Abstract not available.

Abstract not available.

Abstract not available.

Household food budgets offer a window on consumers' demand for convenience. During the 1980s and 1990s, three shifts likely promoted an increase in the share of the food budget devoted to convenient meal options, namely meals out and prepared foods: the growing number of hours that women spent in paid work, the growing opportunity cost of women's time spent doing housework, and the drop in the price of food relative to all other goods. I test whether the impact of these economic trends (on food budget allocation) was mediated by a change in the impact of children on household meal allocation. I find support for this hypothesis in a model of food away expenditures, which likely reflects two unmeasured shifts. First, (own) child care and household production of meals apparently became substitutes rather than complements. Second, a range of both prepared foods and family-friendly restaurants became available. The growing demand for time-saving meal options, including frozen food and meals out, has important implications for a core determinant of living standards: the ability to harness scale economies from home production of meals. I test whether greater reliance on convenient meals reduced household-level economies of scale. Other factors could mediate against, or even offset such a loss, including technological advances in the production and distribution of food. Using Engel curve analyses, I find that scale economies fell from 1980 to 2000, thereby reducing living standards; my lower- and upper-bound estimates of the drop are 44 percent and 110 percent respectively. Economies of scale are not simply a function of household size and composition, as standard equivalence scaling techniques suggest; they are affected by the ways that households trade non-market work and market substitutes. This dissertation contributes to the small literature that challenges the validity of fixed-parameter equivalence scales, such as the per capita scale, which ignore household production. I first attach plausible values to scale parameters and then compare equivalent-income trajectories of parents and non-parents across (standard) fixed parameter and (non-standard) time-varying equivalence scales. I present plausible lower- and upper-bound estimates of the rise in income inequality between parents and non-parents.

This dissertation claims that from 1879 until the early 1970s organized baseball players labored under a unique form of slavery. An analysis is provided of the economics surrounding organized baseball, the culture interpreting and describing the treatment of players, and the laws and rules structuring organized baseball to argue that the baseball industry resembled slavery more than it resembled any other social structure. The dissertation also discusses the struggle that took place within and outside of this slavery to liberate the “boys of summer” from their contractual bondage. This struggle culminated in 1976 with the introduction of free agency and the elimination of the reserve clause in organized baseball, setting in motion a transition to capitalism from this slavery. Ironically, ballplayers had previously labored under capitalism in the nineteenth century until escalating labor costs and player movement from team to team led to a transition to the slavery from which the players would not be liberated until 1976. Following this discussion, the dissertation turns to a careful analysis of this new capitalist economic structure that emerged after 1976. It examines how clubs become complex sites of revenue flows not only from baseball, but also from broadcasting, the state, concessions, luxury seating, etc. The dissertation then examines the impact of these flows on the actors and structures inside and outside of organized baseball. Through its study of organized baseball, this dissertation allows for a new way of thinking about the organization of an industry and the struggles between labor and management within that industry. It also offers a new way to conceptualize the relationship between the law, culture, and economics. By studying organized baseball, this dissertation provides a new and unique understanding of the labor struggles in organized baseball, the relationship between baseball and the state, and the relationships between individual clubs. It thus allows for a more generalized understanding of labor-management conflicts as well as conflicts between industry and the state.

My dissertation research is motivated by the growing participation of African women in migration streams long dominated by men. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence from my field research on the rural-urban migration of women in Ghana, I explore the role of social norms in shaping migration and remittance behavior in developing countries. Existing studies of the impact of migrant remittances on intra-household allocation are based on datasets that assume that remittances flow to a unified household, in which the household head receives remittances and makes decisions about their use. In contrast, this study makes use of a unique dataset generated during my field research that provides detailed information not only on migration, remittances and household expenditures, but also on the identities of the remitters and recipients of remittances in 181 rural households in northern Ghana. The study also draws on in-depth interviews with migrants, household and community members to understand how social norms influence migration and remittance behavior. I find that gendered social norms play an important role in migration and remittance decisions, so that gender becomes an important determinant of who migrates and who sends remittances, to whom, and why. In particular, I find that female migrants often direct their remittances to other women, thereby creating female-centered networks of remittance flows within the household. To determine the effect of this on intra-household resource allocation, I analyze the impact of remittances from female migrants on education expenditure. I find that migrant households in which women are the primary remitter or recipient of remittances spend significantly more on education per child of school-going age than do other migrant households. By taking an intra-household approach to the analysis of migration and remittances that emphasizes the role of gendered social norms in migration and remittance decisions, this research contributes to the growing body of knowledge of how gender shapes migration outcomes. More importantly, by drawing attention to the positive development outcomes that could result from the migration of women, this research strengthens the case for formulating policies to improve the working and living conditions of women migrants around the world.

This dissertation explores the impact of the “threat effects” of foreign direct investment on labor markets in the United States. In this context, the term “threat effect” refers to the use by employers of the implicit or explicit threat that they will move all or part of their production to a different location, even if they do not actually do so. Some economists have argued that increased capital mobility, by making such threats more credible, enhances the bargaining power of employers relative to workers through this threat effect channel. Using game theoretic and econometric analysis I found that the threat effect of capital mobility exerts a large and statistically significant negative influence on wages.

