necessary and sufficient for consistency with maximization of a betweenness preference. The conditions employ novel geometric arguments and provide a more stringent test than what is used in the experimental literature, which is to check for direct violations of the key axiom.

Abstract not available

The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, an alternative microfoundation for mark-up pricing over the business cycle is developed. Second, the macroeconomic implications of this microfoundation are examined and an alternative theory of the relationship between mark-up pricing and accumulation is advanced. Three major hypotheses are considered. It is hypothesized that an optimal cyclical pricing policy for an oligopolistic price leader faced with dynamic cost and demand behavior and international competition is a variable mark-up. That is, the mark-up rises from initial trough until the midexpansion of the typical business cycle and then declines from that point until the terminal trough. Secondly, it is hypothesized that increases in the degree of competition increase the cyclical flexibility of the optimal mark-up policy. That is, the absolute value of mark-up expansion and contraction amplitudes increase as competition intensifies. Thirdly, it is hypothesized that the relationship between mark-up pricing and accumulation is a contradictory one. That is, the variable mark-up solution serves as the microfoundation for a profit squeeze theory of the business cycle. A critical evaluation of the post-Keynesian pricing and accumulation literatures serves as the basis for the alternative micro model developed. The model effectively integrates the interaction between a dynamic cost structure and competitive constraints on pricing by considering the trade-off between the mark-up and market share that occurs in the maximization of present value. In an extension of the model, the linkage between the firm's investment and mark-up decisions is considered. The model shows that such behavior is responsible for a business cycle. Support for the hypotheses is obtained from simulation results and empirical evidence on profit margins and international competition compiled for five business cycles between 1949 and 1975.