In this study I examine the joint effect of explanations and monetary incentives on employees' effort allocation decisions in a multi-action setting. A rich literature in economics indicates that monetary incentives substantially influence employees' decisions. This literature demonstrates that the size of the incentive for a given performance measure should consider the measure's sensitivity, congruence and precision. Research in psychology demonstrates the decision influencing effects of explanations (a non-monetary factor) on employees' decisions through perceptions of fairness. I expect that effort allocation decisions are influenced both by explanations and monetary incentives: I hypothesize that providing reasonable and complete explanations substantively alter agents' action choices relative to a setting with monetary incentives alone. Using student subjects in experiments, I find that monetary incentives matter. Moreover, for sizeable monetary incentives, providing a detailed explanation modifies behavior favorably relative to when an unclear explanation is provided. However, for all of the considered monetary incentives, merely requesting a desired course of action is also enough to modify behavior favorably. This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing evidence of a decision influencing benefit associated with the use of explanations such as causal maps employed by firms adopting the balanced scorecard. This study also contributes to the organizational justice literature by providing evidence regarding the interaction effect of multiple antecedents of justice.

In this study, employees are given autonomy in effort allocation across two tasks - complex and simple tasks, where the return to the organization is significantly higher for the complex task requiring high skill than for the simple task requiring low skill. An unavoidable feature of multi-task settings is that effort expended on one task detracts from effort that can be expended on another task. This effort trade-off among tasks becomes problematic when the returns from different tasks are unequal, with important consequences for a firm's overall performance. The design of management accounting control systems in such multi-task setting is difficult because organizations have to achieve multiple objectives: to improve productivity on both simple and complex tasks (i.e., performance) and to direct employee effort to more complex tasks given that the complex tasks are more valuable to firms (i.e., effort allocation). In a laboratory experiment, I examine the effects of two motivational mechanisms, financial compensation and relative performance information (RPI), on employee performance and effort allocation between simple and complex tasks. I find that the effects of RPI and financial compensation are independent such that each motivational mechanism affects performance and effort allocation separately. In addition, I find that the effects of RPI or financial compensation depend on whether a worker is a top performer or a bottom performer. Also, findings demonstrate that the effects of these motivational mechanisms on employee effort allocation and performance depend on the complexity of the task. Future research studies and managers who design incentive systems should consider the implementation of different types of incentives for different performer levels. Organizations should consider the degree of complexity of the tasks that workers must perform in multi-task settings.

La recherche en gestion de la force de vente concernant les produits du luxe en est à ses prémices. Compte tenu du poids accru des marques de luxe et des perspectives futures très prometteuses, il importe d’enrichir la recherche et de comprendre les leviers de ventes des produits de luxe. L’industrie du luxe dispose de deux voies d’accès aux consommateurs finaux. D’une part, un réseau spécialisé / dédié contrôlé directement par les fabricants du luxe et d’autre part, des boutiques généralistes multi-marques (en dehors du contrôle des fabricants du luxe). Une part importante des ventes de produits de luxe est réalisée dans ces boutiques non dédiées au luxe où de multiples marques de luxe coexistent et côtoient d’autres marques aux divers statuts. Cette thèse s’attache à expliquer le niveau d’effort que la force de vente de ces boutiques généralistes va dédier aux marques de luxe. Cette thèse repose sur une vaste littérature sur la dissonance cognitive et la théorie de l’identité sociale / The domain of sales management research for luxury products is still nascent. With the persistent growth of luxury brands and ongoing optimistic projections for the future, it is imperative to take a step forward in this field and understand the triggers that enable luxury sales. The personal luxury goods industry operates via two routes to market – “retail” (directly controlled by luxury brand manufacturers) and “wholesale” (outside of luxury brand manufacturer’s control). A significant amount of sales happen via the “wholesale” route, in multi-brand stores where a mix of luxury brands co-exists with non-luxury brands. Drawing from a literature on cognitive dissonance and social identity theory, using multilevel methods, this dissertation raises the question of how to predict salespeople’s effort allocation towards a focal luxury brand in this multi-brand selling environment