This dissertation inspects the underlying reasons of demand for social protection policies. It investigates the relationship between labor market risks and preferences for social insurance with a particular emphasis on unemployment insurance. Redistributive and social insurance motives are analyzed jointly. To that end, income, and occupational unemployment risk are considered as the key determinants. The occupational unemployment rate is treated as an estimate of labor market risk, and it is concluded that this explains the political preferences towards social protection policies. A model of optimal choice with heterogeneous workers, which encompasses both redistribution and social insurance incentives, has been presented. It has been showed that the direction of the relationship between the desired levels of transfer payments and each key determinant depends on the transition probabilities. The claimed positive link between specific human capital investment and social insurance holds only with several restrictions on transition probabilities. Moreover, income inequality, measured as deviation from mean income, has a direct impact on preferences for transfer payments. Then, by employing an ordered-probit estimation procedure, empirical tests both examining cross-country and over time developments have been conducted. The results suggest that risk exposure measured as occupational unemployment rate along with income levels is explanatory for preferences for social insurance, and hence the cross-country variations and developments over time in social protection policies cannot be attributed to the differences in types of human capital investment.

Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of a series of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (e.g. Coase, (1937), Williamson, (1985)). The ultimate right to make decisions that are not subject to a pre-existing contractual arrangement - hereafter referred to as decision-control rights, are assigned to some person or group associated with the enterprise. The entity with decision-control rights has the final say over how to organize essential firm operations that range from the determination of production techniques, to deciding how to monitor or compensate the firm's members. To the extent that firm members have competing interests or are asymmetrically affected by such decisions, those members with decision-control rights may be confronted with important normative issues regarding which firm objectives should be pursued. In my dissertation, I employ a behavioral economic perspective in order to examine how workplace governance practices interact with both the level of satisfaction and motivation of workers. In the first essay of the dissertation, I collected data from a real-effort experiment to compare changes in the performance of research participants that were subjected to an identical set of wage incentives that were either implemented (1) endogenously by the group to which subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only one member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random process completely exogenous to the group. The 3 (3 distinct decision-control rights regimes) X 2 (2 distinct incentive contracts) between-subjects design allows for a clean comparison of performance under different decision-control rights treatments. I report evidence suggesting that the decision-control rights arrangement used to select the compensation contract can significantly influence the subsequent level of performance of research subjects. The second essay (co-authored with Michael Carr), analyzes the relative effects of voice, autonomy, and wages in explaining job satisfaction using subjective evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004 wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). We show that the amount of autonomy and voice that a worker has over the firm is an important omitted variable, biasing the estimated coefficient on the wage upwards. And, conditional upon having a job, voice and autonomy are considerably more important determinants of job satisfaction than the wage. The final essay offers a critique of the traditional economics of work organization in consideration of the literature developed in behavioral and experimental economics. I argue that many models of worker motivation developed using the rational choice model (RCM) carry the cost of ignoring common sentiments and behaviors that have been systematically demonstrated in experimental studies. After providing an extensive review of the experimental economics literature as it may inform various workplace organizational faculties, I conclude that the literature suggests that establishment of work teams and incentive schemes that reward teams for collective success would carry the expectation of sustained satisfaction and productivity of workers more than firm environments that rely on employee competition as a motivational device.

The temporary help supply (THS) industry is an ideal prism through which to view the labor market. As one of the fastest growing industries in the United States it is an important phenomenon in its own right. As a labor market intermediary which weakens the attachment between employer and employee the industry is indicative of larger changes in the organization of labor relations. Finally, as an industry two thirds of whose employees are female, it captures some of the dynamics of the way in which gender operates in the labor market. The dissertation considers three aspects of the temporary help industry. First, the relationship between the temporary help industry and the increase in female labor force participation rates is considered. A common argument in the literature is that women with family responsibilities choose THS employment because of the flexibility it affords. Using Current Population Survey microdata tapes, this hypothesis is tested and rejected. Instead, I argue that the gender of the worker is a salient feature in the determination of occupational characteristics. This is in contrast to other political economy models which view the labor market as divided into good jobs and bad jobs, with workers then allocated according to their position in a social hierarchy. Second, if growth in the industry is not being driven by employee preferences, what is driving it? Explicitly incorporating conflict into the labor market, I argue that part of the markup, i.e. the difference between what the THS firm pays the worker and what it charges its client firms, is the cost of disciplining a worker who otherwise has little stake in the company's future and therefore might incur productivity problems for the client firm. Finally, I discuss the conditions under which reliance on a temporary help firm is a viable option for employers. Using annual data from County Business Patterns I demonstrate that neither cyclical nor secular variability in demand nor the growth of service employment fully explain the growth of THS employment. Rather, THS employment reflects structural change in the system of labor relations.